On the Design and Analysis of Incentive Mechanisms in Network Science by Gao, Yang
ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: ON THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
OF INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
IN NETWORK SCIENCE
Yang Gao, Doctor of Philosophy, 2014
Dissertation directed by: Professor K. J. Ray Liu
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
With the rapid development of communication, computing and signal process-
ing technologies, the last decade has witnessed a proliferation of emerging networks
and systems, examples of which can be found in a wide range of domains from on-
line social networks like Facebook or Twitter to crowdsourcing sites like Amazon
Mechanical Turk or Topcoder; to online question and answering (Q&A) sites like
Quora or Stack Overflow; all the way to new paradigms of traditional systems like
cooperative communication networks and smart grid.
Different from tradition networks and systems where uses are mandated by
fixed and predetermined rules, users in these emerging networks have the ability
to make intelligent decisions and their interactions are self-enforcing. Therefore, to
achieve better system-wide performance, it is important to design effective incentive
mechanisms to stimulate desired user behaviors. This dissertation contributes to the
study of incentive mechanisms by developing game-theoretic frameworks to formally
analyze strategic user behaviors in a network and systematically design incentive
mechanisms to achieve a wide range of system objectives.
In this dissertation, we first consider cooperative communication networks and
propose a reputation based incentive mechanism to enforce cooperation among self-
interested users. We analyze the proposed mechanism using indirect reciprocity
game and theoretically demonstrate the effectiveness of reputation in cooperation
stimulation. Second, we propose a contract-based mechanism to incentivize a large
group of self-interested electric vehicles that have various preferences to act coordi-
nately to provide ancillary services to the power grid. We derive the optimal contract
that maximizes the system designer’s profits and propose an online learning algo-
rithm to effectively learn the optimal contract. Third, we study the quality control
problem for microtask crowdsourcing from the perspective of incentives. After ana-
lyzing two widely adopted incentive mechanisms and showing their limitations, we
propose a cost-effective incentive mechanism that can be employed to obtain high
quality solutions from self-interested workers and ensure the budget constraint of
requesters at the same time. Finally, we consider social computing systems where
the value is created by voluntary user contributions and understanding how user
participate is of key importance. We develop a game-theoretic framework to for-
mally analyze the sequential decision makings of strategic users under the presence
of complex externality. It is shown that our analysis is consistent with observations
made from real-word user behavior data and can be applied to guide the design of
incentive mechanisms in practice.
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With the rapid development of communication, computing and signal process-
ing technologies, the last decade has witnessed a proliferation of emerging network-
s/systems that help to promote the connectivity of people to an unprecedentedly
high level. Examples of these emerging networks can be found in a wide range
of domains from online social networks like Facebook or Twitter to crowdsourcing
sites like Amazon Mechanical Turk or Topcoder where people solve various tasks
by assigning them to a large pool of online workers; to online question and an-
swering (Q&A) sites like Quora or Stack Overflow where people ask all kinds of
questions; and all the way to new paradigms of traditional systems like coopera-
tive communication networks and smart grid. Within these networks, individuals
are closely connected with each other via various relationships and achieve their
utilities through interactions with others. Therefore, to provide fundamental guide-
lines for the better system design, it is important to model, analyze and steer user
behaviors and interactions for these emerging networks.
Different from traditional networks and systems where uses are mandated by
fixed and predetermined rules, user interactions in emerging networks are generally
self-enforcing. On the one hand, users in these systems have great flexibilities in
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their actions and have the ability to observe, learn, and make intelligent decisions.
On the other hand, due to the selfish nature, users will act to pursuit their own
interests, which oftentimes conflicts with other users’ objectives and the system
designer’s goal. These new features call for new theoretical and practical solutions
to the designs of emerging networks. How can system designers design their systems
to resolve the conflicting interests among users? And given various and conflicting
interests among users, how to achieve a desired system-wide performance?
The above questions motivate the study of incentive mechanisms in network
science. Incentive mechanisms refer to schemes that aim to steer user behaviors
through the allocation of various forms of rewards such as monetary rewards, vir-
tual points and reputation status. Plenty of empirical evidence can be found in the
social psychology literature that demonstrate user behaviors in emerging networks
are indeed highly influenced by these rewards [1] - [6]. For example, it has been
shown in [3] and [4] that increased monetary rewards lead to more active user par-
ticipation on crowdsourcing sites. Similarly, Anderson et al. reported in [6] that
badges, a particular form of reputation status, are effective in stimulating desired
user behaviors in social computing systems. Although we can learn from the social
psychology literature on what factors influence user behaviors and thus can be used
as rewards, how to allocate these rewards to achieve desired user behaviors is still
not well understood, which leads to ad hoc or poor designs of incentive mechanism-
s in many emerging networks in practice. How can we understand fundamentally
about user behaviors under presence of rewards in emerging networks? Moreover,
based on such understandings, how should system designers of emerging networks
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design incentive mechanisms to achieve various objectives in a systematic way?
It is the focus of this dissertation research to address these questions. In par-
ticular, towards a fundamental understanding of user behaviors, game theory is a
powerful mathematical tool that studies the strategic interactions among multiple
decision makers [7]. It has been wildly accepted and adopted in many fields such
as economics, politics, business, social sciences and biology. In this dissertation re-
search, we develop game-theoretic frameworks to formally model user participation
and interactions under various scenarios in emerging networks. Using these frame-
works, we can theoretically analyze and predict user behaviors through equilibrium
analysis. Finally, based on our analysis, we optimize in a systematical way the
design of incentive mechanisms for emerging networks to achieve a wide range of
system objectives and analyze their performances accordingly.
Since different emerging networks vary from each other in terms of system
designer’s objectives and constraints as well as the interdependency among users,
incentive mechanisms should be designed and analyzed for specific systems and take
into account their unique characteristics. In this dissertation of research, we study
the design and analysis of incentive mechanisms in network science by discussing
four typical emerging networks. Each of these four networks has unique challenges
in terms of incentive mechanism design and they together cover a wide range of
scenarios, as illustrated below.
• In the first case, we consider wireless cooperative communication networks
where each user can benefit from the help from his peers and yet helping
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others is costly. Therefore, a key incentive challenge here is how to encourage
cooperation among users and suppress the selfish free-riding behavior.
• In the second case, we consider vehicle-to-grid (V2G) networks where a large
number of electric vehicles (EVs) are grouped together to provide ancillary
services to the power grid. A key challenge faced by the system designer is
how to stimulate self-interested EVs to act coordinately to accomplish the
service request.
• In the third case, we consider microtask crowdsourcing, where the requester
solve large volumes of small tasks by assigning them to a large pool of online
strategic workers. The requester hope to obtain high quality solutions from
workers and yet his budget is limited. Therefore, how should the requester
design incentive mechanisms to collect high quality solutions in a cost-effective
way?
• In the fourth case, we study social computing systems where values are created
by the voluntary contributions of sequentially arrived users. In these systems,
the key questions to ask are how to understand systematically the sequential
user behaviors in the presence of complex externality among users as well as
how to design incentive mechanisms to induce active participation and high
quality contribution from users.
In a nutshell, the study of incentive mechanisms is of key importance in net-
work science as networks and systems are evolving to become more and more in-
telligent and self-enforcing. In this dissertation, to enable a better system design
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for networks and systems, we develop game-theoretic frameworks to formally un-
derstand strategic user behaviors and to design effective incentive mechanisms in a
systematic manner.
1.2 An Overview of Incentive Mechanisms in Network Science
As discussed above, incentive mechanisms refer to schemes that aim to steer
user behaviors through the allocation of various forms of rewards such as monetary
rewards, virtual points and reputation status. Various incentive mechanisms have
been designed and analyzed for a wide range of networks and systems. Depending
on the incentive tools they adopt, incentive mechanisms can be broadly classified
into three categories [8]: direct reciprocity based, reputation based and payment
based mechanisms, which we will discuss separately in the following subsections.
1.2.1 Direct Reciprocity Based Incentive Mechanisms
Direct reciprocity based incentive mechanisms are built on top of repeated
interactions between a pair of users. The key idea is to allow a user to condition
his/her current action on the history of how the opponent treats him/her. When a
pair of users interact with each other repeatedly, direct reciprocity based mechanisms
can be designed to promote cooperation among self-interested users and therefore
lead to better system-wide performance.
The main advantage of direct reciprocity base mechanisms is of their sim-
plicity: it stimulates cooperation among users without the requirement of further
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resources such as payment infrastructures or reputation systems. As a result, direct
reciprocity based incentive mechanisms have been applied in many networks where
users interact with each other in pairs repeatedly and where additional resources
may be difficult to obtain [9] - [12]. A famous example is the tit-for-tat incentive
mechanism employed by the BitTorrent file-distribution network, which has been
shown to greatly promote cooperative behaviors among self-interested users [9]. In
[11], Yu and Liu considered direct reciprocity based mechanisms in ad hoc networks
and derived a set of optimal cooperation strategies for users using various optimality
criteria, such as Pareto optimality, fairness, and cheat-proofing. In [12], the direct
reciprocity based cooperation stimulation schemes have been studied for mobile ad
hoc networks under scenarios where noisy and imperfect observations exist.
Nevertheless, the major drawback of direct reciprocity based incentive mecha-
nisms is that their effectiveness relies heavily on the assumption that the interactions
between any pair of users are long-lasting. When this assumption is not true, ac-
cording to the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma and the backward induction principle
[7], the unique Nash equilibrium is to always play non-cooperatively. Such an as-
sumption limits the application of direct reciprocity based incentive mechanisms
in many scenarios. For example, in wireless multi-user cooperative communication
networks, instead of having a fixed relay, source nodes select different relay nodes at
each time to achieve higher order of spatial diversity and thus better performance,
which makes the direct reciprocity based mechanisms unapplicable.
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1.2.2 Reputation Based Incentive Mechanisms
As discussed above, a major limitation of direct reciprocity based incentive
mechanisms is the implicit assumption that interactions between any pair of users
are long-lasting. This is mainly because a user’s behavior will not be evaluated
by other players except his/her opponents in direct reciprocity based mechanisms.
Clearly, a more effective mechanism should take into account not only direct eval-
uations from the opponents but also evaluations from other observers, which leads
to the notion of “indirect reciprocity”, which is the foundation of reputation based
incentive mechanisms. Indirect reciprocity is a key concept in explaining the evo-
lution of human cooperation and was first studied under the name of third party
altruism in 1971 [13]. Later, such a concept drew great attentions in both areas of
economics [14] and evolutionary biology [15] [16]. The basic idea behind indirect
reciprocity is that through building up a reputation and social judgement system,
cooperation can lead to a good reputation and expect to be rewarded by others
in the future. Indirect reciprocity based incentive mechanisms have been applied
to stimulate cooperation among self-interested users in various networks, including
packet forwarding networks [17], multi-user cooperative communication networks
[87] and cognitive radio networks [19]. In these works, the performances of indirect
reciprocity based mechanisms are studied formally using game-theoretic frameworks,
which theoretically justifies the use of reputation in cooperation stimulation.
In addition to theoretical analysis, the use of reputation based mechanisms has
also been studied empirically in many networks [20] - [23]. Particularly, in [22], a
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local reputation system was first set up based on shared history among the neighbor-
hood nodes and then used to identify and punish non-cooperative nodes. The work
in [23] proposed to enforce cooperation through a global reputation mechanism.
Another variation of reputation based mechanisms are mechanisms that use
badges. Badges are employed by many social computing systems to recognize users
for various kinds and degrees of overall contributions to the site. In [6], Anderson et
al. proposed a model for user behavior on social media sites in the presence of badges.
Through analyzing the best strategy of users, they find that users are influenced by
badges, which is also consistent with aggregated user behavior they observed from
Stack Overflow. In [24], Easley and Ghosh analyzed equilibrium existence and
equilibrium user participation for two widely adopted badge mechanisms: badges
with absolute standards and badges with relative standards.
1.2.3 Payment Based Incentive Mechanisms
Payment based mechanisms are the most commonly used type of incentive
mechanisms. Through the design of two key components, i.e., the allocation rule
and the pricing rule, payment based mechanisms can be used by the system designer
to achieve a variety of objectives, such as maximizing revenue and maximizing social
welfare. Applications of payment based mechanisms can be found in a wide range
of networks and systems as discussed in the following.
Payment based incentive mechanisms have been widely used to stimulate co-
operation for wireless ad hoc networks [25] - [27] and peer-to-peer networks [28]
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[29]. The cooperation stimulation problem has been studied in multiuser coopera-
tive communication networks [30], where a two-level Stackelberg game was used to
jointly address the incentive issue, relay selection and resource allocation problems
in a distributed manner. In [31], the pricing game was studied under scenarios where
channel state information (CSI) was held privately.
There are also a large number of payment based mechanisms in smart grid
systems. For example, pricing based methods have been used to address the demand
response problem in [32] - [37], where users are offered different prices so as to
incentive desired electricity usage patterns that are beneficial to the grid. Moreover,
in [38], Wu et al. studied the problem of coordinating a large group of selfish and
intelligent EVs to provide frequency regulation to the power gird and proposed a
pricing scheme to accomplish the service request at the equilibrium. However, one
major drawback is that they assume a homogeneous setting without taking into
account different preferences of EVs. To address this issue, the authors in [39]
consider a heterogeneous setting and study design of a pricing scheme to effectively
exploit different preferences of EVs.
Another important area where payment based mechanisms are heavily used is
crowdsourcing, where tasks are outsourced to a large pool of unknown online work-
ers. Some crowdsourcing systems are structured as contests, which can be analyzed
from game-theoretic perspectives using all-pay auctions [4] [40] [41]. In addition to
crowdsourcing contests, many crowdsourcing systems focus on microtasks and em-
ploy payment based incentive mechanisms as well to obtain high quality solutions.
In [42], Shaw et al. conducted an experiment to compare the effectiveness of a collec-
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tion of social and financial incentive mechanisms. In [43] and [44], Singer and Mittal
proposed an online mechanism for microtask crowdsourcing where tasks are dynam-
ically priced and allocated to workers based on their bids. In [45], Singla and Krause
proposed a posted price scheme where workers are offered a take-it-or-leave-it price
offer and employed multi-armed bandits to design and analyze the proposed scheme.
Gao et al. studied cost effective incentive mechanisms for microtask crowdsourcing
in [46], where a novel mechanism for quality-aware worker training is proposed to
reduce the requesters cost in stimulating high quality solutions from self-interested
workers.
Instead of monetary rewards, many payment based mechanisms use virtual
points as their stimulation tools. In [47], Ghosh and Hummel studied the issue of
whether, in the presence of strategic users, the optimal outcome can be implement-
ed through a set of mechanisms that are based on virtual points. The incentive
mechanism design problem for online Q&A sites has been studied in [48], where the
objective is to allocate virtual points to incentivize users to contribute their answers
more quickly.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
From the discussion above, it is of key importance to study incentive mecha-
nisms in network science in order to steer user behaviors to achieve desired system
performance. Towards this end, this dissertation develops game-theoretic frame-
works for four typical scenarios in network science to formally understand strategic
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user behaviors and systematically design incentive mechanisms. The rest of the
dissertation is organized as follows.
1.3.1 Cooperation Stimulation for Multiuser Cooperative Communi-
cations (Chapter 2)
Cooperative communications have been viewed as a promising transmit paradig-
m for future wireless networks. Since the viability of cooperative communications
largely depends on the willingness of users to help, it is very important to study the
incentive issues when designing cooperative communication systems. In this chapter,
we propose a cooperation stimulation scheme for multiuser cooperative communica-
tions using indirect reciprocity game. By introducing the notion of reputation and
social norm, rational users who care about their future utilities get the incentive to
cooperate with others. Different from existing works on reputation based schemes
that mainly rely on experimental verifications, we theoretically demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed scheme in two steps. First, we conduct steady state
analysis of the game and show that cooperating with users having good reputation
can be sustained as an equilibrium when the cost-to-gain ratio is below a certain
threshold. Then, by modeling the action spreading at transient states as an evolu-
tionary game, we show that the equilibria we found in the steady state analysis are
stable and can be reached with proper initial conditions. Moreover, we introduce
energy detection to handle possible cheating behaviors of users and study its impact
to the proposed indirect reciprocity game. Finally, simulation results are shown to
11
verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
1.3.2 Contract-Based Mechanism for Vehicle-to-Grid Ancillary Ser-
vices (Chapter 3)
With the foreseeable large scale deployment of electric vehicles (EVs) and the
development of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technologies, it is possible to provide ancillary
services to the power grid in a cost efficient way, i.e., through the bidirectional
power flow of EVs. A key issue in such kind of schemes is how to stimulate a
large number of EVs to act coordinately to achieve the service request. This is
challenging since EVs are self-interested and generally have different preferences
toward charging and discharging based on their own constraints. In this chapter, we
propose a contract-based mechanism to tackle this challenge. Through the design
of an optimal contract, the aggregator can provide incentives for EVs to participate
in ancillary services, match the aggregated energy rate with the service request
and maximize its own profits. We prove that under mild conditions, the optimal
contract-based mechanism takes a very simple form, i.e., the aggregator only needs to
publish two optimal unit prices to EVs, which are determined based on the statistical
distribution of EVs’ preferences. We then consider a more practical scenario where
the aggregator has no prior knowledge regarding the statistical distribution and
study how should the aggregator learn the optimal unit prices from its interactions
with EVs.
12
1.3.3 Cost-Effective Incentive Mechanisms in Microtask Crowdsourc-
ing (Chapter 4)
Recently, microtask crowdsourcing has emerged as an innovative new way to
solve large volumes of small tasks at a much lower price compared with traditional in-
house solutions. Though promising, it suffers from quality problems due to the lack
of incentives. On the other hand, providing incentives for microtask crowdsourcing
is challenging since verifying the quality of submitted solutions is so expensive that
it will negate the advantage of microtask crowdsourcing. We study cost-effective
incentive mechanisms for microtask crowdsourcing in this chapter. In particular, we
consider a model with strategic workers, where the primary objective of a worker
is to maximize his own utility. Based on this model, we first analyze two basic
mechanisms and show their limitations in collecting high quality solutions with
low cost. Then, we propose a cost-effective mechanism that employs quality-aware
worker training as a tool to stimulate workers to provide high quality solutions. We
prove theoretically that the proposed mechanism can be designed to obtain high
quality solutions from workers and ensure the budget constraint of the requester
at the same time. Beyond its theoretical guarantees, we further demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed mechanisms through a set of behavioral experiments.
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1.3.4 Game-Theoretic Analysis of Sequential User Behavior in Social
Computing (Chapter 5)
Social computing systems refer to online applications where values are created
by voluntary user contributions. Understanding how user participate is of key impor-
tance to the design of social computing systems. In many social computing systems,
users decide sequentially whether to participate or not and, if participate, whether
to create a piece of content directly, i.e., answering, or to rate existing content con-
tributed by previous users, i.e., voting. Moreover, there exists an answering-voting
externality as a user’s utility for answering depends on votes received in the future.
We present in this chapter a game-theoretic model that formulates the sequential
decision making of strategic users under the presence of this answering-voting ex-
ternality. We prove theoretically the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy
equilibrium. To further understand the equilibrium participation of users, we show
that there exist advantages for users with higher abilities and for answering earli-
er. Therefore, the equilibrium exhibits a threshold structure and the threshold for
answering gradually increases as answers accumulate. We further extend our result-
s to a more general setting where users can choose endogenously their efforts for
answering. To show the validness of our model, we analyze user behavior data col-
lected from a popular Q&A site Stack Overflow and show that the main qualitative
predictions of our model match up with observations made from the data. Finally,
we formulate the system designer’s problem and abstract from numerical simula-
tions several design principles that could potentially guide the design of incentive
14
mechanisms for social computing systems in practice.
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Chapter 2
Cooperation Stimulation for Multiuser Cooperative Communications
In recent years, cooperative communications [49] have been viewed as a promis-
ing transmit paradigm for future wireless networks. Through the cooperation of re-
lays, cooperative communications can improve communication capacity, speed, and
performance; reduce battery consumption and extend network lifetime; increase
throughput and stability region for multiple access schemes; expand transmission
coverage area; and provide cooperation tradeoff beyond source-channel coding for
multimedia communications [49].
However, most existing works assume by default that users are altruistic and
willing to help unconditionally, regardless of their own utilities, which appears to be
unrealistic in wireless networks where users are rational, intelligent and often do not
serve a common objective. They will and have the capabilities to make intelligent
decisions based on their own preferences. Moreover, since relaying others’ informa-
tion consumes valued resources such as power and frequency, users have no incentive
to help and tend to act selfishly as “free-riders”. In such a case, cooperative com-
munication protocols will fail to achieve good social outcomes without considering
incentive issues. It is therefore of great interest to design effective incentive schemes
that can stimulate cooperation among selfish users.
In this chapter, we propose to employ indirect reciprocity game [17] to stim-
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ulate cooperation among selfish users in a multiuser cooperative communication
network. Indirect reciprocity is a key concept in explaining the evolution of human
cooperation. The basic idea behind indirect reciprocity is that through building up
a reputation and social judgement system, cooperation can lead to a good reputa-
tion and expect to be rewarded by others in the future. Moreover, based on the
indirect reciprocity game modeling, we can theoretically justify the use of reputa-
tion in stimulating cooperation, which is lacked in the current literature. The main
contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows.
• We propose a game-theoretic scheme to jointly consider the cooperation stim-
ulation and relay selection for multiuser cooperative communications based
on indirect reciprocity game. With the proposed scheme, selfish users have
the incentive to cooperate and the full spatial diversity can be achieved when
global CSI is available.
• We conduct steady state analysis of the indirect reciprocity game by formu-
lating the problem of finding the optimal action rule at the steady state as a
Markov Decision Process (MDP). We analyze mathematically all equilibrium
steady states of the game and show that cooperating with users having good
reputation can be sustained as an equilibrium when the cost to gain ratio is
less than a certain threshold.
• To study the transient state of the game, we further model the action spreading
at transient states as an evolutionary game. Then, we show that the equilibria
we found are stable and demonstrate with simulation results that they can be
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reached given proper initial conditions.
• To deal with possible cheating behaviors of users, we introduce energy detec-
tion at the base station (BS) and study its impact to the indirect reciprocity
game.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we describe the
problem formulation and introduce basic components in our system model. Then,
the steady state analysis using MDP is presented in details in Section 2.2. We
model action spreading at the transient state as an evolutionary game in Section
2.3. In Section 2.4, energy detection at the BS is introduced to deal with cheating
behaviors and its impact to the indirect reciprocity game is studied. Finally, we
show the simulation results in Section 2.5 and summarize this chapter in Section
2.6.
2.1 System Model
In this section, we first present our physical layer model which employs the
amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperation protocol and relay selection. Then we show
the proposed incentive scheme using indirect reciprocity game and analyze its over-
head. Finally, the payoff function is discussed.
2.1.1 Physical Layer Model with Relay Selection
As shown in Figure 2.1 (a), we consider a TDMA based multi-user cooperative
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(b)
Figure 2.1: Multi-user cooperative communication system: (a) system model, (b)
time frame structure.
have their own information to be delivered to a base station (BS) d. Without loss of
generality, the transmitted information can be represented by symbols, while nodes
in practice will transmit the information in packets that contains a large number
of symbols. Nodes are assumed to be rational in the sense that they will act to
maximize their own utilities. Throughout this paper, we will use user, node and
player interchangeably.
We divide time into time frames and each time frame is further divided into
N time slots, as shown in Figure 2.1 (b). At each time slot, only one prescribed
node is allowed to transmit and all the remaining N−1 nodes can serve as potential
relays. AF protocol is employed in the system model. As a result, every time slot
will consists of two phases. In phase 1, the source node broadcasts its information
to the BS and all other nodes. Assuming that node i acts as the source node, then
















Pshi,jxi + ni,j, (2.2)
where Ps is the transmitted power at the source node, xi is the transmitted symbol
with unit energy, hi,d and hi,j are channel coefficients from user i to the BS and
user j respectively, and ni,d and ni,j are additive noise. Without loss of generality,
we model the additive noise for all links as i.i.d. zero-mean, complex Gaussian
random variables with variance N0. Moreover, homogeneous channel condition is
considered in this work, where we model channel coefficients hi,d and hi,j as zero-
mean, complex Gaussian random variables with variance σ21 and σ
2
2 respectively for
all i, j ∈ {1, 2, ...N}. We also assume quasi-static channel in our system model,
which means channel conditions remain the same within each time slot and vary
independently from time slot to time slot.
In phase 2, a relay node is selected to amplify the received signal and forward it
to the destination with transmitted power Pr. The received signal at the destination











ni,j + nj,d. (2.3)




Pr|hj,d|2N0 + Ps|hi,j|2N0 +N20
. (2.4)
We adopt two relay selection schemes based on the availability of CSI. If the
BS is assumed to have the global CSI, e.g. BS can collect CSI from all potential
20
relays through feedback channels, then we employ optimal relay selection (ORS), in
which the relay node that can provide the best relayed SNR will be selected to assist
the source node. Since the best relay is selected at each time slot, source nodes can
achieve full spatial diversity if the relay nodes choose to cooperate [49] [50] [51]. On
the other hand, if the BS does not know the global CSI, a random relay selection
(RRS) is employed, in which the BS will randomly choose one node as the relay from
all potential relays with equal probability. Once a relay is selected, it will decide
whether to help according to a certain action rule which maximizes its own payoff
and send its decision back to the BS. If the selected relay node chooses to help, then
the received SNR increment at the BS after the maximal-ratio combining (MRC)






Γi,j,d for RRS if node j is selected.
(2.5)
Note that for RRS, the required CSI of MRC can be obtained by the BS through
channel estimations after the relay selection. In case of the selected relay node
choosing not to help, we assume that the source node will not retransmit its packet
and the system will remain idle during that phase.
2.1.2 Incentive Schemes Based on Indirect Reciprocity Game
In order to stimulate the selected relay node to cooperate, we employ an
incentive scheme based on indirect reciprocity game. Reputation and social norm are
two key concepts in indirect reciprocity game modeling. In particular, a reputation
21









GG GB BG BB
C 1 λ 1− λ 0
D λ 1 0 1− λ
score is assigned to each user at the end of every time slot that reflects the social
assessment toward this user. In this paper, we adopt a binary reputation score,
where users can have either good reputation or bad reputation which are denoted
by G and B respectively. Although more complicated reputation scores can be
considered here, we will show in the rest of this paper that a binary reputation score
is sufficient in sustaining cooperation among rational users. Social norm is a function
used for updating reputation, which specifies what new reputation users will have
according to their performed actions and current reputation. In our system model,
only the selected relay node’s reputation will be updated while the reputation for
source node and unselected relays remains unchanged. Unless otherwise specified,
we will simply use relay or relay node to indicate the selected relay node in the rest
of this paper. Moreover, all reputation updates will be performed at the BS, who
maintains the reputation information of all users.
We design the social norm Q as a function of relay’s current reputation, source
node’s reputation and the relay’s action as
Q : {G,B} × {G,B} × {C,D} 7→ [0, 1], (2.6)
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where C and D stand for cooperation and defection of the relay respectively. The
value of the social norm is designed to be the probability of assigning a good reputa-
tion to the relay. More specifically, for any i, j ∈ {G,B} and k ∈ {C,D}, Q(i, j, k)
stands for the probability of having a good reputation at the end of this time slot
for the relay that currently has reputation i and chooses action k towards the source
node with reputation j. Values of the proposed social norm are shown in Table 2.1,
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that controls the weight of current reputation in
determining the new reputation. When λ gets smaller, the relay’s new reputation
will become less relevant to its current reputation and therefore depend more on
the immediate reputation that is determined by the relay’s action and the source’s
reputation.
An action rule, a = [ aG,G aG,B aB,G aB,B ]
T , is an action table of the
relay, where element ai,j stands for the probability of cooperation given the relay’s
reputation i and the source’s reputation j. For the special case of pure action rules,
elements in the action table can only take values of 0 or 1. In our system model,
every user decides its action rule at the beginning of each time frame, based on the
social norm and reputation distribution of the network.
Finally, we summarize in Algorithm 4 the proposed indirect reciprocity game
for one time frame.
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Algorithm 1 : Proposed Indirect Reciprocity Game in One Time Frame
1. BS notifies users the reputation distribution of the population.
2. Users decide their action rules based on the social norm and reputation distribution.
3. for time slots i=1,2,...,N
• User i broadcasts to the BS and other users.
• BS selects one relay node using ORS or RRS and notifies the selected relay the
source node’s reputation.
• The selected relay decides whether to cooperate according to his/her action rule
and reports his/her decision to the BS.
• The selected relay amplifies and forwards signals for the source if chooses to
cooperate or remains silence if not.
• BS updates the selected relay’s reputation.
2.1.3 Overhead of The Proposed Scheme
In the following, we would like to briefly analyze the overhead of the proposed
scheme. The main overhead introduced by relay selection is the effort paid for
channel estimations. If RRS is employed, two additional channel estimations need
to be performed in each time slot to obtain CSI between the BS and the selected
relay as well as that between the source and the selected relay. This results in a
complexity of O(1), which is with the same order as the traditional TDMA scheme.
If ORS is employed, CSI between the BS and all potential relays as well as that
between the source and all potential relays must be estimated, which leads to a
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complexity of O(N).
Moreover, at each time slot, the BS needs to first notify the reputation score
of the source node to the selected relay node and then update the selected relay’s
reputation at the end. Since only binary reputation scores are considered in this
paper, we can represent each reputation score efficiently using one bit. Therefore,
the communication overhead of reputation update is just 2 bits per time slot, which
is almost negligible compared with the size of users’ packets.
2.1.4 Payoff Functions
In this subsection, we discuss payoff functions in the proposed game. In each
time slot, if the relay chooses to decline the request, both source and relay will
receive a payoff of 0. On the other hand, if the relay chooses to cooperate, then the
source node will receive a gain G while the relay suffers a cost C. Since the realization
of channel is not available to users when they determine their action rules, payoff
functions should be measured in an average sense. In this work, we choose the cost
as a linear function of transmitted power, which is defined as
C = Prc, (2.7)
where c is the cost per unit power. For the gain function, we design it to be a linear
function of the averaged SNR increment as
G = Eh[Γci ] · g, (2.8)
where g is the gain per unit SNR increment. Here, user i is assumed to be the source
node and the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of all channel coeffi-
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cients. Note that other forms of payoff functions can also be similarly considered
and put into the framework of this paper.
Proposition 2.1 Based on the channel models in Section II.A and assuming Ps/N0 






















Proof : For ORS, let Y = max
j 6=i
PrPs|hi,j |2|hj,d|2
Pr|hj,d|2N0+Ps|hi,j |2N0 . According to [[51], (16)],











where β1 = N0/Prσ
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1, β2 = N0/Psσ
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2 and K1(x) is the first-order modified Bessel
functions of the second kind, defined in [[52], (9.6.22)]. Moreover, since Y ≥ 0, we
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Note from (2.11) to (2.12), we approximated K1(x) as given in [[52], (9.6.9)] by
K1(x) ≈ 1/x and (2.13) is obtained using the identity in [[53], (0.155, 4)]. Finally,
26
when Ps/N0  1 and Ps/N0  1, we have for ORS













Since the estimate of G under RRS can be regarded as a special case of that
under ORS with N − 1 = 1, results for RRS follow directly from (2.14).
In practice, the gain can be estimated either using (2.9) or through experiments
conducted at the BS. Let ρ = CG represent the cost to gain ratio of the game, which
can greatly influence user behaviors. Intuitively, it would be more likely for users
to cooperate if ρ is smaller. In this chapter, we restrict that 0 < ρ < 1.
2.2 Steady State Analysis Using MDP
2.2.1 Stationary Reputation Distribution
Reputation is a key concept in indirect reciprocity games. Therefore, one
important aspect of the network state in indirect reciprocity game modeling is the
reputation distribution among the whole population. In this subsection, we first
derive the reputation distribution updating rule. Then we determine the stationary
reputation distribution and define the steady state of the game.
Let xt represents the probability of a user to have good reputation at time
frame t. Then by assuming an action rule a is employed by all users in the network,
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we have
xt+1 = xt [xtdG,G + (1− xt)dG,B] + (1− xt) [xtdB,G + (1− xt)dB,B] ,
= (dG,G − dG,B − dB,G + dB,B)x2t + (dG,B + dB,G − 2dB,B)xt + dB,B,
∆
= fa (xt) , (2.15)
where di,j with i, j ∈ {G,B} is the reputation updating probability which stands
for the probability that the relay will have a good reputation after one interaction,
given that it currently has reputation i and the source’s reputation is j. The di,j
can be calculated based on the social norm in Table 2.1 as follows.
di,j = ai,jQ(i, j, C) + (1− ai,j)Q(i, j,D). (2.16)
Clearly, di,j is a function of the action ai,j and we use di,j instead of di,j(ai,j) just
for notation simplicity. According to Table 2.1 and (2.16), we have
dG,G = aG,G(1− λ) + λ,
dG,B = −aG,B(1− λ) + 1,
dB,G = aB,G(1− λ),
dB,B = −aB,B(1− λ) + (1− λ).
(2.17)
Based on the reputation distribution updating rule in (2.15), we study the
stationary reputation distribution and have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 For any action rule a, there exists a stationary reputation distri-
bution, which is the solution to the following equation
xa = fa(xa). (2.18)
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Proof : First, according to (2.15), the stationary reputation distribution xa
given action rule a, if exits, must be the solution to (2.18). Next, in order to
show the existence of the stationary reputation distribution, we need to verify that
equation (2.18) has a solution in the interval [0, 1]. Let f̃a(x) = fa(x)− x. We have
f̃a(0) = dB,B ≥ 0 and f̃a(1) = dG,G − 1 ≤ 0. Since (2.18) is a quadratic equation,
there must exist a solution in the interval [0, 1].
From Proposition 2.2, we can see that if an action rule a is employed by all
users, then the stationary reputation distribution will be reached. As a consequence,
the game will become stable, which leads to the steady state of the proposed indirect
reciprocity game defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Steady State) (a, xa) is a steady state of the indirect reciprocity
game if a is an action rule that employed by all users and xa is the corresponding
stationary reputation distribution.
2.2.2 Long-Term Expected Payoffs at Steady States
In this subsection, we study the long-term expected payoff functions at the
steady state. Assume that the indirect reciprocity game is in a steady state (a, xa),
i.e. all players choose action rule a and the reputation distribution remains stable
at xa. Let vi,j with i, j ∈ {G,B} denote the expected payoff that a player, currently
having reputation i and being matched with a player with reputation j can have
from this interaction to future. If the player acts as the relay, then its long-term
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expected payoff can be expressed as
uri,j(ai,j) = −Cai,j + δ[di,jxavG,G + di,j(1− xa)vG,B
+ (1− di,j)xavB,G + (1− di,j)(1− xa)vB,B],
(2.19)
where the first term represents the cost incurred in the current interaction and the
second term represents the future payoff, which is discounted by a discounting factor
δ ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand, if the player acts as the source, then the long-term
expected payoff can be written as
usi,j(aj,i) = Gaj,i + δ [xavi,G + (1− xa)vi,B] . (2.20)
Note that only relay’s reputation will be updated. Moreover, by the homogeneous









respectively. Therefore, given that the user is participating
in the interaction, it will act as either the source or the relay with equal probability



















di,jxavG,G + di,j(1− xa)vG,B




Let V = [ vG,G vG,B vB,G vB,B ]
T denote the long-term expected payoff
vector. The following proposition can be derived.
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Proposition 2.3 In the proposed indirect reciprocity game, the long-term expected
payoff vector in a steady state (a, xa) can be obtained as







(1 + dG,G)xa (1 + dG,G)(1− xa) (1− dG,G)xa (1− dG,G)(1− xa)
(1 + dG,B)xa (1 + dG,B)(1− xa) (1− dG,B)xa (1− dG,B)(1− xa)
dB,Gxa dB,G(1− xa) (2− dB,G)xa (2− dB,G)(1− xa)







[ (G − C)aG,G GaB,G − CaG,B GaG,B − CaB,G (G − C)aB,B ]
T , (2.25)
and I is a 4 by 4 identity matrix.
Proof : By rearranging (2.22) into the matrix form, we have
(I− δ
2
Ha)V = ba. (2.26)
To prove (2.23), it suffices to show that matrix (I− δ
2
Ha) is invertible. Since the
row sum of 1
2
Ha is 1 for every row and 0 < δ < 1, by the Gerschgorin theorem and




Ha) < 1, (2.27)
where µ(·) represents the spectral radius. Then, the Corollary C.4 in [55] establishes




2.2.3 Equilibrium Steady State
From above analysis, we can see that each player’s utility depends heavily on
other players’ actions. Therefore, as a rational decision-maker, every player will
condition his/her action on others’ actions. For example, from the social norm in
Table 2.1, we can see that the relay node will have good reputation with a larger
probability by choosing cooperation than by choosing defection when the source
node has good reputation. In such a case, if other players’ action rules favor players
with good reputation, the relay node will choose to help in the current time slot
since he/she will benefit from others’ help in the future. On the other hand, if other
players help good reputation players with a very low probability, then the relay node
may choose not to help since cooperation is costly.
To study these interactions theoretically, we first define a new concept of e-
quilibrium steady state. Then, by modeling the problem of finding optimal action
rule at the steady state as an MDP, we characterize all equilibrium steady states of
the proposed indirect reciprocity game mathematically.
Definition 2.2 (Equilibrium Steady State) (a, xa) is an equilibrium steady s-
tate of the indirect reciprocity game if:
1. (a, xa) is a steady state;
2. a is the best response of any user, given that the reputation distribution is xa
and all other users are adopting action rule a, i.e. the system is in steady
state (a, xa).
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From the definition above, we can see that no user can benefit from any u-
niliteral deviations in an equilibrium steady state. Moreover, determining whether
a steady state is an equilibrium is equivalent to the problem of finding the best re-
sponse of users in this steady state, which can be modeled as an MDP. In this MDP
formulation, the state is the reputation pair (i, j), the action is action rule a, the
transition probability is determined by {di,j} and the reward function is determined
by C, G and the steady state (a, xa). Furthermore, since the transition probability
and the reward function remain unchanged for a given steady state, the proposed
MDP is stationary [55].












which can be solved numerically using the well-known value iteration algorithm [55].
In this work, instead of solving the problem numerically, we will characterize the
equilibrium steady states theoretically by exploring the structure of this problem.
Note that the formulated MDP varies from steady state to steady state and there
are infinitely many steady states, which makes the problem of finding all equilibria
even harder. To make this problem tractable, we derive the following proposition,
which successfully reduces the potential equilibria that are of the practical interests
into the set of three steady states.
Proposition 2.4 In the proposed indirect reciprocity game, if (a, xa) is an equilib-
rium steady state for more than one possible ρ, it must be one of the following steady
states.
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1. (a1, xa1) with a1 = [ 0 0 0 0 ]
T and xa1 = 1/2
2. (a2, xa2) with a2 = [ 1 0 1 0 ]
T and xa2 = 1
3. (a3, xa3) with a3 = [ 0 1 0 1 ]
T and xa3 = 0.
Proof : One necessary condition for a steady state to be an equilibrium is that
any single user has no incentive to deviate from the specified action rule for one













for all i, j ∈ {G,B} and âi,j ∈ [0, 1]. In (2.29), {ai,j} is the steady state action rule
that is employed by all other players and {âi,j} is an alternative action rule for the
player. The second terms on both sides are identical, which is due to the fact that
only relay’s actions will affect the payoffs. Moreover, since only one-shot deviation
is considered here, the long-term expected payoffs starting from next interaction
remain unchanged. After substituting (2.19) into (2.29), we can rewrite (2.29) as
C(âi,j − ai,j) ≥ δ [∆di,jxavG,G + ∆di,j(1− xa)vG,B −∆di,jxavB,G −∆di,j(1− xa)vB,B] ,
(2.30)
where ∆di,j = d̂i,j − di,j and d̂i,j is the reputation updating probability of user using




C − δ(1− λ)rTV
]
(âG,G − aG,G) ≥ 0,∀âG,G ∈ [0, 1]. (2.31)[
C + δ(1− λ)rTV
]
(âG,B − aG,B) ≥ 0,∀âG,B ∈ [0, 1]. (2.32)[
C − δ(1− λ)rTV
]
(âB,G − aB,G) ≥ 0,∀âB,G ∈ [0, 1]. (2.33)[
C + δ(1− λ)rTV
]
(âB,B − aB,B) ≥ 0, ∀âB,B ∈ [0, 1]. (2.34)
In (2.31)-(2.34), V is the long-term expected payoff vector which can be computed
by (2.23) and r = [ xa 1− xa −xa −1 + xa ]T .
Two coefficient terms,
[




C + δ(1− λ)rTV
]
, are crit-
ical here in evaluating the steady state. According to (2.23), we can see that
C − δ(1− λ)rTV = 0 and C + δ(1− λ)rTV = 0 are two linear equations of ρ, each of
which can have at most one solution. Therefore, if an steady state is an equilibrium
for more than one possible ρ, it must satisfy (2.31)(2.33) when C − δ(1− λ)rTV 6= 0
holds and (2.32)(2.34) when C + δ(1− λ)rTV 6= 0 holds.
If
[
C − δ(1− λ)rTV
]
> 0, for (2.31) and (2.33) to be valid, we must have
aG,G = 0 and aB,G = 0. On the other hand, if
[
C − δ(1− λ)rTV
]
< 0, (2.31) and
(2.33) will lead to aG,G = 1 and aB,G = 1. Similarly, from (2.32) and (2.34), we
will have aG,B = 0 and aB,B = 0 if
[
C + δ(1− λ)rTV
]
> 0 as well as aG,B = 1
and aB,B = 1 if
[
C + δ(1− λ)rTV
]
< 0. Moreover, since
[





C + δ(1− λ)rTV
]
< 0 can not be satisfied simultaneously, there are only three
potential equilibrium action rules. The corresponding reputation distributions can
then be calculated respectively according to Proposition 2.2.
Results in Proposition 4 show that steady states in the proposed indirect
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reciprocity game can be broadly categorized into two classes. In the first class,
there are three steady states which are resistant to one-shot deviations and have the
potential to be equilibria for a set of ρ. The second class consists of all remaining
steady states, which either cannot be an equilibrium or can only be an equilibrium
for a specific cost to gain ratio. However, such an equilibrium is not robust to
estimation errors of system parameters, which is highly likely in a multiuser wireless
network scenario, and thus is of no practical interests. Therefore, we only need to
analyze three, instead of infinitely many, steady states to study practical equilibria
of the indirect reciprocity game.
Next, we solve the optimality equations for the three steady states to show
which of them are equilibria and under what conditions they will be. Our main
results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 In the proposed indirect reciprocity game, there are three equilibrium
steady states, which can be given as follows.
1. (a1, xa1) is an equilibrium for all 0 < ρ < 1
2. (a2, xa2) is an equilibrium if 0 < ρ ≤ δ(1−λ)2−δ−λδ
3. (a3, xa3) is an equilibrium if 0 < ρ ≤ δ(1−λ)2−δ−λδ
Proof : Since the formulated MDP for each steady state is stationary, then, according
to Theorem 6.2.7 in [55], it suffices to consider only stationary action rules in order
to find the optimal action rule. At a steady state (a, xa), we can express the long-
term expected payoff that a user choosing action rule â can receive while others are
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d̂i,jxavG,G(â, a) + d̂i,j(1− xa)vG,B(â, a) + (1− d̂i,j)xavB,G(â, a)








δ [xavi,G(â, a) + (1− xa)vi,B(â, a)]
(2.35)




HâV(â, a) + b(â, a), (2.36)
where Hâ is defined in (2.24) with the subscript emphasizing its dependence on
action rule â, and b(â, a) = 1
2




in Proposition 2.3, we have




Moreover, the sufficient and necessary condition for the steady state (a, xa) to be
an equilibrium can be written as
V(a, a) ≥ V(â, a) (2.38)
for all â = [ âG,G âG,B âB,G âB,B ] ∈ [0, 1]4.
In the following, we solve (2.38) based on (2.37) for each of the three steady
states in Theorem 2.1 respectively.
1. When a = [ 0 0 0 0 ]
T and xa = 1/2, we have V(a, a) = 0 and b(â, a) =
−1
2




−1â ≥ 0. (2.39)
Since all elements in matrix Hâ and vector â are nonnegative, we have (Hâ)
nâ ≥











n, we can see that (2.39) holds for all 0 < ρ < 1. There-
fore, (a, xa) is an equilibrium steady state for all 0 < ρ < 1.
2. When a = [ 1 0 1 0 ]
T and xa = 1, based on (2.37), we can have
vG,G(â, a) =
2(1− δ)(G − CâG,G) + δ(1− λ)(G − C)âB,G
2(1− δ)(2− δ(1 + λ+ (1− λ)(âG,G − âB,G)))
, (2.40)
vG,B(â, a) =
ψ1 + ψ2âG,G + ψ3âG,B + ψ4âB,G
2(1− δ)(2− δ(1 + λ+ (1− λ)(âG,G − âB,G)))
, (2.41)
vB,G(â, a) =
(δ(1− λ)G − (2− δ − δλ)C)âB,G
2(1− δ)(2− δ(1 + λ+ (1− λ)(âG,G − âB,G)))
, (2.42)
vB,B(â, a) =
δ(1− δ)(1− λ)(G − CâG,G) + ψ5âB,G + ψ3âB,B
2(1− δ)(2− δ(1 + λ+ (1− λ)(âG,G − âB,G)))
, (2.43)
where
ψ1 = [2− δ(1 + λ)− δ2(1− λ)]G,
ψ2 = −δ(1− δ)(2C + G(1− λ)),
ψ3 = −(1− δ) [δ(1− λ)G + (2− δ(1 + λ+ 2(1− λ)(âG,G − âB,G)))C] ,
ψ4 = δ(1− λ)(G − δC),
ψ5 = δ
2(1− λ)G − δ(1 + λ− 2λδ)C.
Since ψ3 < 0 and the denominator 2(1− δ)(2− δ(1 + λ+ (1− λ)(âG,G − âB,G))) >
0, the long-term expected payoffs are maximized when âG,B = 0 and âB,B = 0.
Then, by maximizing (2.40)-(2.43) with âG,B = 0 and âB,B = 0 over âG,G ∈
[0, 1] and âB,G ∈ [0, 1], we can show that the payoff functions are maximized





3. The steady state with a = [ 0 1 0 1 ]
T and xa = 0 is symmetric with the
previous steady state. Therefore, the same result can be proved in a similar
manner as in 2).
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From Theorem 2.1, we know that the proposed indirect reciprocity game can
have three equilibria in practice. In the first equilibrium, users do not cooperate
at all, which results in a reputation distribution of half and half. In the second
equilibrium, users only cooperate with those having good reputation and all pop-
ulation have good reputation, while in the last equilibrium, users only collaborate
with those having bad reputation and all population have bad reputation. Actually,
it can be seen that the last two steady states are mutually symmetric states of the
game, both of which lead to full cooperation but with different interpretations of
reputation scores. Moreover, results in Theorem 2.1 show that, if the cost to gain
ratio is below a certain threshold, cooperation can be enforced by using the proposed
indirect reciprocity game.
2.3 Evolutionary Modeling of the Indirect Reciprocity Game
2.3.1 Evolution Dynamics of the Indirect Reciprocity Game
The indirect reciprocity game is highly dynamic before it reaches the steady
state. Since the reputation distribution of the whole population and actions adopted
by different users are changing constantly, all users are uncertain about the network
state and each other’s actions. In such transient states, to improve their utilities,
users will try different strategies in every play and learn from the strategy interac-
tions using the methodology of understand-by-building. Moreover, since a mixed
action rule is a probability distribution over pure action rules, users will adjust the
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probability of using a certain pure action rule as the network state evolves. Such
an evolution process can be modeled by replicator dynamics in evolutionary game
theory. Specifically, let pa stand for the probability of users using pure action rule
a ∈ AD, where AD represents the set of all pure action rules. Then, by replicator











where Ua is the average payoff of users using action rule a and η is a scale factor
controlling the speed of the evolution. After discretizing the replicator dynamic











2.3.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
An action rule is asymptotically stable to the replicator dynamics if and only if
it is the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy [56], an equilibrium concept widely adopted
in evolutionary game theory. Let π(a, â) denote the payoff of a player using action
rule a against other players using action rule â. Then, we have the formal definition
of an ESS as follows.
Definition 2.3 An action rule a∗ is an ESS if and only if, for all a 6= a∗,
• equilibrium condition: π(a, a∗) ≤ π(a∗, a∗), and
• stability condition: if π(a, a∗) = π(a∗, a∗), π(a, a) < π(a∗, a).
According to the above definition of ESS, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 2.2 In the indirect reciprocity game, we have
1. For all 0 < ρ < 1, action rule a1 is an ESS at the steady state {a1, xa1},
2. When ρ < δ(1−λ)
2−δ−λδ , action rule a2 and a3 are ESSs at steady states {a2, xa2}
and {a3, xa3} respectivly.
Proof : From the definition of ESS, in order to show an action rule is an ESS, it
suffices to prove that the corresponding equilibrium is strict. When a = a1, we
know from the proof of Theorem 1 that (2.39) holds for all 0 < ρ < 1 and all action
rules â. Moreover, since the row sum of matrix δ
2
Hâ is δ ∈ (0, 1) for every row,
the equality in (2.39) holds if and only if â = a. Therefore, (a1, xa1) is a strict
equilibrium steady state for all 0 < ρ < 1. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem
1, we can also show that (a2, xa2) and (a3, xa3) are strict equilibrium steady states
when 0 < ρ < δ(1−λ)
2−δ−λδ .
From Theorem 2.2, we can see that, when ρ takes value at certain intervals,
equilibrium steady states found in Theorem 1 are also stable in the sense that if such
an action rule is adopted by the majority of the population, then no other action
rule can spread among the population under the influence of replicator dynamics.
2.4 Energy Detection
The indirect reciprocity game discussed so far requires that the relay reports its
action to the BS. However, due to the selfish nature of users, the selected relay will
cheat if cheating can lead to a higher payoff. For example, when the source node has
a good reputation, the relay may notify the BS that it will help but keeping silence
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at the relay phase. The system performance will degrade as a result. To overcome
such limitations, we introduce energy detection at the BS to detect whether or not
the source’s signal is forwarded by the relay.
The hypothesis model of received signals at the relay phase is
H0 : y(t) = n(t), (2.46)
H1 : y(t) =
√
Prhx(t) + n(t), (2.47)
where n(t) is the additive white Gaussian noise, x(t) is the normalized signal for-
warded by the relay, Pr represents the transmitted power of the relay and h is the
channel gain from the relay to the BS. The detection statistics of the energy detector







Then, the BS can decide whether the relay helped forward signals for the source
by comparing the detection statistics S with a predetermined threshold S0. The
probability of false alarm PF and the probability of detection PD for a given threshold
are expressed as
PF = Pr {S > S0 |H0} , (2.49)
PD = Pr {S > S0 |H1} , (2.50)
which can be computed based on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
in [57]. In this work, we regard PF and PD as system parameters and analyze their
impact on user behaviors as follows.
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Figure 2.2: The payoff versus the probability of cooperation in systems without
incentive schemes.
With energy detection, the BS will no longer rely on reports from the relay
and thus can prevent the performance degradation caused by cheating. On the
other hand, however, reputation may be assigned incorrectly due to false alarm
and missing detection. Therefore, after taking the effect of energy detection into
account, the new reputation updating probability di,j can be written as
di,j=[ai,jPD + (1− ai,j)PF ]Q(i, j, C)
+ [ai,j(1− PD) + (1− ai,j)(1− PF )]Q(i, j,D). (2.51)
Then, following the same analysis in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, we study the
indirect reciprocity game with energy detection and obtain the following results.
Corollary 2.1 In the indirect reciprocity game with energy detection, we have
1. The steady state with a = [ 0 0 0 0 ]
T and xa = 1/2 is an equilibrium for
all 0 < ρ < 1
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium evaluation of the game without energy detection.
2. When 0 < ρ ≤ δ(1−λ)(PD−PF )





and the steady state with a = [ 0 1 0 1 ]




3. Action rule a = [ 0 0 0 0 ]
T is an ESS for all 0 < ρ < 1
4. When 0 < ρ < δ(1−λ)(PD−PF )
2−δ−λδ , action rules a = [ 1 0 1 0 ]
T and a =
[ 0 1 0 1 ]
T are ESSs
Proof : Following the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition 2.4 and Theorem
2.1, we can prove 1) and 2). Then, 3) and 4) can be proved in a similar manner as
in the proof of Theorem 2.2.
2.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we conducted numerical simulations to evaluate the proposed
indirect reciprocity game. A fixed-size population with N = 100 is considered
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium evaluation of the game with energy detection.
and the discounting factor δ of each user is set as 0.9. We assume G = 1 in our
simulations.
We first look into the case without reputation and social norm to show the
necessity of cooperation stimulation schemes. We assume one particular user chooses
to cooperate with probability p while all the other users choose to always cooperate.
Figure 2.2 shows payoffs of this particular user versus p under different cost values.
From the figure, we can see that under all cost values, the user can always gain a
higher payoff by cooperating with a lower probability. This is because cooperation is
costly and no incentive scheme is employed. As a result, to maximize their payoffs,
users will choose not to cooperate and act selfishly as free-riders, which leads to the
failure of cooperative communication systems.
In the second simulation, we evaluate the performance of the proposed incen-
tive scheme where λ is set to be 0.5. In Figure 2.3, we assume that the game starts
at steady state (a, xa) with a = [ 1 0 1 0 ]
T and xa = 1. Then we show pay-
offs of a specified user that deviates to action rule [ p 0 p 0 ]
T under different
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Proposed scheme without energy detection
Tit−for−tat without energy detection
Proposed scheme with energy detection
Tit−for−tat with energy detection
Figure 2.5: Comparison of normalized utilities between the indirect reciprocity game
and the tit-for-tat mechanism [9] in the case of unilateral deviations.
cost values. From Figure 2.3, we can see that as the probability of cooperation p
increases, the user’s payoff increases when C = 0.2 and decreases when C = 0.8.
This agrees with the our theoretic derivations in Theorem 2.1 since the threshold
δ(1−λ)
2−δ−λδ = 9/13 according to the simulation settings.
In Figure 2.4, we evaluate the equilibrium steady state of the indirect reci-
procity game with energy detection. In the simulation, the probability of false
alarm PF and the probability of detection PD are set to be 0.1 and 0.9 respectively.
Then, according to Corollary 2.1, the cost-to-gain ratio threshold that enables co-
operation becomes δ(1−λ)(PD−PF )
2−δ−λδ = 36/65 and the stationary reputation distribution
that corresponds to a = [ 1 0 1 0 ]
T is xa =
1−PF
2−PD−PF
= 0.9. Starting from such
steady state, we show the payoff of a particular user that deviates to action rule
[ p 0 p 0 ]
T under different cost values. From the figure, we can see that the user
will have no incentive to deviate from the steady state action rule when C = 0.2
while it will not cooperate when C = 0.8 just as expected.
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Population with good reputation
Population using specified action
Figure 2.6: Population evolution of the game without energy detection (C=0.2).
Next, we compare the performance of the proposed indirect reciprocity game
with that of the tit-for-tat incentive mechanism, which is employed by the BitTorrent
file-distribution system to stimulate cooperative behaviors among users [9]. The
specified user strategy in the tit-for-tat incentive mechanism is to choose cooperation
unless the opponent choose to defect in the previous round. We compare, in Figure
2.5, utilities of a user using the action of pure defection normalized by those of
using the desired actions between the two schemes. All other users are assumed to
adopt the desired actions respectively in both schemes. If the normalized utility is
greater than 1, then deviating from the desired action to the action of pure defection
is profitable. From the results, we can see that the proposed scheme can enforce
cooperation over a much larger range of cost to gain ratios than the tit-for-tat
mechanism. This is because the direct reciprocity model that underlies the tit-
for-tat incentive mechanism assumes implicitly that the interaction between a pair
of users lasts for a long time, which no longer holds in the multi-user cooperative
communications scenario.
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Population with good reputation
Population using specified action
Figure 2.7: Population evolution of the game with energy detection (C=0.2).
In the forth simulation, we study the evolutionary properties of the indi-
rect reciprocity game. The initial probability of choosing a specified action rule
a = [ 1 0 1 0 ]
T is set to be 0.61 while the intial probabilities of choosing other
pure action rules are set equally as 0.4/15. The initial reputation distribution of
the population is assumed to be 1/2. Moreover, we use η = 0.1 in the replicator
dynamics equation. We first study the low cost case where we set C = 0.2. From
Theorem 2.2, we know that the specified action rule is an ESS for both games with
and without energy detection. In Figure 2.6, we show the evolutionary results for
the indirect reciprocity game without energy detection. From Figure 2.6, we can see
that the game convergies to the equilibrium steady state that corresponds to the
action rule a = [ 1 0 1 0 ]
T and remains stable once converges. Therefore, the
1This simulation is intended to show that the specifited action rule a = [ 1 0 1 0 ]
T is an
ESS under low cost case and thus is resistant to the invasion of any other action rules. In practice,
the BS can guide users to adopt the action rule a at the very begining by assigning the initial
reputation according to the stationary reputation distribution xa.
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Population with good reputation
Population using specified action
Figure 2.8: Population evolution of the game without energy detection (C=0.8).
specified action rule is verified to be an ESS for low cost case.
Evolutionary results for the game with energy detection are shown in Figure
2.7. From the figure, we can see that the specified action rule is quickly spread over
the whole population. Moreover, the reputation distribution converges to 0.9 and
then remains stable just as indicated by Corollary 2.1.
We then study the high cost case where we set C = 0.8. In such case, the
cost-to-gain ratio ρ is larger than the thresholds for both games with and without
energy detection. Therefore, the specified action rule is no longer an ESS and the
cooperation can not be sustained. To verify our theoretical results, we show in
Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 the evolutionary results under C = 0.8 for games with
and without energy detection respectively. From Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9, we
can see that for both games the reputation distributions converge to 1/2 and the
probabilities of choosing the specified action eventually become zero. Therefore, the
specified action rule is not an ESS at the high cost case, which coincides with our
results in Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.1.
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Population with good reputation
Population using specified action
Figure 2.9: Population evolution of the game with energy detection (C=0.8).
Finally, we compare the proposed scheme with the tit-for-tat mechanism from
the perspective of population evolution. We set C = 0.5 and assume the initial
probability of choosing the desired action is 0.6 for both schemes. Moreover, for
the proposed scheme, the initial reputation distribution of the population is set as
1/2. For the tit-for-tat mechanism, we consider two actions other than the tit-
for-tat strategy: pure cooperation and pure defection, each of which has an initial
probability of 0.2. In Figure 2.10, we show the population evolution for the case
without energy detection. From the results, we can see that the desired action, a =
[ 1 0 1 0 ]
T , in our scheme is evolutionarily stable while the tit-for-tat stragegy
is vulnerable to invasions of other actions, which again shows that the proposed
indirect reciprocity game is more effective than direct reciprocity based methods.
Results with energy detection are of the similar form as in Figure 2.10 and therfore
are skipped due to page limiations.
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Figure 2.10: Comparison of population evolution between the indirect reciprocity
game and the tit-for-tat mechanism [9].
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a cooperation stimulation scheme for multiuser
cooperative communications using indirect reciprocity game. With the concept of
reputation and social norm, our proposed scheme does not rely on the assumption
that the number of interactions between a pair of users are infinite and therefore
can be incorporated with any optimal relay selection algorithms to achieve full
spatial diversity. Moreover, different from experimental verifications in existing
works, we theoretically justify the use of reputation in stimulating cooperation. In
particular, we prove that cooperation with users having good reputation can be
sustained as an equilibrium given that the cost to gain ratio is under a certain
threshold. By modeling the action spreading as an evolutionary game, we further
show that at low cost case the action rule of relaying information for users with
good reputation is an ESS and therefore resistant to the mutation of any other
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action rules. To take possible cheating behaviors of users into consideration, we
also introduce energy detection at the BS and analyze its impact to the indirect
reciprocity game. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme
in stimulating cooperation among rational and selfish users.
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Chapter 3
Contract-Based Mechanism for Vehicle-to-Grid Ancillary Services
Ancillary services, such as spinning reserve and frequency regulation, support
the reliable operation of power grid by maintaining the balance between generation
and load. Though critical to the power grid, these services are now accomplished
primarily by turning large generators on and off or ramping them up and down,
which are very costly. It has been reported that the cost of ancillary services accounts
for 5− 10% of electric cost in the US [58]. On the other hand, high penetrations of
electric vehicles (EVs) are foreseeable within the next few years due to the increasing
need of reducing oil dependence and improving energy efficiency. It is predicated
in [59] that by 2020, 25% of newly purchased light-duty vehicles should be grid-
enabled EVs. Such a widespread adoption of EVs, together with the development
of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technologies [60], will open new opportunities for the power
grid. Using EVs’ batteries as distributed electricity storage, it is possible to provide
ancillary services to the power grid in a cost efficient way: charging (or discharging)
EVs’ batteries when generation is greater (or less) than load in the power grid.
Since the capacity of an individual EV is limited, a large number of EVs,
from thousands to hundreds of thousands, shall be grouped together to provide
meaningful ancillary services to the power grid [61]. A new player, the aggregator, is
also introduced as a middle man between the power grid and EVs that is responsible
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for the aggregation of EVs. A key issue in V2G ancillary services therefore is to
design effective coordination mechanisms that can be employed by the aggregator
to coordinate a large group of EVs to accomplish the service request.
Recently, a growing body of literature has investigated different charging con-
trol schemes for the aggregator. In [62], Xu and Wong proposed a coordinated
charging control method that uses approximate dynamic programming to minimize
the charging cost and reduce the power losses. Wu et al. proposed algorithms that
help the aggregator to determine the purchase of energy in the day-ahead market
and to distribute the purchased energy to EVs [63]. Among these works, many of
them have studied the use of EVs for ancillary services. Frequency regulation has
been considered in [64], where an optimal centralized control strategy was proposed.
In [65], Sortomme et al. studied the unidirectional V2G and developed an optimal
algorithm for unidirectional regulation.
The viability of previous works [62]-[65] depends on the willingness of EVs to
participate and to act coordinately. In practice, EVs are selfish in that they are
only interested in maximizing their own utilities regardless of whether the ancillary
services can be accomplished or not. Moreover, with the development of smart grid
technologies [66], it is possible for EVs to make intelligent decisions representing
their own interests. Therefore, it is no longer valid to assume that EVs will follow
some controlling policies made by the aggregator unconditionally. Instead, proper
incentive schemes must be designed to stimulate a large group of selfish and intel-
ligent EVs to act coordinately to accomplish the ancillary services. However, the
design of effective incentive schemes is challenging due to the possible information
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asymmetry between the aggregator and EVs. In practice, since EVs generally face
different practical constraints, such as arrival time, departure time, initial battery s-
tate of charge (SOC) and targeted battery SOC, they will have different preferences
toward charging/discharging at different time. Nevertheless, such preferences are
unknown to the aggregator, which makes the task of designing effective incentive
schemes even more challenging.
To tackle this challenge, we first model EV’s preference as a willingness to
pay (WTP) parameter [67] that reflects the private and subjective valuation of each
EV towards charging/discharging its battery. Then, based on this heterogeneous
model, we solve the incentive issue in V2G ancillary services using contract theory,
which studies, in the presence of asymmetric information, how the principal (the
aggregator) delegates an action (charging/discharging at a certain rate) to intelli-
gent and selfish agents (EVs) through a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract [68].
Through the optimal contract design, the aggregator not only can stimulate self-
interested EVs to act coordinately to provide ancillary services to the power grid,
but also maximizes its own profits. We show theoretically that, under mild con-
ditions, the optimal contract takes a very simple form where the aggregator only
needs to publish two optimal unit prices to EVs, one for selling energy and the other
for purchasing energy. Such an optimal contract-based mechanism has a distributed
manner and can be implemented very efficiently with no additional communication
and controlling overhead, compared with traditional pricing schemes.
To determine the optimal unit prices explicitly, the aggregator needs to know
the statistical distribution of EVs’ preferences. We then extend our results to a
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more practical scenario where the aggregator has no prior knowledge regarding the
statistical distribution and study how should the aggregator learn the optimal unit
prices from its interactions with EVs. In such a case, the aggregator naturally faces
an exploration-exploitation tradeoff between choosing the unit prices with the best
predicted performance to maximize immediate utility and trying different unit prices
to obtain improved estimates. Inspired by the well-known UCB1 algorithm [69] in
the machine learning literature, we propose an algorithm for the aggregator to learn
the optimal unit prices. To show the effectiveness of our algorithm, we compare it
with the benchmark case where the aggregator has the prior knowledge and thus
can choose the optimal unit prices at every time slot. We prove theoretically that
the total performance loss of our algorithm compared with the benchmark case over
t time slots, formally defined as regret in Section 3.3, can be upper bounded by
O(log t). In other words, the averaged performance loss will converge to 0 faster
than O( log t
t
) uniformly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we introduce the
system model and problem formulation. The optimal contract design is discussed
in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 considers the scenario where the statistical distribution
of EVs’ preferences is unknown. Finally, we show simulation results in Section 3.4





Figure 3.1: The vehicle-to-grid system model considered in this paper.
3.1 System Model and Problem Formulation
3.1.1 V2G System Model
We consider a V2G system as shown in Figure 3.1. There are a group of N EVs
interested in providing ancillary services to the power grid by charging/discharging
their batteries. One aggregator serves as the middle agent between the power grid
and participating EVs, which can be either an electricity retailer or a third party
business, such as a battery manufacturer, that sees business opportunities in V2G
ancillary services. The aggregator combines the capacity of the N associated EVs
to provide ancillary services at a desired scale. In particular, the aggregator sells the
combined capacity of ancillary services through a contract with power plants or by
bidding directly in the ancillary services market. Once the agreement on capacity is
established, the system operator (SO) dispatches appropriate service request within
the capacity boundary to the aggregator based on real-time operation status of the
power grid. Therefore, the aggregator can focus on coordinating the associated EVs
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to accomplish the service request without caring about the grid side benefit [64].
We divide the daily operation of the power grid into multiple time slots, each of
which corresponds to one service period. At each time slot, the SO sends a service
request to the aggregator indicating the aggregated energy rate needed from the
aggregator in order to accomplish the ancillary service. Denote by ∆ the service
request sent to the aggregator. If ∆ > 0, the aggregator needs to consume power.
If ∆ < 0, the aggregator needs to inject power into the power grid. The service
request is accomplished by the aggregator through coordinating the N associated
EVs to charge/discharge their batteries. However, we assume that the aggregator
has no direct control over the charging/discharging behaviors of EVs, who are self-
interested and will act selfishly to maximize their own utilities. Similarly as in [38],
we assume that the aggregator is equipped with a set of backup batteries to assure
reaching the service request.
3.1.2 A Distributed Framework for EV Coordination
The key challenge faced by the aggregator is to coordinate the charging/discharging
behaviors of a large number of EVs to accomplish the given service request while sat-
isfying the charging constraints of all EVs. This becomes even more challenging due
to the fact that the aggregator has no direct control over the charging/discharging
behaviors of EVs and that EV owners may not want to report their driving activities
to the aggregator due to privacy concerns.
To solve such a challenging task, we propose in this paper a distributed frame-
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Figure 3.2: The proposed distributed framework for EV coordination.
work for charging/discharging coordination as shown in Figure 3.2. In this frame-
work, EV owners are represented by local softwares to manage their EVs. The local
software runs a scheduling algorithm that takes the charging constraints of an EV,
such as current battery SOC, targeted battery SOC and desired plug-in duration,
as input and outputs a scalar-valued parameter at each time slot. Such a parameter
represents the unit gain that an EV can receive by charging/discharging its battery
and thus indicates its preference towards charging/discharging at each time slot,
which we refer to as the willingness to pay (WTP) parameter [67]. Let r denote the
charging/discharging rate of an EV and p denote the price paid to the aggregator.
Then, the utility function of an EV with WTP parameter θ can be written as
uθ(r, p) ,

θηr − p, if r ≥ 0,
(C + θ)ηr − p, otherwise,
(3.1)
where C > 0 is the unit cost associated with discharging, which consists of the base
energy cost and the battery degradation cost. Recall that η represents the length
59
of the service period. Both r and p can take either positive or negative values. In
particular, r > 0 means the EV charges its battery at current time slot while r < 0
means discharging.
We assume θ ∈ Θ = [θd, θd] ∪ {0} ∪ [θc, θc] with θd > −C, θd < 0 and θc > 0.
The sign of θ indicates whether the EV tends to charge or discharge: when θ < 0,
i.e. θ ∈ [θd, θd], the EV prefers to discharge and we refer such an EV as discharge-
preferred EV; θ = 0 means that the EV wants to remain idle, which we refer to
as idle EV; when θ > 0, i.e. θ ∈ [θc, θc], the EV prefers to charge, which we refer
to as charge-preferred EV. Moreover, the larger |θ| is, the more an EV wants to
charge/discharge its battery, respectively.
Given a certain coordination mechanism, the charging requirements of an EV
can be satisfied by properly choosing (possibly different) WTP parameters for dif-
ferent time slots. Since the number of EVs is large, the WTP parameter θ ∈ Θ for
all EVs can be modeled as a random variable such that the value for a specific EV is
considered as a realization. Denote by f(θ) the probability density function (PDF)
of the random WTP parameter. Then, the aggregator’s task reduces to the design
of a coordination mechanism based on f(θ).
It can be seen from Figure 1(b) that f(θ) depends on the coordination mech-
anism while the design of the coordination mechanism itself relies on f(θ), which
results in a closed-loop problem. When N is large, such a closed-loop problem can
be analyzed using the mean field equilibrium (MFE) [70]-[72]. At a MFE, each EV
optimizes its local scheduling algorithm with respect to the coordination mechanism
and f(θ). Moreover, the optimized scheduling algorithms of all EVs yield a WTP
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parameter distribution that is consistent with f(θ). That is, the V2G system reach-
es a steady state with fixed f(θ). A similar setting was studied in [73], where the
MFE was characterized and analyzed for a decentralized charging control problem
for large populations of EVs with respect to a certain pricing rule. However, detailed
discussions of the scheduling algorithm are beyond the scope of this chapter.
As a first step towards this distributed framework, we study in this chapter
the design of coordination mechanism for general WTP parameter distributions. We
assume
f(θ) = Pdfd(θ)1(θd ≤ θ ≤ θd) + Pidleδ(θ) + Pcfc(θ)1(θc ≤ θ ≤ θc), (3.2)
with Pd +Pidle +Pc = 1. Moreover, fd(θ) with θ ∈ [θd, θd] and fc(θ) with θ ∈ [θc, θc]
represent the PDF of the WTP parameter for discharge-preferred EVs and charge-
preferred EVs respectively. We assume that fd(θ) and fc(θ) are positive and finite.
At each time slot, given the WTP parameter, each EV as an independent
decision-maker will act to maximize its own utility function in (5.2) without con-
sidering whether the aggregated load matches the service request or not. Therefore,
an inherent conflict exists in terms of objectives between the aggregator and EVs.
We further assume that the WTP parameter is the private information of each EV,
which implies that the aggregator has no access to the specific value of each EV’s
WTP parameter. We first study the case where the aggregator is aware of the dis-
tribution of EV’s WTP parameter, i.e., f(θ). Then, in Section 3.3, we extend our
results to the scenario that the aggregator has no prior knowledge regarding f(θ).
In both cases, there exists an information asymmetry between the aggregator and
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EVs, which makes the coordination at the aggregator even harder.
3.1.3 Contract-Theoretic Formulation
To resolve the conflicting objectives between the aggregator and EVs in the p-
resence of asymmetric information, we propose to use a contract-theoretic approach.
Through an optimal design of contract, the aggregator not only can stimulate self-
interested EVs to act coordinately to accomplish the service request but also can
maximize its own profits. In contract theory, a contract is a collection of contract
items. Particularly, in our case, each contract item corresponds to a pair (r, p),
which specifies the EV’s charging/discharging rate and the resulted payment to the
aggregator. At each time slot, the aggregator will publish the contract to all par-
ticipating EVs. Then each EV will choose one contract item that maximizes its
utility defined in (5.2). According to the revelation principle [7], it is sufficient to
consider the class of contracts that ensure each EV to truthfully choose the con-
tract item designed for its type. Therefore, we can design our contract as a pair
of functions as φ = {(r(θ), p(θ)), θ ∈ Θ}. Throughout this chapter, we restrict our
attentions to functions that are piecewise differentiable over Θ \ {0}. We would like
to note that such a set of function is general enough to include any rate and pricing
functions that can be implemented in practice. To be a feasible contract, φ needs
to satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and the individual rationality
(IR) constraint, which we define as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Incentive Compatibility) A contract φ = {(r(θ), p(θ)), θ ∈ Θ}
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satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint if it is the best response of each EV
to choose the contract item for its true WTP parameter, i.e.,
uθ(r(θ), p(θ)) ≥ uθ(r(θ̃), p(θ̃)), ∀θ, θ̃ ∈ Θ. (3.3)
Definition 3.2 (Individual Rationality) A contract φ = {(r(θ), p(θ)), θ ∈ Θ}
satisfies the individual rationality constraint if each EV receives a non-negative u-
tility by accepting the contract item for its true WTP parameter, i.e.,
uθ(r(θ), p(θ)) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (3.4)
A contract that satisfies the IR constraint will provide non-negative utilities to all
EVs, and therefore ensures the participation of self-interested EVs.
In addition to the IC and IR constraints, the aggregator will design the contract
such that the preferences of EVs are respected, i.e.,
r(θ) ∈ [rmin, 0], ∀θ ∈ [θd, θd],
r(0) = 0,
r(θ) ∈ [0, rmax], ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc],
(3.5)
where rmax > 0 and rmin < 0 are the maximum charging and discharging rates
of EVs, respectively. This is because the preference type of EVs may come from
physical constraints. For example, an EV may become charge-preferred since its
battery is running out, which makes it impossible for the EV to discharge.
To guarantee that the expected aggregated energy rate of all EVs meets the











r(θ)Pdfd(θ)dθ = ∆−max{λNPcrmax,∆}, (3.7)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that controls the degree to which the charging
demands of all EVs should be guaranteed. In the extreme case of λ = 0, charging(or
discharging) is not an option when ∆ < 0 (or ∆ > 0). In such a case, the aggregator
can achieve the highest system efficiency in terms of providing ancillary services to
the power grid since EVs will not cancel out each other’s effort. With positive λs,
the aggregator sacrifices a certain degree of efficiency but provides flexibilities for
EVs to achieve their charging requirements.
Under the above two constraints, the acceptable range of the service request,
∆, becomes [NPdrmin+λNPcrmax, NPcrmax]. Denote by Φ the set of contracts that
satisfy all constraints in (3.3)-(3.7). Among all contracts in Φ, the aggregator will
choose the optimal one, which maximizes its profit as






The proposed contract-based coordination mechanism in one time slot can be
summarized in the following four steps.
1. The aggregator receives ∆ from the SO and calculates φ∗
2. The aggregator broadcasts φ∗ to all EVs
3. After receiving φ∗, each EV selects one contract item that maximizes its utility
and informs the aggregator its decision
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4. The aggregator coordinates the ancillary service and records EVs’ payments
given the selected contract items
3.2 Optimal Contract Design
To find the optimal contract, we need to solve the optimization problem de-
fined in (3.8), which is challenging because it optimizes over a class of functions
specified by some complex constraints. In this section, we first simplify the opti-
mization problem to a certain extent by finding equivalent conditions to the IC and
IR constraints. Then, by decomposing the above optimization problem into two
subproblems, we show that, under some mild conditions, the optimal contract takes
a very simple form.
We present in the following that the IC and IR constraints can be simplified
under our problem settings.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose a contract φ = {(r(θ), p(θ)), θ ∈ Θ} satisfies the rate
constraint in (3.5). Then φ guarantees IC among charge-preferred EVs, i.e., uθ(r(θ), p(θ)) ≥
uθ(r(θ̃), p(θ̃)), ∀θ, θ̃ ∈ [θc, θc], if and only if, ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc],
ṙ(θ) ≥ 0 (3.9)
and
θṙ(θ)− ṗ(θ) = 0. (3.10)
Proof : From (3.5), we have r(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc], which implies uθ(r(θ), p(θ)) =
θr(θ)− p(θ), ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc]. To prove Proposition 1, we first show that the two condi-
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tions in (3.9) and (3.10) are necessary conditions. It follows from the IC condition
among charge-preferred EVs that, ∀θ, θ̃ ∈ [θc, θc],
θr(θ)− p(θ) ≥ θr(θ̃)− p(θ̃),
and
θ̃r(θ̃)− p(θ̃) ≥ θ̃r(θ)− p(θ).
Adding the above two inequalities, we have
(θ − θ̃)(r(θ)− r(θ̃)) ≥ 0,∀θ, θ̃ ∈ [θc, θc].
Therefore, we can conclude that ṙ(θ) ≥ 0,∀θ ∈ [θc, θc].
Moreover, let
gθ(θ̃) , θr(θ̃)− p(θ̃).
Then the IC condition among charging-preferred EVs implies that
θ ∈ arg max
θ̃∈Θ
gθ(θ̃), ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc].










p(θ) = 0, ∀θ ∈ (θc, θc).
Moreover, since fc(θ) is finite, boundary values of ṙ(θ) and ṗ(θ) will not affect our
results. We can then extend the above equality to the boundary points and establish
(3.10).
Next, we prove conditions in (3.9) and (3.10) are also sufficient conditions. We
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where the second equality follows from (3.10) and the last equality is obtained
through integration by parts.
After some manipulations, we have




≥ θr(θ̃)− p(θ̃), ∀θ, θ̃ ∈ [θc, θc],
where the inequality follows from (3.9).
Corollary 3.1 Suppose a contract φ = {(r(θ), p(θ)), θ ∈ Θ} satisfies the rate
constraint in (3.5). Then φ guarantees IC among discharge-preferred EVs, i.e.,
uθ(r(θ), p(θ)) ≥ uθ(r(θ̃), p(θ̃)), ∀θ, θ̃ ∈ [θd, θd], if and only if, ∀θ ∈ [θd, θd],
ṙ(θ) ≥ 0 (3.11)
and
(C + θ)ṙ(θ)− ṗ(θ) = 0. (3.12)
Proof : Since φ satisfies (3.5), we have r(θ) ≤ 0, ∀θ ∈ [θd, θd], which implies
uθ(r(θ), p(θ)) = (C + θ)r(θ) − p(θ), ∀θ ∈ [θd, θd]. Then, the results can be proved
similarly as in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 give equivalent conditions for a weaker IC
constraint such that EVs will have no incentive to switch to any other contract items
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that fall in the same category as their owns. Under these condition, we show in the
following that the IR constraint can be simplified.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose a contract φ = {(r(θ), p(θ)), θ ∈ Θ} satisfies (3.10),
(3.12) and the rate constraint defined in (3.5). Then, φ satisfies the IR constraint
if and only if the following conditions hold
θcr(θc)− p(θc) ≥ 0, (3.13)
(C + θd)r(θd)− p(θd) ≥ 0, (3.14)
p(0) ≤ 0. (3.15)
Proof : We prove Proposition 2 by showing that conditions (3.13) - (3.15) corre-
spond to the IR constraint for charge-preferred, discharge-preferred and idle EVs,
respectively.
First, since r(0) = 0, the IR constraint for idle EVs reduces to (3.15).
Next, let
Uc(θ) , θr(θ)− p(θ), ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc], (3.16)
represent the utility of charge-preferred EVs that choose their default contract items.




Uc(θ) = r(θ) + θṙ(θ)− ṗ(θ) = r(θ), ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc].
Moreover, since r(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc] according to (3.5), we have
θc ∈ arg min
θ∈[θc,θc]
Uc(θ).
The IR conditions for charge-preferred EVs are thus equivalent to Uc(θc) ≥ 0.
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Finally, let
Ud(θ) , (C + θ)r(θ)− p(θ), ∀θ ∈ [θd, θd], (3.17)
represent the utility of discharge-preferred EVs that choose their default contract




Ud(θ) = r(θ) + (C + θ)ṙ(θ)− ṗ(θ) = r(θ) < 0, ∀θ ∈ [θd, θd]. (3.18)
Therefore, The IR conditions for discharge-preferred EVs are equivalent to Ud(θd) ≥
0.
Proposition 3.3 Under the rate constraint in (3.5), a contract φ = {(r(θ), p(θ)), θ ∈
Θ} satisfies the IC and IR constraints in (3.3) and (3.4) respectively, if and only if
it satisfies (3.9) - (3.15) and
max{p(θc)− θcr(θc), p(θd)− (C + θd)r(θd)} ≤ p(0) ≤ min{p(θc), p(θd)− Cr(θd)}.
(3.19)
Proof : First, we show that (3.9) - (3.15) and (3.19) are necessary conditions. It has
been proved in Proposition 3.1, Corollary 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 that the IC and
IR constraints imply (3.9) - (3.15). Therefore, it suffices to show that (3.19) can
also be derived from the IC and IR constraints. From (3.3) and (3.5), we have
θcr(θc)− p(θc) ≥ θcr(0)− p(0) = −p(0),
(C + θd)r(θd)− p(θd) ≥ θdr(0)− p(0) = −p(0),
−p(0) ≥ −p(θc),
−p(0) ≥ Cr(θd)− p(θd)
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which implies (3.19) and thus proves the necessary part.
Next, we show that (3.9) - (3.15) and (3.19) are also sufficient conditions. It
has been proved in Proposition 3.2 that (3.9) - (3.15) are sufficient conditions for
the IR constraint. Moreover, we have proved in Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.1
that conditions (3.9) - (3.15) imply a weaker IC condition, i.e., EVs will have no
incentive to switch to any other contract items that fall in same category as their
owns. Therefore, it suffices to show that with an additional condition (3.19), EVs
will not have the incentive to switch to contract items from other categories either.
Since θcr(θc) − p(θc) ≤ θr(θ) − p(θ), ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc] and (C + θd)r(θd) − p(θd) ≤
(C + θ̃)r(θ̃) − p(θ̃), ∀θ̃ ∈ [θd, θd] as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.2, we can
derive from (3.19) that
θr(θ)− p(θ) ≥ −p(0) = θr(0)− p(0), ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc],
(C + θ̃)r(θ̃)− p(θ̃) ≥ −p(0) = θ̃r(0)− p(0), ∀θ̃ ∈ [θd, θd],
which implies that charge-preferred and discharge-preferred EVs have no incentive
to choose the contract item designed for idle EVs.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show from (3.9) - (3.12) that−p(θc) ≥ −p(θ),
∀θ ∈ [θc, θc] and Cr(θd) − p(θd) ≥ Cr(θ̃) − p(θ̃), ∀θ̃ ∈ [θd, θd]. Therefore, we have
from (3.19) that 
−p(0) ≥ −p(θ), ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc],
−p(0) ≥ Cr(θ̃)− p(θ̃), ∀θ̃ ∈ [θd, θd],
which shows that idle EVs do not have the incentive to choose the contract items
designed for charge-preferred and discharge-preferred EVs.
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In addition, ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc] and ∀θ̃ ∈ [θd, θd], we have
θr(θ)− p(θ) ≥ −p(0) ≥ Cr(θ̃)− p(θ̃) ≥ (C + θ)r(θ̃)− p(θ̃),
(C + θ̃)r(θ̃)− p(θ̃) ≥ −p(0) ≥ −p(θ) ≥ θ̃r(θ)− p(θ),
indicating that charge-preferred (or discharge-preferred) EVs have no incentive to
switch to contract items designed for discharge-preferred (or charge-preferred) EVs.
Therefore, (3.9) - (3.15) and (3.19) are sufficient conditions for the IC and IR con-
straints.
From Proposition 3, we now obtain an equivalent set of constraints for the
optimal contract design problem in (3.8) as conditions (3.5) - (3.7), (3.9) - (3.15)
and (3.19). Based on this new set of constraints, we can simplify the optimal contract















































fc(θ)dθ for θ ∈ [θc, θc] is the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the WTP parameter for charge-preferred EVs. Note that the equality in
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(3.21) follows from (3.18) and the equality in (3.22) is obtained through integration



























fd(θ)dθ is the CDF of the WTP parameter for discharge-preferred
EVs.
Our first observation is that we can maximize G(φ) while satisfying the con-
straints by setting p(0) = 0, Uc(θc) = 0 (i.e., p(θc = θcr(θc)) and Ud(θd) = 0 (i.e.,
p(θd) = (C+θd)r(θd)). In such a case, the contract item for idle EVs is determined as
(r(0), p(0)) = (0, 0). Moreover, notice that the optimal contract design problem for
charge-preferred EVs is decoupled from that for discharge-preferred EVs. Therefore,
we can derive the optimal contract by solving two optimization problems, (3.23) and
(3.31), which we will discuss in the following two subsections.
3.2.1 The Optimal Contract Design for Charge-Preferred EVs
Let ∆c , max{λNPcrmax,∆}. The optimal contract design for charge-preferred
EVs can be simplified to a constrained optimization problem with respect to the rate
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ṙ(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc],
0 ≤ r(θ) ≤ rmax ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc].
Given the optimal rate function r∗(θ), we can determine the optimal pricing function
p∗(θ) as
p∗(θ) = θcr(θc) +
∫ θ
θc
τ ṙ∗(τ)dτ, ∀θ ∈ [θc, θc]. (3.24)
To characterize the optimal contract analytically, we introduce below the con-
cept of regular distribution.
Definition 3.3 (Regular Distribution [74]) We say that a distribution is regu-
lar if
[




Regular distribution is an assumption widely adopted in mechanism design
literature [7] [74], which compromises a large class of practical distributions, such
as uniform, exponential and normal. We show in the following theorem that the
optimal contract for charge-preferred EVs takes a very simple form under this mild
condition.
Theorem 3.1 If the distribution specified by fc(θ) is regular, then the optimal con-
tract for charge-preferred EVs can be expressed as, for θ ∈ [θc, θc],
r∗(θ) = rmax1(θ ≥ αc),
p∗(θ) = αcrmax1(θ ≥ αc),
(3.25)
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Proof : It can be easily verified that r∗(θ) and p∗(θ) in (3.25) satisfy (3.24).
Therefore, to prove Theorem 3.1, it suffices to show that r∗(θ) in (3.25) is the
solution to the optimization problem in (3.23).
We can check that r∗(θ) satisfies the constraints in (3.23) and therefore is a
valid candidate. To show its optimality, denote by r̂(θ) an arbitrary rate function
that satisfies the constraints in (3.23). Let
δr(θ) = r
∗(θ)− r̂(θ). (3.27)





δr(θ)fc(θ)dθ = 0. (3.28)














































θ − 1− Fc(θ)
fc(θ)
]
dθ ≥ 0, (3.30)
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which implies that r∗(θ) is the solution to the optimization problem in (3.23) and
thus concludes the proof.
From Theorem 1, we can see that, under the assumption of regular distribu-
tions, it is optimal to let charge-preferred EVs with preferences higher than a certain
threshold to charge with the maximum rate while keeping others idle. The threshold
can also be interpreted as the optimal unit price with which charge-preferred EVs
will purchase energy from the aggregator.
3.2.2 The Optimal Contract Design for Discharge-Preferred EVs
Let ∆d , ∆ − max{λNPcrmax,∆}. Similarly as in the charge-preferred EV



















ṙ(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ [θd, θd],
rmin ≤ r(θ) ≤ 0 ∀θ ∈ [θd, θd].
Once we obtain the optimal rate function r∗(θ), the optimal pricing function p∗(θ)
can be determined as
p∗(θ) = (C + θd)r(θd) +
∫ θ
θd
(C + τ)ṙ∗(τ)dτ, ∀θ ∈ [θd, θd]. (3.32)
We show in the following corollary the optimal contract for discharge-preferred EVs.
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Corollary 3.2 Let f̃d(θ) , fd(−θ) for θ ∈ [−θd,−θd]. If f̃d(θ) is regular, then the
optimal contract for discharge-preferred EVs can be expressed as, for θd ∈ [θd, θd],
r∗(θ) = rmin1(θ ≤ αd),
p∗(θ) = (C + αd)rmin1(θ ≤ αd),
(3.33)








Proof : Let F̃d(θ) ,
∫ θ
−θd
f̃d(θ)dθ be the CDF corresponding to f̃d(θ). We have
F̃d(θ) = 1−Fd(−θ). Moreover, let r̃(θ) , −r(−θ). Then, the optimization problem


















˙̃r(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ [−θd,−θd],
0 ≤ r̃(θ) ≤ −rmin ∀θ ∈ [−θd,−θd].
Since f̃d(θ) is regular, according to Theorem 1, the above optimization can be solved
by
r̃∗(θ) = −rmin1(θ ≥ α̃d), (3.36)








Choosing αd = −α̃d and invoking (3.32), we can derive the optimal contract for
discharge-preferred EVs in (3.33).
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According to corollary 3.2, the optimal contract for discharge-preferred EVs
also has a threshold structure such that EVs with discharging preferences stronger
than a certain threshold will discharge at the full rate while other discharge-preferred
EVs will remain idle. Moreover, EVs that discharge their batteries will be compen-
sated using a single unit price that is determined by the threshold.
3.2.3 The Distributed Implementation of Optimal Contract
To summarize, under the assumption of regular distributions, the optimal
contract can be written as, for θ ∈ Θ,
r∗(θ) = rmax1(θ ≥ αc) + rmin1(θ ≤ αd),
p∗(θ) = αcrmax1(θ ≥ αc) + (C + αd)rmin1(θ ≤ αd),
(3.38)
where αc and αd satisfy (3.26) and (3.34), respectively. Such an optimal contract-
based mechanism is in essence a posted pricing scheme with prices being carefully
designed. Therefore, it can be implemented very efficiently in a distributed way
with nearly no communication and controlling overhead, as demonstrated in the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.3 The optimal contract can be implemented through Algorithm 2.
Proof : Algorithm 2 differs from a direct implementation of the contract-based mech-
anism in that it only requires the aggregator to publish the optimal unit prices rather
than the entire contract to EVs and let EVs decide their charging/discharging
rates. Due to the rationality assumption of EVs, they will choose their charg-
ing/discharging rates so that their utilities can be maximized. Formally, the energy
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Algorithm 2 : Implementation of The Optimal Contract
1: The aggregator receives the service request from the SO.
2: The aggregator calculates the optimal unit price for selling energy, αc, and that
for purchasing energy, C + αd.
3: The aggregator publishes αc and C + αd to all EVs.
4: Each EV decides whether to participate or not as well as the corresponding
charging/discharging rate based on its own utility.
5: The aggregator records the payments of participating EVs.





uθ(r, αcr), if max
0≤r≤rmax
uθ(r, αcr) ≥ max
rmin≤r≤0
uθ(r, (C + αd)r),
arg max
rmin≤r≤0
uθ(r, (C + αd)r), otherwise.
It can be easily verified that r̂(θ) = rmax1(θ ≥ αc) + rmin1(θ ≤ αd), which is exactly
the expression of r∗(θ) in (3.38) and thus concludes the proof.
3.3 Learning The Optimal Unit Price without Priors
In Section 3.2, we have shown that the optimal contract-based mechanism
for regular distributions takes a very simple form where the aggregator only needs
to design and publish two optimal unit prices. Nevertheless, in order to calculate
the optimal unit prices explicitly, such a simple scheme requires the distributional
knowledge of EV’s WTP parameter. In practice, although it is reasonable to model
EV’s preference towards charging/discharging as a WTP parameter, sometimes it is
difficulty for the aggregator to know the distribution of such a parameter. We tackle
this challenge in this section. In particular, we will stick with the simple structure
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of the optimal contract and study how to learn the optimal unit prices without the
prior knowledge of f(θ). We assume λ = 0 in this section and focus on the case
with ∆ > 0. In such a case, since ∆c = ∆ and ∆d = 0, only charge-preferred EVs
will be involved and the aggregator only needs to design the unit price for selling
energy, which we simply refer to as the unit price when context is clear. The case
with ∆ < 0 can be analyzed similarly and is skipped due to space limitation.
Consider a more practical setting where the unit price can only have discrete
values. Let Υ = {αi|αi = K−iK θc + iK θc, i = 0, 1, ..., K} be the set of unit prices
that the aggregator can choose from. Although the aggregator will suffer some loss
by restricting the unit price to a set of discrete values, such a performance loss
decreases as K increases. Moreover, since the achieved total energy rate at each
time slot is integer multiples of the maximum charging rate rmax, we assume that
the service request takes value from the set Ω = {∆j|∆j = jrmax, j = 1, 2, ...,M}
and the residue is handled by the backup batteries.




1(θn,τ ≥ αi)rmax, (3.39)
where θn,τ is the WTP parameter of EV n at time slot τ . We would like to point
out that independence holds for Xi,τ in different time slots but does not hold across
different unit prices, i.e., Xi,s and Xi,τ are independent while Xi,τ and Xj,τ are not
for each 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ K and for each 1 ≤ s ≤ τ .
Assuming the service request at time slot τ is ∆jτ , we can define a new random
variable that represents the normalized square of the difference between the total
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If the aggregator has the prior knowledge of the distribution, it would choose
the optimal unit price αi∗τ at every time slot. Here, we adopt a slightly different yet
more practical sensed of optimality such that the normalized mean square residue
is minimized, i.e.,
i∗τ ∈ arg min
0≤i≤K
(µi,jτ ). (3.42)
We denote µi∗τ ,jτ by µ
∗
jτ for notation simplicity.
Without the knowledge of f(θ), the aggregator needs to learn the optimal unit
price from the interactions with EVs. During the learning procedure, the aggregator
faces an exploration-exploitation tradeoff between choosing the unit price with the
best predicted performance to maximize immediate utility and trying different unit
prices to obtain improved estimates. Finding a learning algorithm that solves the
exploration-exploitation tradeoff is traditionally formulated as a multi-armed bandit
problem. However, results from multi-armed bandit literature cannot be directly
applied here since they assume the optimal choice remains unchanged, whereas in
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our case, the optimal unit price depends on the service request and is changing over
time.
Define by σ = {στ} the learning policy, where στ is a map from the observation
history up to time slot τ − 1 to the index of unit price to be selected at time slot
τ . To evaluate the performance of σ, we adopt regret as our performance criterion
[69] [75], which is the total performance loss with respect to the bench mark case of
choosing the optimal unit price at every time slot. A formal definition of regret is
given as follows.





(µστ ,jτ − µ∗jτ )
]
, (3.43)
where the expectation is taken over the possible randomness of the policy.
Our objective is to find a policy that yields low regret. We show the proposed
policy in Algorithm 3, which modifies the UCB1 algorithm in [69] to tackle the case
with time-variant optimal choices.
In Algorithm 3, we maintain two quantities for each unit price, yi and ni,
which represent the empirical estimate of the normalized mean squared residue of
unit price αi and the number of times αi has been chosen, respectively. The xi,τ
is the realization of Xi,τ , which can be observed if αi is chosen at time slot τ . We
record all observed xi,τ in the algorithm and use them to calculate yi at each time
slot based on the service request ∆jτ . After initialization, the unit price is chosen






Algorithm 3 : Learning The Optimal Unit Price
1: // Initialization
2: for t = 1 to K + 1 do
3: σt = t− 1
4: Observe and record xσt,t
5: nσt ← 1
6: end for
7: // Main Loop
8: while t ≤ T do
9: for i = 0 to K do













13: Observe and record xσt,t
14: nσt ← nσt + 1
15: t← t+ 1
16: end while
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simple, such an index policy well captures the exploration-exploitation tradeoff faced
by the aggregator.
To show the effectiveness of the proposed policy, we prove in the following that
its regret Rσ(t) is upper bounded uniformly by O(log t).
Lemma 3.1 Denote by Ti(t) the number of times that the unit price αi is chosen





1(στ = i, µi,jτ > µ
∗
jτ ). (3.44)











(µi,j − µ∗j), subject to µi,j 6= µ∗j .
Proof : Lemma 3.1 can be proved by extending the results in [69, Theorem 1]. We
introduce another random variable T̂i(t) to represent the number of times αi is




1(στ = i). (3.46)
Clearly, we have Ti(t) ≤ T̂i(t) for every 0 ≤ i ≤ K and every t ≥ 1.
Recall that, for any service request ∆j and any unit price αi, Yi,j is a random
variable with mean µi,j which is independent over time. If unit price αi has been
chosen s times, we can have s i.i.d. realizations of Yi,j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ N . Denote
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by {Yi,j,k|k = 1, ..., s} the sequence of s i.i.d. random variables corresponding to







Let h be an arbitrary positive integer. Then, for an arbitrary sequence of
service requests {∆jτ |τ = 1, ..., t}, We have
Ti(t) ≤ 1 +
t∑
τ=K+2






1(στ = i, µi,jτ > µ
∗




1(Y i,jτ ,T̂i(τ−1) −
√
2 ln(τ − 1)
T̂i(τ − 1)
≤ Y i∗τ ,jτ ,T̂i∗τ (τ−1) −
√
2 ln(τ − 1)





































































implies at least one of
the following must hold



















We can bound the probability of events (3.48) and (3.49) using the Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound [76] as
Pr
















≤ e−4 ln τ = τ−4,








≤ µ∗jτ+1 − µi,jτ+1 + dmin ≤ 0 (3.51)
for si ≥ (8 ln t)/d2min, which implies that we can make event (3.50) false by setting
h = d 8 ln t
d2min

































































Theorem 3.2 The regret Rσ(t) of the proposed policy σ can be upper bounded by











































































which concludes the proof.
3.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we conducted numerical simulations to evaluate the proposed
contract-based mechanism. A V2G system with N = 10, 000 EVs is considered. We
assume EVs’ WTP parameters are drawn independently and identically according to
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Figure 3.3: (a) The service request. (b) The difference between service request
and the aggregated energy rate of all EVs. (c) The total payment received by the
aggregator using the proposed mechanism. (d) The total payment received by the
aggregator using the fixed pricing scheme [38]. (e) Difference between the total
payment to aggregator using the proposed mechanism and that using the fixed
pricing scheme.
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the PDF f(θ) = 2.5∗1(−0.2 ≤ θ ≤ −0.02)+0.1∗δ(θ)+2.5∗1(0.02 ≤ θ ≤ 0.2), where
the unit of θ is $/kWh. The price range here reflects typical retail prices of electricity
sold to end users in the U.S. according to the U.S. Energy Information Adminstration
Report [77]. From f(θ), we can get Pc = Pd = 0.45 and Pidle = 0.1. The unit cost
C consists of the base energy cost and the battery degradation cost. In particular,
the base energy cost is assumed to be 0.22$/kWh1 and the battery degradation cost
is assumed to be 0.04$/kWh, which is predicted by laboratory measurements and
reported in [78]. Therefore, we set C = 0.22+0.04 = 0.26$/kWh in our simulations.
Our simulations are conducted under the scenario of frequency regulation and the
service period η is chosen as 5 minutes. Moreover, we set rmax = 19.2kW and
rmin = −19.2kW according to the Level 2 charging standard in North America [79].
In the first simulation, we evaluate the performance of the optimal contract-
based mechanism. The aggregator is assumed to know the distribution of EV’s
WTP parameter and can determine the optimal unit price explicitly in every time
slot. Simulation results are shown in Figure 3.3. We assume ∆ follows a truncated
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and the standard deviation of N ∗ Pc ∗ rmax.
The maximum and minimum value of ∆ are set to be N ∗ Pc ∗ rmax and N ∗ Pd ∗
rmin, respectively. A sample path of ∆ is shown in Figure 3.3(a). We show in
Figure 3.3(b) the difference between ∆ and the aggregated energy rate of all EVs by
using the proposed mechanism. For the ease of comparison with existing incentive
mechanisms, we set λ = 0 in the proposed mechanism. We can see that with the
1This makes the price range that EVs would use to sell electricity without considering the
battery degradation the same as the one they use to purchase electricity.
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The fixed pricing scheme
(a)


























The fixed pricing scheme
(b)
Figure 3.4: Comparison of the expected total payment to aggregator using the
proposed mechanism and that using the fixed pricing scheme [38]: (a) ∆ > 0; (b)
∆ < 0.
proposed mechanism, the aggregator can achieve over 95% of the service request.
The differences are not zeros due to the randomness of EV’s WTP parameter.
We then compare the proposed mechanism with the pricing scheme in [38]
in terms of the total payment received by the aggregator. In [38], to achieve
the service request, the aggregator randomly selects a certain number of EVs to
charge/discharge their batteries at a fixed rate. The aggregator will pay each select-
ed EV a base price ω, which is the same for all selected EVs, and charge them penalty
prices if the service request can not be reached. Therefore, to avoid penalties, the s-
elected EVs will follow the aggregator’s instructions if they can receive non-negative
utilities at the equilibrium. Otherwise they will simply choose not to participate.
Since the aggregator does not know each EV’s preference, the base price should be
large enough so that every selected EV will have the incentive to participate. In the
simulation, we set the fixed charging/discharging rate as rmax/rmin, respectively. To
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ensure participations, the base price is set as ω = −min
θ∈Θ
θηrmax = 0.32$ when ∆ > 0
and ω = −min
θ∈Θ
(θ + C)ηrmin = 0.736$ when ∆ < 0. The total payment received by
the aggregator using the optimal contract-based mechanism, P opt, is shown in Fig-
ure 3.3(c) and that using the fixed pricing scheme in [38], P fixed, is shown in Figure
3.3(d). We show the difference between P opt and P fixed in Figure 3.3(e). From the
simulation results, we can see that the optimal contract-based mechanism enables
the aggregator to exploit different preferences of EVs and to extract more profit
while achieving the service request statistically. On the other hand, in the pricing
scheme in [38], the aggregator always has to overpay EVs, which results in a loss of
profit for the aggregator.
In addition, we further compare the expected total payments received by the
aggregator for the two schemes. Simulation results for ∆ < 0 and ∆ > 0 are
shown in Figure 3.4(a) and Figure 3.4(b), respectively. In both cases, the optimal
contract-based mechanism achieves higher payments, which is consistent with our
observations in Figure 3.3.
Next, we study the impact of λ on the aggregator’s profit. In particular, we
are interested in whether the aggregator’s promise to always satisfy a certain ratio,
λ, of the total charging demand of all EVs will lead to a loss of profit. We compare
the expected total payments received by the aggregator using the optimal contact
for λ = 0, 0.1 and 0.5. Simulation results for ∆ > 0 are shown in Figure 3.5(a). Note
that when ∆ > λNPcrmax, λ will have no impact on the design of optimal contract,
which leads to the same payments to aggregator. When 0 < ∆ < λNPcrmax,
the results are mixed. In particular, the optimal contract with λ = 0.1 achieves
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of the expected total payment to aggregator using the
optimal contract for λ = 0, 0.1 and 0.5: (a) ∆ > 0; (b) ∆ < 0.
higher payments than the base one with λ = 0 while the one with λ = 0.5 receives
lower payments. The reason is that the aggregator needs to purchase energy from
discharge-preferred EVs in order to simultaneously satisfy the service request and
the promised charging demand. As the unit price for selling energy is decreasing in
λ and that for purchasing energy is increasing in λ, when λ is small, it is possible
that the aggregator benefits from transferring energy from discharge-preferred EVs
to charge-preferred EVs. On the other hand, when λ is large, such an internal energy
transfer will become costly and thus result in a loss of profit to the aggregator.
We then show the simulation results for ∆ < 0 in Figure 3.5(b). Similar
observations can be made when |∆| is small. Nevertheless, as |∆| increases, the
aggregator will eventually purchase energy at a higher price than it sells. In such a
case, having non-zero λ will always incur a loss of profit to the aggregator. Moreover,
when ∆ < 0, the capacity of ancillary service that the aggregator can provide also































Figure 3.6: Averaged regrets of the proposed learning policy.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the proposed learning policy. Since
the learning procedures for ∆ > 0 and ∆ < 0 are not coupled, the aggregator can
run learning algorithms independently for these two cases. In the simulation, we
only consider time slots with ∆ > 0. The learning curve for time slots with ∆ < 0
has a similar behavior and is skipped due to space limitation. We set K = 10
and M = N ∗ Pc = 4, 500. Moreover, the service request is assumed to be drawn
independently from the set Ω = {∆j|∆j = jrmax, j = 1, 2, ...,M} uniformly. We
show in Figure 3.6 the averaged regret, Rσ(t)
t
, of the proposed learning policy. From
the simulation, we can see that the averaged regret converges to 0 quickly, which
demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed learning policy.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we study a distributed framework for EV coordination in V2G
ancillary services. In this framework, EVs locally express various constraints as a
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value of preference toward charging/discharging at each time slot, which is unknown
to the aggregator. Then, given the distribution of the preference of all EVs, we
formulate the interactions between the aggregator and EVs as an optimal contract
design problem and characterize the optimal contract for regular distributions. The
derived optimal contract takes a very simple form where the aggregator only needs to
publish two optimal unit prices, one for selling energy and the other for purchasing
energy, to EVs and therefore can be implemented very efficiently. By using the
optimal contract-based mechanism, the aggregator can maximize its profits while
coordinating EVs to satisfy the service request. Although calculating the optimal
unit price explicitly requires the distributional knowledge of EVs’ preferences, the
case without knowing such statistical distributions has also been investigated. In
particular, we propose a learning algorithm for the aggregator to learn the optimal




Cost-Effective Incentive Mechanisms in Microtask Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing, which provides an innovative and effective way to access on-
line labor market, has become increasingly important and prevalent in recent years.
Until now, it has been successfully applied to a variety of applications ranging from
challenging and creative projects such as R&D challenges in InnoCentive [80] and
software development tasks in TopCoder [81], all the way to microtasks such as
image tagging, keyword search and relevance feedback in Amazon Mechanical Turk
(Mturk) [82] or Microworkers [83]. Depending on the types of tasks, crowdsourcing
takes different forms, which can be broadly divided into two categories: crowdsourc-
ing contests and microtask crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing contests are typically
used for challenging and innovative tasks, where multiple workers simultaneously
produce solutions to the same task for a requester who seeks and rewards only the
highest-quality solution. On the other hand, microtask crowdsourcing targets on
small tasks that are repetitive and tedious but easy for an individual to accomplish.
Different from crowdsourcing contests, there exists no competition among workers
in microtask crowdsourcing. In particular, workers will be paid a prescribed reward
per task they complete, which is typically a small amount of money ranging from a
few cents to a few dollars.
We focus on microtask crowdsourcing in this chapter. With the access to large
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and relatively cheap online labor pool, microtask crowdsourcing has the advantage
of solving large volumes of small tasks at a much lower price compared with tradi-
tional in-house solutions. However, due to the lack of proper incentives, microtask
crowdsourcing suffers from quality issues. Since workers are paid a fixed amount of
money per task they complete, it is profitable for them to provide random or bad
quality solutions in order to increase the number of submissions within a certain
amount of time or effort. It has been reported that most workers on Mturk, an
leading marketplace for microtask crowdsourcing, do not contribute high quality
work [84]. To make matters worse, there exists an inherent conflict between incen-
tivizing high quality solutions from workers and maintaining the low cost advantage
of microtask crowdsourcing for requesters. On the one hand, requesters typically
have a very low budget for each task in microtask crowdsourcing. On the other
hand, the implementation of incentive mechanisms is costly as the operation of ver-
ifying the quality of submitted solutions is expensive [85]. Such a conflict makes it
challenging to design incentives for microtask crowdsourcing, which motivates us to
ask the following question: what incentive mechanisms should requesters employ to
collect high quality solutions in a cost-effective way?
In this chapter, we address this question from a game-theoretic perspective.
In particular, we investigate a model with strategic workers, where the primary
objective of a worker is to maximize his own utility, defined as the reward he will
receive minus the cost of producing solutions of a certain quality. Based on this
model, we first study two basic mechanisms widely adopted in existing microtask
crowdsourcing applications. In particular, the first mechanism assigns the same task
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to multiple workers, identifies the correct solution for each task using a majority
voting rule and rewards workers whose solution agrees with the correct one. The
second mechanism assigns each task only to one worker, evaluates the quality of
submitted solutions directly and rewards workers accordingly. We show that in
order to obtain high quality solutions using these two mechanisms, the unit cost
incurred by requesters per task is subject to a lower bound constraint, which is
beyond the control of requesters and can be high enough to negate the low cost
advantage of microtask crowdsourcing.
To tackle this challenge, we then propose a cost-effective mechanism that em-
ploys quality-aware worker training as a tool to stimulate workers to provide high
quality solutions. In current microtask crowdsourcing applications, training tasks
are usually assigned to workers at the very beginning and are irrelevant to the qual-
ity of submitted solutions. In contrast, our mechanism makes more effective use of
training tasks by assigning them to workers when they perform poorly. With the
introduction of quality-aware training tasks, the quality of a worker’s solution to one
task will affect not only the worker’s immediate utility but also his future utility.
Such a dependence provides requesters with an extra degree of freedom in designing
incentive mechanisms and thus enables them to collect high quality solutions while
still having control over their incurred costs. In particular, we prove theoretically
that the proposed mechanism is capable of collecting high quality solutions from
self-interested workers and satisfying the requester’s budget constraint at the same
time. Beyond its theoretical guarantees, we further conduct a set of behavioral
experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We introduce our model in
Section 4.1 and study two basic mechanisms in Section 4.2. Then, in Section 4.3,
we describe the design of a cost-effective mechanism based on quality-aware worker
training and analyze its performance. We show simulation results in Section 4.4 and
our experimental verifications in Section 4.5. Finally, we summarize the chapter in
Section 4.6.
4.1 The Model
There are two main components in our model: the requester, who publishes
tasks; and workers, who produce solutions to the posted tasks. The submitted
solution can have varying quality, which is described by a one-dimensional value. the
requester maintains certain criteria on whether or not a submitted solution should
be accepted. Only acceptable solutions are useful to the requester. Workers produce
solutions to the posted tasks in return for reward provided by the requester. We
assume workers are strategic, i.e., they choose the quality of their solutions selfishly
to maximize their own utilities.
In our model, a mechanism describes how the requester will evaluate the sub-
mitted solutions and reward workers accordingly. Mechanisms are designed by the
requester with the aim of obtaining high quality solutions from workers. They should
be published at the same time as tasks are posted. Mechanisms can be costly to the
requester, which negates the advantages of crowdsourcing. In this work, we focus
on mechanisms that not only can incentivize high quality solutions from workers,
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but also are cost-effective. We now formally describe the model.
Worker Model. We model the action of workers as the quality q of their
solutions. The value q represents the probability of this solution is acceptable to the
requester, which implies that q ∈ [0, 1]. Since microtasks are typically simple tasks
that are easy for workers to accomplish, we assume workers are capable of producing
solution of quality 1. Moreover, we assume that the solution space is infinite and
the probability of two workers submitting the same unacceptable solution is 0. The
cost incurred by a worker depends on the quality of solution he chooses to produce:
a worker can produce a solution of quality q at a cost c(q). We make the following
assumptions on the cost function c(·):
1. c(q) is convex in q, i.e., it is more costly to improve a high quality solution
than to improve a low quality one by the same amount.
2. c(q) is differentiable1 in q.
3. c′(q) > 0, i.e., solutions with higher quality are more costly to produce.
4. c(0) > 0, i.e., even producing 0 quality solutions will incur some cost.
The benefit of a worker corresponds to the received reward, which depends
on the quality of his solution, the mechanism being used and possibly the quality
of other workers’ solutions. We focus on symmetric scenarios, which means the
benefit of a worker is evaluated under the assumption that all the other workers
1We assume that the cost functions are differentiable mainly for the purpose of mathematical
analysis.
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choose the same action (which may be different from the action of the worker under
consideration). Denote by VM(q̃, q) the benefit of a worker who submits a solution
of quality q while other workers produce solutions with quality q̃ and mechanismM
is employed by the requester. A quasi-linear utility is adopted, where the utility of
a worker is the difference between his benefit and his cost:
uM(q̃, q) = VM(q̃, q)− c(q). (4.1)
Mechanism Choice. We formulate microtask crowdsourcing as a game,
where the requester designs the rules of the game, i.e., mechanisms, to collect high
quality solutions in a cost-effective way and workers are players of the game who act
to maximize their own utilities. To capture the interaction among strategic workers,
we adopt the symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) as the solution concept. In cases
where a worker’s utility does not depend on other workers’ actions, SNE reduces to
a simple optimal action solution.
Mechanisms are evaluated at the SNE. In particular, the equilibrium action
of workers can be used to indicate the effectiveness of mechanisms. Among many
possible symmetric Nash equilibria, we will be interested in a desirable one where
workers choose q = 1 as their equilibrium actions, i.e., self-interested workers are
willing to contribute with the highest quality solutions. We would like to emphasize
that such an outcome is practical in that microtasks are typically simple tasks that
are easy for workers to accomplish satisfactorily.
In a mechanismM, there is a unit cost CM per task incurred by the requester,
which comes from the reward paid to workers and the cost for evaluating submitted
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solutions. We refer to such a unit cost CM as the mechanism cost of M. Since one
of the main advantages of microtask crowdsourcing lies in its low cost, mechanisms
should be designed to achieve the desirable outcome with low mechanism cost. In
particular, we assume that the requester has a predetermined budget B > 0 for the
mechanism cost. A mechanismM is referred to as the budget feasible mechanism if
and only if CM ≤ B. To study a mechanism, we address the following questions: (a)
under what conditions does the desirable SNE exist? and (b) can the mechanism
ensure the budget constraint and the existence of the desirable SNE simultaneously?
Validation Approaches. As an essential step towards incentivizing high
quality solutions, a mechanism should be able to evaluate the quality of submitted
solutions. We describe below three approaches considered in this paper, which are
also commonly adopted in existing microtask crowdsourcing applications.
The first approach is majority voting, where the requester assigns the same
task to multiple workers and accepts the solution that submitted by the majority of
workers as the correct one. Clearly, the validation cost of majority voting depends
on the number of workers per task. It has been reported that, if assigning the
same task to more than 10 workers, the cost of microtask crowdsourcing solutions is
comparable to that of in-house solutions [85] and when the number of tasks is large,
it is financially impractical to assign the same task to too many workers, e.g., more
than 3 [84]. Therefore, when majority voting is adopted in incentive mechanisms,
a key question need to be addressed: what is the minimum number of workers per
task for the existence of the desirable SNE?
Second, the requester can use tasks with known solutions, which we refer to
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as gold standard tasks, to evaluate the submitted answers. Validation with gold
standard tasks is expensive since correct answers are costly to obtain. More im-
portantly, as the main objective of the requester in microtask crowdsourcing is to
collect solutions for tasks, gold standard tasks can only be used occasionally for the
purpose of assessing workers, e.g., as training tasks.
Note that both majority voting and gold standard tasks assume implicity that
the task has a unique correct solution, which may not hold for creative tasks, e.g.,
writing a short description of a city. In this case, a quality control group [??]
can be used to evaluate the submitted solution. In particularly, the quality group
can be either a group of on-site experts who verify the quality of submitted solution
manually or another group of workers who work on quality control tasks designed by
the requester. In the first case, the time and cost spent on evaluating the submitted
solutions is typically comparable to that of performing the task itself. In the second
case, the requester not only have to investigate time and effort in designing quality
control tasks but also need to pay workers for working these tasks. Therefore,
validation using quality control group is also an expensive operation.
4.2 Basic Incentive Mechanisms
We study in this section two basic mechanisms that are widely employed in
existing microtask crowdsourcing applications. Particularly, for each mechanism, we
characterize conditions under which workers will choose q = 1 as their best responses
and study the minimum mechanism cost for achieving it.
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4.2.1 A Reward Consensus Mechanism
We first consider a mechanism that employs majority voting as its validation
approach and, when a consensus is reached, rewards workers who submitted the
consensus solution. We refer to such a mechanism as the reward consensus mecha-
nism and denote it by Mc. In Mc, a task is assigned to K + 1 different workers.
We assume that K is an even number and is greater than 0. If the same solution is
submitted by no less than K/2 + 1 workers, then it is chosen as the correct solution.
Workers are paid the prescribed reward r if they submit the correct solution. On
the other hand, workers will receive no payments if their submitted solutions are
different from the correct one or if no correct solution can be identified, i.e., no
consensus is reached.
InMc, the benefit of each worker depends not only on his own action but also
on other workers’ actions. Therefore, a worker will condition his decision making
on others’ actions, which results in couplings in workers’ actions. To capture such
interactions among workers, we adopt the SNE as our solution concept, which can
be formally stated as:
Definition 4.1 (Symmetric Nash Equilibrium of Mc) The q∗ is a symmetric
Nash equilibrium in Mc if q∗ is the best response of a worker when other workers
are choosing q∗.
We show below the necessary and sufficient conditions of q∗ = 1 being an SNE
in Mc.
Proposition 4.1 In Mc, q∗ = 1 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if and only if
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r ≥ c′(1).
Proof : Under the assumption that the probability of any two workers submitting
the same unacceptable solution is zero (which is reasonable as there are infinitely
possible solutions), a worker’s solution will be accepted if and only if he submits
the correct solution and there are no less than K/2 other workers who submit the
correct solution. Since the probability of n out of K other workers submitting the
correct solution is K!
n!(K−n)! q̃
n(1− q̃)K−n, we can calculate the utility of a worker who
produces solutions of quality q while other workers choose action q̃ as




n!(K − n)! q̃
n(1− q̃)K−n − c(q).
According to Definition 4.1, q∗ is an SNE of Mc if and only if




Since uMc(1, q) = rq − c(q) is a concave function of q and q ∈ [0, 1], the necessary
and sufficient condition of q∗ = 1 being an SNE can be derived as
∂uMc(1, q)
∂q
|q=1 = r − c′(1) ≥ 0. (4.3)
From Proposition 4.1, we can see that Mc can enforce self-interested workers
to produce the highest quality solutions as long as the prescribed reward r is larger
than a certain threshold. Surprisingly, this threshold depends purely on the worker’s
cost function and is irrelevant to the number of workers. The mechanism cost of
Mc can be calculated as
CMc = (K + 1)r ≥ (K + 1)c′(1). (4.4)
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Therefore, to minimize the mechanism cost, it is optimal to choose the minimum
value of K, i.e., K = 2, and let r = c′(1). In this way, the requester ensures that
the desirable action q∗ = 1 can be sustained as an equilibrium with the minimum
mechanism cost C∗Mc = 3c
′(1). Having more workers working on the same task
will only increase the mechanism cost while not helping to improve the quality of
submitted solutions. If B ≥ 3c′(1), the reward consensus mechanism is budget
feasible to allow the establishment of the desirable SNE. On the other hand, if the
predetermined budget B < 3c′(1), there exists no budget feasible reward consensus
mechanism that can be used to collect high quality solutions.
We note that there exits multiple equilibria for the reward consensus mech-
anism. To eliminate equilibria other than q = 1, the requester can first withhold
information about K from workers, i.e., workers will no longer know the number
of workers who will solve the same task. In such a case, there exits no equilibrium
with q ∈ (0, 1) since workers are uncertain about how others’ actions will affect their
utility except for q = 0 and q = 1. Moreover, q = 0 is unlikely to be a practical
equilibrium since it implies that no worker will receive any reward. Once a worker
observes that there are indeed rewards given out, he will rule out the belief about
equilibrium q = 0 in his deliberations. To formally eliminate the equilibrium with
q = 0, the requester can employ a combination of the reward consensus mechanism
and the reward accuracy mechanism as we will show later in Section 3.3. In such a
case, once the SNE with q = 1 exists, it becomes the unique equilibrium and thus a
good prediction of user behaviors.
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4.2.2 A Reward Accuracy Mechanism
Next, we consider a mechanism that rewards a worker purely based on his
own submitted solutions. Such a mechanism is referred to as the reward accuracy
mechanism and is denoted byMa. In particular, depending on the characteristics of
tasks, Ma will use either gold standard tasks or the quality control group to verify
whether a submitted solution is acceptable or not. In our discussions, however, we
make no distinctions between the two methods. We assume that the validation cost
per task is d and there is a certain probability ε  1 that a mistake will be made
in deciding whether a solution is acceptable or not.
As we have discussed, these validation operations are expensive and should
be used rarely. Therefore, Ma only evaluates randomly a fraction of submitted
solutions to reduce the mechanism cost. Formally, in Ma, the requester verifies a
submitted solution with probability αa. If a submitted solution is acceptable or not
evaluated, the worker will receive the prescribed reward r. On the other hand, if
the solution being evaluated is unacceptable, the worker will not be paid.
InMa, the utility of a worker is irrelevant to actions of other workers. There-
fore, we write the utility of a worker who produces solutions of quality q as
uMa(q) = r [(1− αa) + αa(1− ε)q + αaε(1− q)]− c(q).
The SNE inMa reduces to an optimal action q∗ by which a worker’s utility function
is maximized. Since uMa(q) is a concave function of q and q ∈ [0, 1], we can derive
the necessary and sufficient conditions of q∗ = 1 as
αa ≥
c′(1)
(1− 2ε)r . (4.5)
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We can see that there is a lower bound on possible values of αa, which depends
on the cost function of workers and the prescribed reward r. Since αa ∈ [0, 1], for
the above condition to hold, we must have r ≥ c′(1)
(1−2ε) . Moreover, we can calculate
the mechanism cost in the case of q∗ = 1 as
CMa = (1− αaε)r + αad.
The requester optimizes the mechanism cost by choosing the sampling prob-







(1− αaε)r + αad. (4.6)
By solving the above convex optimization problem using the Karush-Kuhn-












1−2ε + d, otherwise.
(4.7)








1−2ε , if d ≥
c′(1)
1−2ε ,





Similarly as the reward consensus mechanism, the mechanism cost of the re-
ward accuracy mechanism must be greater than a certain threshold in order for
the requester to collect solutions with the highest quality from workers. That is,
if the requester’s budget B < C∗Ma , the reward accuracy mechanism can no longer
guarantee the existence of the desirable SNE while being budget feasible.
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4.3 Reducing Mechanism Cost By Quality-Aware Worker Training
Our previous discussions show the limitations of the two basic mechanisms
in collection high quality solutions with low cost: to ensure the existence of the
desirable SNE, the requester’s budget B must be higher than certain thresholds, i.e.,
the minimum mechanism costs. These minimum mechanism costs are determined by
the worker’s cost function and possibly the validation cost, all of which are beyond
the control of the requester. If these minimum mechanism costs are large, the
requester will have to either lower his standard and suffer from low quality solutions
or switch to other alternative approaches.
To overcome this issue, we introduce a new mechanism Mt, which employs
quality-aware worker training as a tool to stimulate self-interested workers to submit
high quality solutions. Our proposed mechanism is built on top of the basic mech-
anisms to further reduce the required mechanism cost. In particular, there are two
states in Mt: the working state, where workers work on standard tasks in return
for reward; and the training state, where workers do a set of training tasks to gain
qualifications for the working state.
In the working state, we consider a general model which incorporates both the
reward consensus mechanism and the reward accuracy mechanism. We assume that
with probability 1 − βw, a task will go through the reward consensus mechanism
and with probability βw, the reward accuracy mechanism will be used with the
sampling probability αw. According to our results in Section 4.2.1, it is optimal to
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Figure 4.1: The state transition diagram of our proposed mechanism Mt.
the working state, a submitted solution will be accepted by Mt if it is accepted
by either the reward consensus mechanism or the reward accuracy mechanism. A
submitted solution will be rejected otherwise. When a solution is accepted, the
worker will receive the prescribed reward r and can continue working on more tasks
in the working state. On the other hand, if a worker’s solution is rejected, he will not
be paid for this task and will be put into the training state to earn his qualifications
for future tasks. Let Pw(q̃w, qw) represent the probability of a solution with quality
qw being accepted in the working state when other submitted solutions are of quality
q̃w. We have
Pw(q̃w, qw) =(1− βw)qw
[
q̃2w + 2q̃w(1− q̃w)
]
+ βw(1− αw) + βwαw[(1− 2ε)qw + ε].
(4.9)
The immediate utility of a worker at the working state can be calculated as
uwMt(q̃w, qw) = rPw(q̃w, qw)− c(qw). (4.10)
In the training state, each worker will receive a set of N training tasks. To
evaluate the submitted solutions, an approach similar to the reward accuracy mech-
anism is adopted. In particular, a worker is chosen to be evaluated at random with
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probability αt. A chosen worker will pass the evaluation and gain the permission to
working state if M out N solutions are correct. We assume M = N in our analysis
while our results can be easily extended to more general cases. An unselected work-
er will be granted permission to enter the working state next time. Only workers
who fail the evaluation will stay in the training state and receive another set of
N training tasks. We denote by Pt(qt) the probability of a worker who produces
solutions of quality qt being allowed to enter the working state next time, which can
be calculated as
Pt(qt) = (1− αt) + αt[(1− 2ε)qt + ε]N . (4.11)
The immediate utility of a worker at the training state is
utMt(qt) = −Nc(qt). (4.12)
To summarize, we plot the state transitions of Mt in Figure 4.1. We fur-
ther assume that at the end of each time slot, a worker will leave the system with
probability 1 − δ, where δ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, a new worker will enter the system
immediately after an existing one left. New workers will be placed randomly into the
working state or the training state according to an initial state distribution specified
by the requester.
From (4.10) and (4.12), we can see that workers’ immediate utility in Mt
depends not only on their actions but also on which state they are in. Moreover,
as the state transition probabilities depend on workers’ actions according to (4.9)
and (4.11), taking a certain action will affect not only the immediate utility but
also the future utility. For example, a worker may increase his immediate utility
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by submitting poor solutions at the working state but suffer from the loss of being
placed into the training state next time. Given the dependence of future utility
on current actions, as rational decision makers, workers will choose their actions to
optimize their long-term utility. Formally, we denote by UwMt(q̃w, qw, qt) the long-
term expected utility of a worker who is currently at the working state and chooses
action qw for the working state and action qt for the training state while others
choose action q̃w at the working state. Similarly, we write U
t
Mt(q̃w, qw, qt) for the
long-term expected utility at the training state. We have
UwMt(q̃w, qw, qt) = u
w
Mt(q̃w, qw) + δ[Pw(q̃w, qw)U
w
Mt(q̃w, qw, qt)
+(1− Pw(q̃w, qw))U tMt(q̃w, qw, qt)], (4.13)





+(1− Pt(qt))U tMt(q̃w, qw, qt)]. (4.14)
Based on the definition of worker’s long-term expected utility, the SNE inMt
can be formally defined as:
Definition 4.2 (Symmetric Nash Equilibrium of Mt) The action pair (q̂w, q̂t)
is a symmetric Nash equilibrium ofMt, if ∀qw ∈ [0, 1] and ∀qt ∈ [0, 1], the following
two conditions hold
UwMt(q̂w, q̂w, q̂t) ≥ UwMt(q̂w, qw, qt), (4.15)
U tMt(q̂w, q̂w, q̂t) ≥ U tMt(q̂w, qw, qt). (4.16)
The above definition suggests a way to verify whether an action pair (q̂w, q̂t)
of interest is an SNE or not, which can be summarized as the following three steps.
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1. Assume all workers are adopting (q̂w, q̂t) and one worker of interest may deviate
from it.
2. Find the optimal action (q∗w, q
∗
t ) for this worker.
3. The action pair (q̂w, q̂t) is an SNE if and only if it is consistent with the optimal
action pair (q∗w, q
∗
t ), i.e., q̂w = q
∗
w and q̂t = q
∗
t .
The key challenge here is to find the optimal action pair for a worker given the
other workers’ action, which can be modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP).
In this MDP formulation, the state set includes the working state and the training
state, the action in each state is the quality of solutions to produce, rewards are
the immediate utility specified in (4.10) and (4.12), and transition probabilities are
given in (4.9) and (4.11).
Note that in our discussions so far we assume stationary actions, i.e., workers’
actions are time-invariant functions of the state. Such an assumption can be justified
by properties of MDP as shown in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2 Any worker cannot improve his long-term expected utility by choos-
ing time-variant actions, if all the other workers’ action at the working state is





























t ) is the opti-
mal stationary action pair, given other workers’ action qw.
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Proof : The problem of finding the optimal action pair for a worker given the other
workers’ action can be formulated as an MDP. In this MDP formulation, rewards and
transition probabilities are stationary if other workers’ action at the working state is
stationary. In addition, the state space is stationary and finite and the action space
is stationary and compact. Moreover, the rewards and transition probabilities are
continuous in actions. Therefore, according to Theorem 6.2.10 in [55], there exits a
deterministic stationary action rule by which the optimal utility of this MDP can be
achieved. In other words, choosing any random, time-variant and history dependent
action rules will not lead to a higher utility.
Among all possible symmetric Nash equilibria, we are interested in ones where
q̂w = 1, i.e., workers will produce solutions with the highest quality at the working
state. Note that we do not guarantee solution quality at the training state since in
Mt, the working state serves the production purpose whereas the training state is
designed as an auxiliary state to enhance workers’ performance at the working state.
Solutions collected from the training state will only be used for assessing workers
and should be discarded afterwards. We would like to characterize conditions under
which such symmetric Nash equilibria exist. Toward this end, we will follow the three
steps outlined above with an emphasis on solving the MDP to find the optimal action
pair. Our results are summarized in the following proposition, where we present a
necessary and sufficient condition on the existence of symmetric Nash equilibria with
q̂w = 1.
Proposition 4.3 There exists q̂t ∈ [0, 1] such that (1, q̂t) is a symmetric Nash equi-
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librium of Mt if and only if
UwMt(1, 1, q̂t)− U tMt(1, 1, q̂t) ≥
c′(1)




Proof : To show the existence of an SNE with q̂w = 1, we first assume that all
workers are choosing the action pair (1, q̂t) except one worker under consideration.
Since interactions among workers only occur at the working state, the value of q̂t
will not affect the decision of this particular worker.
Next, we characterize the optimal action pair (q∗w, q
∗
t ) for this particular worker.
The problem of finding the optimal action pair of a certain worker can be modeled as
an MDP where the necessary and sufficient conditions of an action pair being optimal
are given in (4.15) and (4.16). Nevertheless, it is not easy to derive the optimal
action pair directly from these conditions. Therefore, we need to find another set
of equivalent conditions. Since in our MDP formulation, 0 < δ < 1, the state space
is finite and the immediate reward is bounded, Theorem 6.2.7 in [55] shows that
an action pair (q∗w, q
∗
t ) is optimal if and only if it satisfies the following optimality
equations











t )+(1−Pw(1, qw))U tMt(1, q∗w, q∗t )
]}
,(4.18)











t ) + (1− Pt(qt))U tMt(1, q∗w, q∗t )
]}
, (4.19)
and that there exits at least one optimal action pair.
Since the above optimality equations hold for any value of q̂t, we set q̂t = q
∗
t .
Then, to prove that there exists an SNE (q̂w, q̂t) with q̂w = 1, it suffices to show that
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q∗w = 1. Substituting (4.10) into (4.18) and after some manipulations, we have
q∗w ∈ arg max
0≤qw≤1
{[









From (4.9), we know
Pw(1, qw) = [(1− βw) + βwαw(1− 2ε)] qw + βw(1− αw) + βwαwε. (4.21)
Substituting (4.21) into (4.20), we have
q∗w ∈ arg max
0≤qw≤1
{
[(1− βw) + βwαw(1− 2ε)]
[









Recall that c(qw) is a convex function of qw. We can thus derive the necessary
and sufficient condition for q∗w = 1 as
[(1− βw) + βwαw(1− 2ε)]
[
r + δUwMt(1, 1, q
∗
t )− δU tMt(1, 1, q∗t )
]
≥ c′(1), (4.22)
which is also the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the SNE
(q̂w, q̂t) with q̂w = 1. Replacing q
∗
t with q̂t, we obtain the condition in (4.17) and
complete the proof.
In the above proposition, we show that it is an equilibrium for self-interested
workers to produce solutions with quality 1 at the working state as long as the
condition in (4.17) holds. Nevertheless, this condition is hard to evaluate since
neither the equilibrium action at the training state, q̂t, nor the optimal long-term
utility UwMt(1, 1, q̂t) and U
t
Mt(1, 1, q̂t) are known to the requester. On the other
hand, we hope to find conditions that can provide guide the requester in choosing
proper parameters for mechanism Mt. Therefore, based on results of Proposition
3, we present in the following a sufficient condition on the existence of desirable
equilibria, which is also easy to evaluate.
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δ(1− βw) + δβwαw(1− 2ε)





then there exits a symmetric Nash equilibrium (q̂w, q̂t) such that q̂w = 1.
Proof : We first obtain a lower bound on UwMt(1, 1, q̂t)−U tMt(1, 1, q̂t) and then com-
bine this lower bound with Proposition 3 to prove Theorem 1.
Let U(qw, qt) ,
[




. Then, from (4.13) and (4.14),
we have
(I− δQ(qw, qt)) U(qw, qt) = b(qw, qt), (4.24)





 Pw(1, qw) 1− Pw(1, qw)
Pt(qt) 1− Pt(qt)
 . (4.25)
Since 0 < δ < 1, it can be proved according to the Corollary C.4 in [55] that
matrix (I− δQ(qw, qt)) is invertible. Therefore, we can obtain the long-term utility
vector of action pair (qw, qt) as
U(qw, qt) = (I− δQ(qw, qt))−1 b(qw, qt). (4.26)
Based on (4.26), we have
UwMt(1, qw, qt)− U tMt(1, qw, qt) = [1 −1]U(qw, qt)
=
uwMt(1, qw)− utMt(qt)
1 + δ [Pt(qt)− Pw(1, qw)]
. (4.27)
The above results hold for ∀qw ∈ [0, 1] and ∀qt ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for a desired
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action pair (1, q̂t), we have
UwMt(1, 1, q̂t)− U tMt(1, 1, q̂t) =
uwMt(1, 1)− utMt(q̂t)
1 + δ [Pt(q̂t)− Pw(1, 1)]
=
(1− βwαwε)r − c(1) +Nc(q̂t)
1 + δ {1− αt + αt[(1− 2ε)q̂t + ε]N − (1− βwαwε)}
≥ (1− βwαwε)r − c(1) +Nc(0)
1 + δβwαwε
. (4.28)
Since [(1 − 2ε)q̂t + ε]N ≤ 1, the inequality in (4.28) is derived by replacing [(1 −
2ε)q̂t + ε]
N with 1 and by using the fact that c(q) is monotonically increasing in q.
Therefore, the condition in (4.17) is guaranteed to hold if








which leads to the sufficient condition in (4.23).
Theorem 4.1 shows that given any possible settings (αw, βw, r, αt) in Mt, we
can always enforce workers to produce solutions with quality 1 at the working state
by choosing a sufficiently large N . Moreover, if we further divide parameters in
Mt into working state parameters (αw, βw, r) and training state parameters (αt, N),
then results of Theorem 1 illustrate that the requester will no longer be limited by
solution quality constraints when designing the working state, which are guaranteed
to hold via the design of the training state. In other words, through the introduction
of quality-aware worker training, our proposed mechanism offers an extra degree of
freedom in terms of mechanism design for the requester. Such an extra degree of
freedom enables the requester to collect high quality solutions while still having




For the requester, the mechanism cost ofMt at the desirable equilibrium (1, q̂t)
can be written as




where the last term corresponds to the cost of validation in the training state. Since
ε 1, it follows that Pt(q̂t) ≥ 1− αt + αtεN . Therefore, we have




We then design parameters of Mt according to the following procedure: (a)
select working state parameters αw, βw and r, (b) choose N such that (4.28) holds,
(c) design αt such that
αt
1− αt(1− εN)
βwαwεNd ≤ γ{3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwε)r + αwd]}, (4.29)
where γ > 0 is a parameter chosen by the requester to control the relative cost of
training state to working state. The inequality in (4.29) is equivalent to
αt ≤
γ{3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwε)r + αwd]}
γ(1− εN){3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwε)r + αwd]}+ βwαwεNd
. (4.30)
Following the above design procedure, we have
CMt ≤ (1 + γ) [3r(1− βw) + βw((1− αwε)r + αwd)] .
If αw and r are chosen to minimize the cost, we have
C∗Mt = inf0<αw≤1,r>0
(1 + γ) [3r(1− βw) + βw((1− αwε)r + αwd)] = 0 < B,
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which illustrates that there always exists a mechanismMt that not only can ensure
the existence of the desirable SNE but also is budget feasible.
We note that in practice, the requester requester’s budget B is influenced by
many factors such as the market conditions of microtask crowdsourcing and how the
requester values his microtasks, and thus varies from requester to requester. Our
above analysis shows that, given any budget, the proposed mechanism enables the
requester to collect high quality solutions while still staying on budget. Nevertheless,
detailed discussions on how to set a reasonable budget are beyond the scope of this
paper.
4.3.2 Stationary State Distribution
In above discussions, we focus on the quality of submitted solutions at the
working state, while there is no guarantee of solution quality at the training state.
This is sufficient for the requester to collect high quality solutions since the training
state only serves as an auxiliary state and will not be used for production. On the
other hand, the system efficiency ofMt depends on the probability of a worker being
at the working state. If such a probability is small,Mt will have low efficiency as a
large portion of workers are not contributing to actual tasks.
Therefore, to fully study the performance of Mt, we analyze the stationary
state distribution of Mt in this subsection. We denote by πnw the probability of a
worker being at the working state at the nth time slot after entering the platform.
The probability of being at the training state is thus (1 − πnw). We denote by π∞w
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and π0w the stationary state distribution and initial state distribution, respectively.
Note that the initial state distribution π0w is a design aspect that can be controlled
by the requester, i.e., the requester can decide whether a new worker starts at the
working state or at the training state. Our main result is a lower bound of π∞w as
shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4 In Mt, if workers follow a desirable symmetric Nash equilibrium
(1, q̂t), then the stationary state distribution π
∞
w will be reached and
π∞w ≥
(1− δ)π0w + δ(1− αt)
1− δ + δβwαwε+ δ(1− αt)
(4.31)
Proof : Assuming that all workers are adopting the action pair (1, q̂t), then we can
write the state distribution update rule as
πn+1w = δπ
n
wPw(1, 1) + δ(1− πnw)Pt(q̂t) + (1− δ)π0w
= δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(q̂t)]πnw + (1− δ)π0w + δPt(q̂t). (4.32)
If the stationary state distribution π∞w exists, it must satisfy
π∞w = δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(q̂t)] π∞w + (1− δ)π0w + δPt(q̂t). (4.33)
Therefore, we have
π∞w =
(1− δ)π0w + δPt(q̂t)
1− δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(q̂t)]
=
(1− δ)π0w + δ
{
(1− αt) + αt[(1− 2ε)q̂t + ε]N
}
1− δ(1− βwαwε) + δ {(1− αt) + αt[(1− 2ε)q̂t + ε]N}
≥ (1− δ)π
0
w + δ(1− αt)
1− δ + δβwαwε+ δ(1− αt)
.
The last inequality holds since [(1 − 2ε)q̂t + ε]N ≥ 0 and π∞w is monotonically in-
creasing as the value of [(1− 2ε)q̂t + ε]N increases.
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Next, we show that the stationary distribution π∞w will be reached. From
(4.32) and (4.33), we have
πn+1w − π∞w = δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(q̂t)] (πnw − π∞w ).
Since |δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(q̂t)] | < 1, we have
lim
n→∞





From Proposition 4.4, we can see the lower bound of π∞w increases as π
0
w
increases. Since the larger π∞w means higher efficiency, the requester should choose
π0w = 1 for optimal performance. Therefore, we have
π∞w ≥ 1−
δβwαwε
1− δ + δ(1− αt) + δβwαwε
. (4.34)
When βw = 0, i.e., only the reward consensus is employed at the working
state, or in the ideal case of ε = 0, we can conclude that π∞w = 1. This implies that
every newly entered worker will first work at the working state, choose to produce
solutions with the highest quality as their best responses and keep on working in the
working state until they leave the system. As a result, all workers will stay at the
working state and are available to solve posted tasks. Moreover, since no training
tasks are actually assigned in this case, they become equivalent to a threat to enforce
strategic workers to submit high quality answers, which will never be carried out.
On the other hand, when βw > 0 and ε > 0, although all workers will start
with the working state and choose to produce solutions with quality 1, a portion of
them will be put into the training state due to validation mistakes of the requester.
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However, since the probability of error is usually very small, i.e., ε 1, we can still
expect π∞w to be very close to 1, which implies that the majority of workers will be at
the working state. To mitigate the damage to workers caused by validation mistakes,
the requester could take actions such as setting up a mechanism for workers to report
errors and to get compensated. Nevertheless, detailed discussions are beyond the
scope of this paper.
4.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we conduct numerical simulations to examine properties of our
proposed mechanism Mt and to compare its performance with that of the basic
mechanisms Mc and Ma. Throughout the simulations, we assume the following





where λ > 0 is a parameter that controls the degree of sensitivity of a worker’s cost
to his action. In particular, the smaller λ is, the more sensitive a worker’s cost will
be with respect to his actions. In addition, the cost of choosing the highest quality




and c′(1) = 2
(λ+1)
. Moreover, we set d = 10, δ = 0.9 and ε = 0.01
throughout the simulations.
In the first simulation, we evaluate the sufficient condition for the existence
of desirable symmetric Nash equilibria in (4.28) under different settings. Such a



























Figure 4.2: The lower bound of N for the existence of desirable symmetric Nash
equilibria when βw = 0.
required training tasks, which depends on the worker’s cost function as well as
working state parameters βw, αw and r. We set r = 1, which matches the cost of
producing solutions with quality 1. Moreover, since N ≥ 1, when the derived lower
bound of N is less than 1, we set it to be 1 manually.
We show in Figure 4.2 the lower bound of N versus λ when βw = 0, i.e., only
the reward consensus mechanism is used in the working state. Since workers are
more cost-sensitive in producing high quality solutions with a smaller λ, it becomes
more difficult to make q = 1 as their best responses. As a result, we need to set
relatively large Ns to achieve the desirable symmetric Nash equilibrium for small
λs as shown in Figure 4.2. On the other hand, when λ is large enough, the lower
bound in (4.28) will no longer be an active constraint since any N ≥ 1 can achieve
our design objective.
We then study the more general cases where both the reward consensus mech-
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Figure 4.3: The lower bound of N for the existence of desirable symmetric Nash
equilibria when βw 6= 0.
anism and the reward accuracy mechanism are adopted in the working state. We
show in Figure 4.3 the lower bound of N versus αw under different values of βw and
λ. Similarly, we can see that smaller λ leads to a larger lower bound of N . Moreover,
the lower bound of N also increases as αw decreases. This is due to the fact that
it becomes more difficult to enforce workers to submit high quality solutions if we
evaluate the submitted solutions less frequently. Since βw represents the ratio of
tasks that will be evaluated using the reward accuracy mechanism, the smaller βw
is, the less dependent of the lower bound of N will be on the sampling probability
αw.
In the second simulation, we evaluate numerically the lower bound of the
stationary probability of a worker being at the working state, i.e., π∞w under different
settings. We consider βw = 1 in our simulations as π
∞
w = 1 when βw = 0. In
addition,we set π0w = 1, i.e., every newly entered worker will be placed at the
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Figure 4.4: The lower bound of π∞w when βw = 1.
working state. In Figure 4.4, we show the lower bound of π∞w under different values
of αw and αt. We can see that the lower bound of π
∞
w decreases as αw and αt
increases. More importantly, π∞w will be above 0.9 even in the worst case, which
indicates that our proposed mechanism can guarantee the majority of workers being
at the working state.
Next, we verify Theorem 4.1 through numerical simulations. In particular, we
assume all workers adopt the equilibrium action pair (1, q̂t) except one worker under
consideration who may deviate to (qw, q̂t). We set r = 1 and choose N to be the
smallest integer that satisfies the sufficient condition of the existence of desirable
symmetric Nash equilibria in (4.28). We set αt according to (4.30) with γ = 1, i.e.,
αt = min
{ {3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwε)r + αwd]}




Moreover, the equilibrium action at the training state, q̂t, is obtained by solving
(4.18) and (4.19) using the well-known value iteration algorithm [55]. We show in
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Figure 4.5: The long-term expected utility loss of a worker who deviates to action
pair (qw, q̂t): (a) βw = 0; (b) βw = 1, αw = 0.1; (c) βw = 1, αw = 0.9.
Figure 4.5 the long-term expected utility loss of the worker under consideration at
the working state, i.e., UwMt(1, 1, q̂t) − UwMt(1, qw, q̂t). From the simulation results,
we can see that under all simulated settings, choosing qw = 1 will always lead
to the highest long-term expected utility, i.e., zero long-term expected utility loss.
Therefore, as a rational decision maker, this worker will have no incentive to deviate
from the action (1, q̂t), which demonstrates that (1, q̂t) is indeed sustained as an
equilibrium.
Finally, we compare the performance of our proposed mechanism Mt with
that of the two basic mechanismsMc andMa. SinceMt is capable of incentivizing
workers to submit solutions of quality 1 with an arbitrarily low cost, it suffices to
show the quality of solutions achieved by Mc and Ma under different mechanism
costs. In particular, forMc, we assume that a task is given to 3 workers. Therefore,
for a given mechanism cost CMc , the reward to each worker is r = CMc/3. According
to our analysis in Section 4.2.1, the equilibrium action q∗Mc inMc can be calculated
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Figure 4.6: The equilibrium action versus the mechanism cost in Mc.
as q∗Mc = max{min{q, 1}, 0}, where q is the solution to the following equation
r[2q − q2] = c′(q).
In our simulations, when there are multiple equilibria, we pick the one with higher
quality. On the other hand, if there exits no equilibrim, we set q∗Mc = 0. We show
curves of the equilibrium action q∗Mc in Figure 4.6. From the simulation results, we
can see that Mc can only achieve the highest quality 1 when the mechanism cost
CMc is larger than a certain threshold. Moreover, such a threshold increases as λ
increases, i.e., as workers are more cost sensitive in producing high quality solutions.
ForMa, we study two cases where αa = 0.2 and αa = 0.8, respectively. Then,
given a mechanism cost CMa , we set r such that
CMa = (1− αaε)r + αad.
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Figure 4.7: The optimal action versus the mechanism cost inMa: (a) αa = 0.2; (b)
αa = 0.8.
Under Ma, workers will respond by choosing their optimal action q∗Ma as
q∗Ma = arg max
q∈[0,1]
uMa(q).
We show the optimal action q∗Ma versus the mechanism cost CMa forMa in Figure
4.7. Similarly, we can see that requesters are unable to obtain high quality solutions
with low CMa .
4.5 Experimental Verifications
Beyond its theoretical guarantees, we further conduct a set of behavioral ex-
periments to test our proposed incentive mechanism in practice. We evaluate the
performance of participants on a set of simple computational tasks under different
incentive mechanisms. We mainly focused on the reward accuracy mechanism in
the experiment. We found that, through the use of quality-aware worker training,
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our proposed mechanism can greatly improve the performance of a basic reward ac-
curacy mechanism with a low sampling probability to a level that is comparable to
the performance of the basic reward accuracy mechanism with the highest sampling
probability. We describe the experiment in detail below followed by analysis and
discussions of the results.
4.5.1 Description of The Experiment
The task we used was calculating the sum of two randomly generated double-
digit numbers. To make sure all tasks are roughly of the same difficulty level, we
further make the sum of unit digits to be less than 10, i.e., there is no carrying
from the unit digits. The advantage of such a computational task is that: (a) it is
straightforward for participants to understand the rule, (b) each task has a unique
correct solution, (c) the task can be solved correctly with reasonable amount of
effort, and (d) it is easy for us to generate a large number of independent tasks.
In our experiment, participants solve the human computation tasks in ex-
change for some virtual points, e.g., 10 points for each accepted solution. Their goal
is to maximize the accumulated points earned during the experiment. Tasks are
assigned to each participant in three sets. Each set has a time limit of 3 minutes
and participants can try as many tasks as possible within the time limit. Such a
time limit helps participants to quantify their costs of solving a task with various
qualities using time. Different sets employ different incentive mechanisms. In par-
ticular, Set I employs the basic reward accuracy mechanism Ma with the highest
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Figure 4.8: Histogram of accuracy: (a) Set I; (b) Set II; (c) Set III.
sampling probability αa = 1. The basic reward accuracy mechanism Ma with a
much lower sampling probability αa = 0.3 is employed in Set II. We use our pro-
posed mechanism Mt in Set III, which introduces quality-aware worker training to
the same basic reward accuracy mechanism as used in Set II with training state
parameters set as αt = 0 and N = 15. Since correct solution can be obtained for all
tasks, we are able to determine the correctness of each solution without error. That
is, we have ε = 0 in all cases.
We created a software tool to conduct the experiment. As no interaction
among participants is involved, our experiment was conducted on an individual
basis. Before the experiment, each participant was given a brief introduction to
experiment rules as well as a demonstration of the software tool. There was also




We have successfully collected results from 41 participants, most of whom are
engineering graduate students. The number of collected submissions per set varies
significantly from 30 to 180, depending on both the strategy and skills of different
participants. From the requester’s perspective, the accuracy of each participant
represents the quality of submitted solutions and therefore is a good indicator to
the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms. We show the histogram of accuracy for
all three sets in Fig. 4.8.
For Set I, as the highest sampling probability, i.e., αa = 1, was adopted, most
participants responded positively by submitting solutions with very high qualities.
There is only one participant who had relatively low accuracy compared with others
in that he was playing the strategy of “avoiding difficult tasks” according to our
exit survey. A much lower sampling probability of 0.3 was used for Set II. In this
case, it becomes profitable to increase the number of submissions by submitting
lower quality solutions, as most errors will simply not be detected. This explains
why the majority of participants had very low accuracies for Set II. Noteworthily, a
few workers, 5 out 41, still exhibited very high accuracies in Set II. Our exit survey
suggests that their behaviors are influenced by a sense of “work ethics”, which
prevents them to play strategically to exploit the mechanism vulnerability. Similar
observations have also been reported in [87] and [88]. In Set III, as the introduction
of training tasks make it more costly to submit wrong solutions, participants need
to reevaluate their strategies to achieve a good tradeoff between accuracy and the
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number of submitted tasks. From Fig. 8, we can see that the accuracy of participants
in Set III has a very similar distribution as that in Set I.
We now analyze our experimental results qualitatively. Let ΓI , ΓII and ΓIII
represent the accuracy of Set I, Set II and Set III, respectively. Our results show
that ΓIII − ΓII follows a distribution with median significantly greater than 0.6 by
the Wilcoxon signed rank test with significance level of ρ < 5%. On the other hand,
the median of the distribution of ΓI − ΓIII is not significantly greater than 0.01
by the Wilcoxon signed rank test with ρ ≥ 10%. The unbiased estimate of the
variance of ΓI , ΓII and ΓIII are 0.0060, 0.1091 and 0.0107, respectively. Moreover,
according to the Levene’s test with significance level of 5%, the variance of ΓIII is
not significantly different from that of ΓI while it is indeed significantly different
from that of ΓII . To summarize, through the use of quality-aware worker training,
our proposed mechanism can greatly improve the effectiveness of the basic reward
accuracy mechanism with a low sampling probability to a level that is comparable
to the one that has the highest sampling probability.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a cost-effective mechanism for microtask
crowdsourcing that applies quality-aware worker training to reduce mechanism costs
of basic mechanisms in stimulating high quality solutions. We have proved theoret-
ically that, given any mechanism cost, our proposed mechanism can be designed to
sustain a desirable SNE where participated workers choose to produce solutions with
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the highest quality at the working state and a worker will be at the working state
with a large probability. We further conducted a set of human behavior experiments
to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.
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Chapter 5
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Sequential User Behavior in Social
Computing
Social computing systems refer to online applications where values are created
by voluntary user contributions. Recently, with rapid development of social media,
the barrier for people to participate in online activities and create online content
has been greatly reduced, which leads to a proliferation of social computing sys-
tems on the Web. Until now, successful examples can be found in a wide range
of domains, from question and answering (Q&A) sites like Yahoo! Answers, Stack
Overflow or Quora where users solve questions asked by other users; to online re-
views like product reviews on Amazon, restaurant reviews on Yelp or movie reviews
on Rotten Tomatoes; to social news sites like Digg or Reddit where online users
post and promote stories under various categories. These applications help to make
the Web useful by enabling large-scale high quality user generated content (UGC)
and by allowing easy access to UGC. As social computing systems derive almost all
their values from user contributions, it is of key importance for designers of social
computing systems to understand how user participate and interact on their sites.
User participation in social computing systems can take multiple forms. In
addition to creating UGC directly like answering a question on Stack Overflow
or writing a product review on Amazon, an increasingly large fraction of social
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computing systems now allow users to participate by rating existing contributions
on the site. For example, instead of answering the question, users on Stack Overflow
can choose to either vote up or vote down answers posted by other users. Similarly,
users on Amazon have the option to mark other users’ reviews as useful or not.
Such an indirect form of user participation plays multiple roles in social computing
systems. First, voting provides important information regarding the quality and
popularity of contributions from users. Many social computing systems like Stack
Overflow, Quora and Reddit rank and display user contributions according to their
received votes. More importantly, the mechanism of voting also creates a strong
incentive for users to participate directly and create high quality UGC. Users are
motivated by not only the desire for peer recognition but also virtual points rewarded
by the system for every positive vote they receive. For example, it has been shown
that most users on Stack Overflow gain a significant portion of their reputation
points through received votes [89]. It is this incentive affect of voting mechanisms
on user contributions the focus of this chapter. In particular, we are interested in
how the voting behavior of users may affect the amount and quality of UGC in social
computing systems. Without loss of generality, we will adopt Q&A terminologies
and refer the action of creating UGC directly as answering henceforth.
A key aspect to model and analyze the close interaction between answering
and voting is to recognize that users participate in social computing systems se-
quentially rather than simultaneously. Let us consider, for example, a question to
be answered on a Q&A site. Potential contributors view the question sequentially
and decide whether to participate based on observations of the history of the ques-
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tion. If users decide to participate, they can further choose to answer the question
directly with possibly different efforts or to vote on existing answers contributed
by previous users. Moreover, actions from future users have a great impact on a
current user’s payoff since the payoff for answering the question depends on the
votes his answer will receive. What can we understand in such a sequential setting
about the externality created by future users’ voting choices on the current user’s
answering action? And given the presence of such an externality, how can we model
and analyze sequential user behavior for social computing systems? Finally, how
should designers of social computing systems adjust their incentive mechanisms to
steer user behavior to achieve various system objectives?
Our Contributions. We address the above questions from a game-theoretic
perspective. Our first contribution is a sequential game model that captures the
strategic decision making of sequentially arrived users who choose endogenously
whether to participate or not and, if participate, whether to answer the question
or to vote on existing answers. Users who choose voting can either vote up or
vote down on an answer based on the quality of the answer. Users who answer the
question will receive a certain amount of virtual points for each upvote their answers
receive and lose virtual points for every received downvote, which creates a form of
externality among users and is referred to as the answering-voting externality. We
further incorporate into our model two typical scenarios in social computing. In
the first scenario such as questions on focused Q&A sites like Stack Overflow, the
quality of an answer is determined primarily by the domain knowledge and the level
of expertise of a user. Therefore, we consider a homogenous effort model where the
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quality of answer is a function of a user’s ability and the cost incurred by answering
is assumed to be uniform among users. The second scenario corresponds to a more
general setting where users can greatly improve the quality of answer by increasing
their effort. In this case, we assume that users if deciding to answer the question
can also choose endogenously the amount of effort they will put. Therefore, the
quality of answer becomes a function of not only a user’s ability but also the effort
he exerts; the cost incurred by answering is also modeled as a function of a user’s
effort. We refer to this model as the endogenous effort model. We will discuss the
proposed sequential game in details in Section 3.1.
Next, we analyze the sequential user behavior through equilibrium analysis
of the proposed game. We begin with the homogenous effort model in Section
3.2. The solution concept of symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) is
adopted and we show that there always exists a unique pure strategy SSPE for the
proposed game. To further investigate the equilibrium user behavior, the key is to
understand the answering-voting externality, which is expressed by the long-term
expected reward for answering. We show that such a reward is increasing with
respect to answer quality and as a direct result, there exists a threshold structure of
the equilibrium. Such a threshold structure greatly reduces the action space of users
at the equilibrium and enables us to develop a dynamic programming algorithm to
efficiently calculate the equilibrium. Moreover, we find that the reward for answering
is also decreasing in terms of the number of previous answers which illustrates an
advantage for answering earlier. As a result, as answers accumulate, it becomes
more and more competitive to answer the question, which is reflected as gradually
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increasing thresholds of user ability for answering. We then turn our attention to the
endogenous effort model in Section 3.3, where we show that our results obtained for
the homogenous effort model captures the essence of the game and can be extended
naturally to incorporate the more general setting.
Thirdly, after developing a sequential game-theoretic model and analyzing user
behavior through equilibrium analysis, we investigate how qualitative predictions
derived from our model compare with aggregated user behavior on a large-scale
social computing site. Towards this end, we collect user behavior data from one of
the most popular Q&A site Stack Overflow and evaluate our model on the set of
collected data in Section 3.4. We find that the main qualitative predictions of our
model match up with observations made from the real-world data, which validates
our model.
Finally, in Section 3.5, we study how system designers can use our model to aid
their design of incentive mechanisms, i.e., the allocation of virtual points, in practice.
We formalize the system designer’s problem by proposing a general utility function
that can be designed to incorporate several typical use case scenarios. We abstract
through numerical simulations several design principles that could guide system
designers on how to steer user behavior to achieve a wide range of system objectives.




Let us consider a single task that solicits contributions from users on a social
computing site. Such a task can be either a question in an online Q&A forum,
a product/resteruant on Amazon/Yelp for which users can post their reviews, or a
tourist site on Tripadviser where users can report their experience. In the remaining
of the paper, we will use terminologies in Q&A scenarios such as questions and
answers for the ease of discussion, while our results apply equally to other social
computing systems as well.
We assume that there are a countable infinite set of potential users, denoted
by N = {1, 2, 3, ...}, who view and may contribute to the question. Users arrive
sequentially and choose strategically to either answer the question, vote on an exist-
ing solution, or do not participate. Denote by Θ = {A, V,N} the action set where
A represents to answer, V to vote and N not to participate.
Different users have different types, which influence their choices of actions.
We represent the type of a user as a tuple of two elements: σ = (σA, σV ). The
first element, σA ∈ [0, 1], indicates the ability or level of expertise of a user for the
question. A user with a higher value of σA is more capable of answering the question
than a user who has a lower value. The second element, σV ∈ [Vmin, Vmax], models
the degree to which a user would like to express his opinions through voting, which
we refer to as the voting preference. The σV can have either positive or negative
values; the larger value of σV a user has, the more he favors voting.
User types σ are independent and identically distributed according to a distri-
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bution with cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (σA, σV ). Such a distribution
is assumed to be public knowledge while the instantiation of type is known only to
a user himself. We further assume F is atomless on its support.
Among the three possible actions, action N is the most straightforward one.
A user who chooses action N will simply leave the question quietly without making
any impact on the state of the question. Users incur no cost by choosing action N
and will not receive any reward from the system as well. We now describe in details
the other two actions.
The Answering Action. Users who choose action A will submit answers of
various qualities. We denote by q ∈ [0, 1] the quality of an answer, which represents
the probability of an answer being favored by a future user.
For the answering action, we consider two typical scenarios in social comput-
ing. In the first scenario such as questions on focused Q&A sites like Stack Overflow,
the quality of an answer is determined primarily by the domain knowledge and the
level of expertise of a user. The cost of creating an answer is incurred mostly by
transcribing a user’s knowledge and thus is uniform among users. On the other
hand, in the second scenario, users can greatly improve the quality of answer by
increasing their effort. For example, by putting a considerable amount of effort,
most users can write good reviews on Amazon or interesting travel notes on Tri-
pAdvisor. We formally capture these two scenarios through the homogeneous effort
and endogenous effort models below.
1. Homogenous effort model: In the homogenous effort model, the quality of
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answer is determined purely by a user’s ability σA. Without loss of generality,
we assume that q = σA. The cost to answering is uniform among all users but
may depend on the number of existing answers m. We use c(m) to represent
the cost and assume
(a) c(m) is non-decreasing in m, i.e., it may be harder to provide a novel
answer to a question that has more answers than the one that has fewer
answers.
(b) c(0) > 0, i.e., answering a question, even when there are no existing
answers, incurs some cost.
A simple example is c(m) = c > 0, i.e., there is a constant cost for answering
the question.
2. Endogenous effort model: In the endogenous effort model, conditioned on
choosing action A, a user will also decide the amount of effort e ∈ [0, 1] that he
will put in creating the answer. The quality of an answer becomes a function of
not only a user’s ability σA but also his effort e, which we write as q = φ(σA, e).
We assume φ is monotonically increasing in both σA and e. The cost incurred
by answering is denoted by c(m, e), which we assume is strictly greater than
0 and non-decreasing in m and e.
In the following, we will first focus on the homogenous effort model, which
helps to understand the essence of the game. That is, we assume q = σA and
adopt c(m) as the cost for answering. Then in Section 5.3, we show that our results
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obtained for homogenous effort can be extended naturally to the endogenous effort
case. The gain of answering a question comes from the reward given by the system,
which is related to voting actions of future users and will be discussed later in this
section.
The Voting Action. Users can choose action V if there is at least one
existing answer to the question, i.e., m > 0. We assume that once decides to vote,
a user will choose a random answer with equal probability to cast the vote. Users
can choose either to vote up or to vote down an answer, depending on the answer
quality. In particular, if the chosen answer has quality q, then the user will vote
up with probability q and vote down with probability 1 − q. The utility of a user
with type σ who chooses action V can be written as σV +RV −CV . Recall that σV
is the internal preference of a user towards voting. When σV < 0, it implies that
the user dislikes voting and more incentives are needed to stimulate him to vote.
The RV represents the reward provided by the system. For more generality, we
assume it is possible for RV to have negative values, which models the case where
the system discourages voting by charging users for voting. The CV > 0 denotes
the cost incurred by users for casting a vote, for instance the effort of evaluating the
quality of answer.
Similarly as in many social computing systems, the answering action and the
voting action in our model are connected through an incentive mechanism that is
built with virtual points. In particular, if a user chooses action A, he will receive Ru
points for every upvote his answer receives and loses Rd points for every downvote.




















Figure 5.1: The state transition of the proposed game.
we denote byM(RV , Ru, Rd). Such a mechanism connects the answering and voting
actions of users, determines the equilibrium of the game, and provides a tool for the
system designer to incentivize desired user behavior.
Action Rule and Utility. An action rule describes how a user will play given
any possible situation in the game. We use the number of existing answers m to
represent the state of the game, which summarizes the history of the question. When
a user arrives to the question, he first observes the state of the question and then
chooses his action based on the state as well as his own type σ. For more generality,
we assume mixed actions. That is, a user will choose a probability distribution over
the action set Θ rather than a single action item. Therefore, a user’s action rule in
the proposed game is a mapping from m and σ to a probability distribution over Θ.
We write the action rule in our model as
π(m,σ) = [πA(m,σ), πV (m,σ), πN(m,σ)],
where πθ(m,σ) with θ ∈ Θ represents the probability of choosing action θ and thus
πA(m,σ) + πV (m,σ) + πN(m,σ) = 1.
Given an action rule π, the probability of a random user choosing action A
at state m can be calculated as PAπ (m) = Eσ[πA(m,σ)], where the expectation is
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taken over the distribution of user types. Similarly, the probability of voting can be
expressed as P Vπ (m) = Eσ[πV (m,σ)]. To summarize, we show state transitions of
the proposed game given an action rule π in Figure 5.1.
We assume users are impatient and prefer to receive the reward sooner rather
than later, which is modeled by discounting the future using a constant factor δ ∈
(0, 1). Such a modeling approach is a standard practice that is widely adopted in
the economics literature [90] [7]. To understand the utility of users, let us first
derive the reward a user can receive by answering the question, which comes from
future users’ votes. Let gπ(m, q) represent the long-term expected reward a user,
who produces the mth answer with quality q, will receive given that the action rule
π will be adopted by future users. We will refer to such a function as the reward
function for answering or simply as reward function henceforth. Note that gπ(m, q)















the probability of receiving a vote and (Ru + Rd)q − Rd = Ruq − Rd(1 − q) is the
expected reward for receiving a vote. The second term represents the future reward,
which is determined by state transitions of the game.
Since the reward for answering comes from future votes, the utility of a user
depends not only on the number of existing answers, his own type and action,
but also the action rule adopted by future users. Such a dependence creates an
143
answering-voting externality among users and motivates users to condition their
decision makings on other users’ action rules. We evaluate the utility of a user
by assuming a uniform action rule for other users, which is sufficient for analyzing
symmetric outcomes. In particular, we write u(m,σ, θ, π̃) as the utility of a user who
has type σ and chooses the pure action θ ∈ Θ when there are m existing answers
and other users adopt π̃ as their action rule. We have
u(m,σ, θ, π̃) =

−c(m) + δgπ̃(m+ 1, σA) if θ = A
σV +RV − CV if θ = V and m > 0
0 if θ = N.
(5.2)
Note that we need to multiply the reward for answering with δ since the current
user will receive reward starting from the next time slot.
With a slight abuse of notations, we write u(m,σ, π, π̃) as the utility of a user
who adopts the action rule π. Based on the definition of action rule, we have
u(m,σ, π, π̃) =
∑
θ∈Θ
πθ(m,σ) · u(m,σ, θ, π̃). (5.3)
Solution Concept. In the proposed game, users arrive and make decisions
sequentially. Since there are a countable infinite set of potential users, the proposed
game is a sequential game with infinite horizon. We will study the proposed game
using the solution concept of symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE). Sub-
game perfect equilibrium is a popular refinement to the Nash equilibrium under
sequential games. It guarantees that all players choose strategies rationally in every
possible subgame. A subgame is a part of the original game. In our settings, the
subgame can be formally defined using state as follows.
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Definition 5.1 A subgame in the proposed game starts with a state m and consists
of all the remaining part of the original game.
An SSPE is an action rule that if all other users adopt it, then no single user
will have the incentive to deviate at any subgame. We formally define the SSPE for
the proposed game as follows.
Definition 5.2 An action rule π̂ is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the
proposed game if and only if
π̂ ∈ arg max
π
u(m,σ, π, π̂) ∀m ≥ 0, σ ∈ [0, 1]× [Vmin, Vmax]. (5.4)
Although it is well known that every finite sequential game with perfect in-
formation has at least one subgame perfect equilibrium [Proposition 99.2, 91], the
existence of SSPE is not clear for sequential games with infinite horizon, which is
the case here. To show the SSPE is indeed a valid solution concept for our settings,
we prove in next section that there always exists a unique SSPE for the proposed
game which has a threshold structure at every state and thus is easy for users to
follow.
5.2 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we conduct equilibrium analysis for the proposed game to
understand how users participate sequentially in the presence of answering-voting
externality. Particularly, the answering-voting externality is expressed through the
reward function for answering, which is the key to analyze the proposed game.
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Therefore, we will first explore several properties of the reward function for answer-
ing. These properties enable us to establish the existence and uniqueness as well
as the threshold structure of the SSPE. We will also discuss properties of the the
SSPE and develop a dynamic programming algorithm that can be used to obtain
the SSPE efficiently.
We first show that for any action rule π, the reward function gπ can be upper
bounded by a decreasing function of m, as illustrated below.
Proposition 5.1 For any action rule π, we have
gπ(m, q) ≤
(Ru +Rd)q −Rd
(1− δ)m ∀m ≥ 1, q ∈ [0, 1]. (5.5)
Proof : We prove Proposition 5.1 by invoking another equivalent expression of
gπ(m, q) that follows directly from its definition as











where the expectation is over the randomness of user types and action rules. The
time slot is indexed by t and t = 0 stands for the current time slot. We denote by
{Yt}∞t=0 the discrete random process of the state. Conditioned on the current state
m, we have Y0 = m. By relaxing (5.6), we have











Note that in the above inequality, the term inside the expectation decreases with
respect to the value of Yt. Therefore, given the current state m, {Yt = m}∞t=0 is the














(1− δ)m . (5.8)
Based on results of Proposition 5.1, we show in the following that no user will
choose to answer the question if the number of existing answers is large enough.
Lemma 5.1 After reaching a certain state, no users will have any incentive to
choose action A, regardless of other users’ action rule.
Proof : Let us consider a user’s utility of choosing action A. For any action
rule π̃, we have
u(m,σ,A, π̃) ≤ −c(m) + δ (Ru +Rd)σA −Rd
(1− δ)(m+ 1) (5.9)
≤ −c(m) + δRu
(1− δ)(m+ 1) . (5.10)
The inequality in (5.9) follows from Proposition 1. Note the right hand side expres-







≤ −c(0) < 0. (5.11)
Therefore, there exists m̃ ≥ 0 such that ∀m ≥ m̃, we have
u(m,σ,A, π̃) < 0 = u(m,σ,N, π̃),
which implies that action A is strictly dominated by action N and thus users will
have no incentive to choose action A.
Lemma 5.1 shows that the state in the proposed game will stop growing af-
ter a certain value. Therefore, the last state becomes an absorbing state, which
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represents the largest possible number of answers a question can have. Due to the
existence of such an absorbing state, we can then establish the existence of SSPE
as demonstrated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 There always exists a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium for the
proposed game with homogenous effort.
Proof : We explicitly construct an SSPE action rule π̂ to show the existence
result. From Lemma 5.1, we know that there exists m̃ ≥ 0 such that ∀m ≥ m̃, we
have u(m,σ,A, π̃) < 0 = u(m,σ,N, π̃)
For m ≥ m̃, we choose π̂ such that πV (m,σ) = 1(σV + RV − CV ≥ 0),
πN(m,σ) = 1 − πV (m,σ) and πA(m,σ) = 0. It can be verified that this particular
choice of π̂ is the best response of users for state m ≥ m̃ independent of other users’
action rule. For m < m̃, we construct π̂ using backward induction. Recall from (5.2)
that a user’s utility at state m depends on other users’ action rule only for states
starting from m + 1. In other words, modifying other users’ action rule for states
m′ ≤ m will not affect a user’s best response at state m. Based on this observation,
we iteratively set π̂ from m = m̃− 1 to 0 to be the best response of users as
π̂(m,σ) ∈ arg max
π
u(m,σ, π, π̂). (5.12)
It can be verified that the constructed action rule π̂ satisfies (5.4) and thus is
a valid SSPE, which proves the existence of SSPE.
Once the existence of SSPE has been established, we can obtain a tighter
bound on gπ̂ and the absorbing state for SSPE action rules, as demonstrated below.
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Corollary 5.1 If π̂ is an SSPE action rule, then
gπ(m, q) ≤
PV [(Ru +Rd)q −Rd]
(1− δ)m ∀m ≥ 1, q ∈ [0, 1], (5.13)
where PV = Eσ[1(σV +RV − CV ≥ 0)].
Proof : Corollary 5.1 can be proved in a very similar way as Proposition 5.1.
The only modification we need is to use a tighter bound for P Vπ̂ , i.e., P
V
π̂ ≤ PV , since
in SSPE users will choose action V only if their utility for voting is greater than 0.
Corollary 5.2 If π̂ is an SSPE action rule, then
π̂A(m,σ) = 0 ∀m ≥ m,σ ∈ [0, 1]× [Vmin, Vmax], (5.14)
where m = dm∗e such that
c(m∗) =
δPVRu
(1− δ)(m∗ + 1) . (5.15)
Proof : Corollary 5.2 can be proved following the same steps as in Lemma 5.1
and use the tighter bound of gπ̂ given by Corollary 5.1.
Next, we show that given an arbitrary action rule π (not necessarily an SSPE),
a higher quality answer will almost always receive a larger reward than a lower
quality answer does. Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2 Given an action rule π and m ≥ 1, gπ(m, q) is a continuous
function of q. Moreover, gπ(m, q) either equals 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1] or is strictly
increasing in q.
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Proof : Let us consider the time series expression of gπ(m, q) in (5.6). Since the
expectation is irrelevant to q, we have









[(Ru +Rd)q −Rd], (5.16)











If the equality holds, then gπ(m, q) = 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand, since Ru > 0
and Rd > 0, it follows that gπ(m, q) is strictly increasing in q.
Proposition 5.2 shows that the reward function gπ(m, q) is monotonically in-
creasing in answer quality q. In the case of homogenous effort, this implies that
users with higher abilities will have an advantage for answering the question. Such
a property can be employed to greatly simplify the SSPE, which we show in the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 There exists a pure strategy SSPE that has a threshold structure in
each state, i.e., ∀m ≥ 0, σV ∈ [Vmin, Vmax], ∃â(m,σV ) and σ̂V = CV −RV such that
[π̂A(m,σ), π̂V (m,σ), π̂N(m,σ)] = [1, 0, 0] if σA > â(m,σV )
[π̂A(m,σ), π̂V (m,σ), π̂N(m,σ)] = [0, 1, 0] if σA ≤ â(m,σV ) and σV ≥ σ̂V and m ≥ 1
[π̂A(m,σ), π̂V (m,σ), π̂N(m,σ)] = [0, 0, 1] otherwise.
(5.18)
The above action rule is the unique SSPE in the sense that other possible SSPEs
differ with it in actions only for 0 mass of users.
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Proof : Define U(m,σV ) as the maximum utility that a user with voting pref-
erence σV can receive at state m other than choosing action A, i.e.,
U(m,σV ) , max{σV +RV − CV , 0} · 1(m ≥ 1). (5.19)
Note that U(0, σV ) = 0 since action V is not an option when m = 0.
Let us consider an arbitrary SSPE π̂. We first show that there exists a thresh-
old â(m,σV ) such that users will choose action A in π̂ only if their ability is above
the threshold. We know from Proposition 5.1 that
u(m,σ,A, π̂)|σA=0 = −c(m) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, 0) ≤ −c(m) < 0 ≤ U(m,σV ). (5.20)
If the following inequality holds,
u(m,σ,A, π̂)|σA=1 = −c(m) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, 1) ≥ U(m,σV ), (5.21)
since gπ̂(m,σA) is a continuous function of σA, there exists a solution σ
∗
A to
−c(m) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, σ∗A) = U(m,σV ). (5.22)
We set â(m,σV ) = σ
∗
A. On the other hand, if (5.21) does not hold, we set â(m,σV ) =
1 indicating that it is impossible for users to have ability beyond the threshold.
Let us consider a user with type σ = (σA, σV ). When σA > â(m,σV ), since
gπ̂(m,σA) is strictly increasing in σA, we have
u(m,σ,A, π̂) = −c(m) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, σ∗A) > U(m,σV ), (5.23)
which implies that it is optimal to choose action A with probability 1, i,e, π̂A(m,σ) =
1. Similarly, when σA < â(m,σV ), we have
u(m,σ,A, π̂) < U(m,σV ), (5.24)
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which shows action A is strictly dominated by other two actions and thus π̂A(m,σ) =
0. When σA = â(m,σV ), there exists at least one action from {V,N} that has the
same utility as choose action A, therefore π̂A(m,σ) = 0 is optimal.
Next, for cases where action A is dominated, i.e., σA ≤ â(m,σV ), users will
only consider action V and action N . It can be shown that the following is a best
response for users.
π̂V (m,σ) = 1(σV ≥ CV −RV ) · 1(m ≥ 1) (5.25)
π̂N(m,σ) = 1− π̂V (m,σ). (5.26)
Therefore, the action rule given in (5.18) characterizes an SSPE. Moreover, such an
action rule is essentially a pure strategy action rule in that users will choose one
action with probability 1 in all situations.
To prove Theorem 5.2, we are left to show that the action rule given in (5.18)
is also a unique SSPE. Following from the fact that gπ̂(m,σA) is strictly increasing
in σA, the solution to (5.22) and thus the threshold â(m,σV ) is unique. Therefore,
all possible SSPEs will differ with the action rule in (5.18) only for boundary cases,
i.e., users with σA = â(m,σV ) or σV = CV − RV . Since the type distribution F
is atomless on its support, these users add up to have 0 mass, which finalizes the
proof.
From Theorem 5.2, the SSPE of the proposed game not only exists, but also
is unique and in the form of pure strategy. More over, such a unique pure strategy
SSPE has a threshold structure at every state: users will choose answering only if
their ability σA is greater than a threshold function â(m,σV ); otherwise users will
152
Algorithm 4 : A DP algorithm to find the unique SSPE
1: // Initialization
2: σ̂V ← CV −RV
3: â(m,σV )← 1 for m ≥ m̄, σV ∈ [Vmin, Vmax],
4: gπ̂(m, q)← PV [(Ru+Rd)q−Rd](1−δ)(m)
5: // Main loop
6: for m = m− 1 : 0 do
7: U(m,σV )← max{0, σV +RV − CV } · 1(m ≥ 1)
8: if δgπ̂(m+ 1, 1)− c(m) ≤ U(m,σV ) then
9: â(m,σV )← 1
10: else
11: â(m,σV )← a where δgπ̂(m+ 1, a)− c(m) = U(m,σV )
12: end if
13: if m ≥ 1 then
14: PAπ̂ (m)←
∫
1(σA ≤ â(m,σV ))dF (σ)
15: P Vπ̂ (m)←
∫










19: Output (â, σ̂V )
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choose either to vote or not to participate based on a constant threshold σ̂V on their
voting preferences. Such a threshold structure greatly simplifies the action space of
users. As a result, the SSPE can be expressed equivalently using a threshold function
â together with a constant σ̂V . We show in the following that this equivalent form
of SSPE can be efficiently obtained through a dynamic programming algorithm.
Corollary 5.3 The unique pure strategy SSPE of the proposed game can be obtained
through a dynamic programming algorithm as shown in Algorithm 4.
Proof : From Corollary 5.2, we know that for m ≥ m, no users will choose action
A in SSPE. Therefore, we can set â(m,σV ) = 1 for m ≥ m and σV ∈ [Vmin, Vmax].
Moreover, as PAπ̂ (m) = 0, we can derive from (5.1) the expression of gπ̂(m̄, q) as
given by Algorithm 4. Then, based on gπ̂(m̄, q), we can iteratively calculate the
threshold from m = m−1 to 0, following the steps outlined in the proof of Theorem
5.2.
The essence of SSPE lies in the threshold function â(m,σV ), which determines
the portion of users who will answer the question at each stage. How will this
threshold vary for different m and σV ? In particular, how does the voting preferences
of users impact their decisions on whether or not to answer the question? Is it to
a user’s advantage to provide an early answer? And as answers accumulate, will it
become more selective for users to answer the question? In the following, we will
show properties of the threshold function that help to answer these questions. Our
results are summarized in the following two propositions.
Proposition 5.3 In SSPE, at any state m ≥ 0, the threshold of user ability for
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answering, i.e., â(m,σV ), is increasing in user’s voting preference σV . Moreover,




, ∀m ≥ 0, σV ∈ [Vmin, Vmax]. (5.27)
Proof : For any m ≥ 0, let us consider two voting preferences σV 1 and σV 2
such that 1 ≥ σV 1 ≥ σV 2 ≥ 0. If −c(m) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, 1) ≤ max{0, σV 1 +RV −CV },
then according to Algorithm 4, we have â(m,σV 1) = 1 ≥ â(m,σV 2). Otherwise, we
have
−c(m) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, â(m,σV 1)) = max{0, σV 1 +RV − CV }
≥ max{0, σV 2 +RV − CV }
= −c(m) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, â(m,σV 2)).
Since gπ̂ is strictly increasing in answer quality, we can conclude that â(m,σV 1) ≥
â(m,σV 2). Therefore, â(m,σV ) is increasing in σV .




) = 0 ≤ gπ̂(m, â(m,σV )), ∀m ≥ 0, σV ∈ [Vmin, Vmax], (5.28)
which implies that â(m,σV ) ≥ RdRu+Rd due to the monotonicity of gπ̂.
Proposition 5.4 In the SSPE π̂, ∀q ∈ [0, 1], gπ̂(m, q) is decreasing in m. Moreover,
the threshold of user ability for answering, i.e., â(m,σV ), is increasing in m for any
given σV ∈ [Vmin, Vmax].
Proof : We first show that gπ̂(m, q) is a decreasing function of m using math-
ematical induction. From Corollary 5.2, we know that users will not choose action
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A at the absorbing state m in SSPE. Therefore, we have PAπ̂ (m) = 0 and
gπ̂(m, q) =
P Vπ̂ (m)[(Ru +Rd)q −Rd]
(1− δ)m . (5.29)
Then, ∀m such that 1 ≥ m ≥ m− 1, we show in the following that if
gπ̂(m+ 1, q) ≤
P Vπ̂ (m+ 1)[(Ru +Rd)q −Rd]
(1− δ)(m+ 1) , (5.30)
we can derive gπ̂(m, q) ≥ gπ̂(m+ 1, q) and, as a result,
gπ̂(m, q) ≤
P Vπ̂ (m)[(Ru +Rd)q −Rd]
(1− δ)m . (5.31)
Assume the above conclusion does not hold, i.e., gπ̂(m, q) < gπ̂(m + 1, q). Then,
according to the monotonicity of gπ̂ with respect to answer quality q, we have
â(m,σV ) ≥ â(m + 1, σV ), which implies P Vπ̂ (m) ≥ P Vπ̂ (m + 1). Moreover, from
the optimality form expression of gπ̂ in (5.1), we have
gπ̂(m, q)− gπ̂(m+ 1, q) =
PVπ̂ (m)
m
[(Ru +Rd)q −Rd]− (1− δ)gπ̂(m+ 1, q)












1− δ(1− PAπ̂ (m))
≥ 0,
which contradicts to the assumption. Therefore, gπ̂(m, q) ≥ gπ̂(m+ 1, q) must hold.
Moreover, from (5.32), we can also show that
gπ̂(m+ 1, q) ≤
P Vπ̂ (m)[(Ru +Rd)q −Rd]
(1− δ)m . (5.33)
Substituting the above inequality into (5.1), we can then derive (5.31).
Therefore, we can conclude that gπ̂(m, q) is an increasing function of m for
any given q ∈ [0, 1], which proves the first part of Theorem 5.2. The second part of
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Theorem 5.2 can then be verified easily using this result as well as the monotonicity
property of gπ̂ with respect to answer quality q.
The above proposition shows that there exists an advantage for answering the
question earlier: the answers that are posted earlier will receive more rewards than
those posted later. Moreover, since it is more profitable to answer the question when
there are fewer answers, more users will choose answering at the earlier state of the
game. As answers accumulate, it becomes more and more competitive to answer the
question; users are gradually driven away from answering the question, which is left
to a selective group of high ability users, until the question reaches the absorbing
state where no more answers will be posted.
5.3 Extensions to Endogenous Effort
In the previous section, we have studied the sequential user behavior in social
computing systems under the homogenous effort model, which assumes that the
quality of answer equals the user’s ability and all users incur the same cost for
creating an answer. Such a model corresponds to cases where the domain knowledge
of the question and the expertise of the user are essential in answering the question,
such as focused Q&A sites like Stack Overflow. A more general setting would be that
users, in addition to making strategic decisions on whether to answer the question or
not, can also decide endogenously how much effort to exert in producing his answer.
In this section, we will study the proposed game under such an endogenous effort
model. We show that our previous results well capture the essence of the proposed
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game and thus can be extended naturally to incorporate this more general setting.
We now refer actions in the action set Θ as main actions. With the endogenous
effort model, in addition to main actions, users will choose another action e ∈
[0, 1], which indicates the amount of effort they will exert in creating their answers.
Similarly as in the homogeneous effort case, we consider mixed strategies for main
actions and denote by π the corresponding action rule. Let uE(m,σ, θ, e, π̃) represent
the utility of a user with type σ who arrives at state m and choose action θ ∈ Θ and
e ∈ [0, 1] will receive provided that other users adopt main action rule π̃. We have
uE(m,σ, θ, e, π̃) =

−c(m, e) + δgπ̃(m+ 1, φ(σA, e)) if θ = A
σV +RV − CV if θ = V and m > 0
0 if θ = N.
(5.34)
With a slight abuse of notations, we write the utility of a user choosing action rule
π as
uE(m,σ, π, e, π̃) =
∑
θ∈Θ
πθ(m,σ) · uE(m,σ, θ, e, π̃). (5.35)
From (5.34), we can see that the effort of a user impacts his utility of choosing
action A and thus his optimal action rule. On the other hand, however, the choice of
effort only has local impact in the sense that given the state m and other users’ main
action rule π̃, a user’s utility will not depend on other users’ efforts. Moreover, we
would like to note that properties of the reward function for answering in Proposition
5.1 and Proposition 5.2 are derived with respect to the answer quality q, which will
still hold for the endogenous effort case with q = φ(σA, e).
For the endogenous effort case, the SSPE be formally defined as follows.
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Definition 5.3 An action rule pair (π̂, ê) is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibri-
um for the proposed game with endogenous effort if and only if
(π̂, ê) ∈ arg max
π,e
uE(m,σ, π, e, π̂) ∀m ≥ 0, σ ∈ [0, 1]× [Vmin, Vmax]. (5.36)
As before, we are interested in whether there exists an SSPE for the proposed
game with endogenous effort and if so, what is the structure of the SSPE. We answer
these questions in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 There exists a pure strategy symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
for the proposed game with endogenous effort. In this equilibrium, users choose their
main actions according to the following threshold structure
[π̂A(m,σ), π̂V (m,σ), π̂N(m,σ)] = [1, 0, 0] if σA > â(m,σV )
[π̂A(m,σ), π̂V (m,σ), π̂N(m,σ)] = [0, 1, 0] if σA ≤ â(m,σV ) and σV ≥ σ̂V and m ≥ 1
[π̂A(m,σ), π̂V (m,σ), π̂N(m,σ)] = [0, 0, 1] otherwise.
(5.37)
Moreover, conditioned on choosing action A, each user chooses an effort ê(m,σA)
based on the state m and his ability σA.
Proof : To prove Theorem 5.3, we first show that there must exist an absorbing
state in SSPE. From Proposition 5.1 and the monotonicity of c(m, e) in e, we have
uE(m,σ,A, e, π̂) ≤ −c(m, 0) +
δRu
(1− δ)(m+ 1) , (5.38)
where the right hand side expression is strictly decreasing in m and goes to negative
infinity as m → ∞. Therefore, there exists m̃ ≥ 0 such that ∀m ≥ m̃, the utility
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of choosing action A is strictly less than 0, which implies that action A is strictly
dominated by action N .
Next, we construct a pair of action rules (π̂, ê) that satisfy conditions outlined
in Theorem 5.3 and show that it is an SSPE. For m ≥ m̃, since the probability of
choosing action A is 0 for all user types, we can set â(m,σV ) = 1. The choice of
effort is irrelevant in this case. Moreover, let σ̂V = CV − RV . It can be shown that
the main action rule in (5.37) is the best response for all users independent of other
users’ main action rule and thus an SSPE for state m ≥ m̃.
For m < m̃, the (π̂, ê) can be constructed by iteratively pick the best response
backward from m = m̃− 1 to 0. At each state m, let
ê(m,σA) ∈ arg max
e∈[0,1]
{−c(m, e) + δgπ̃(m+ 1, φ(σA, e))}. (5.39)
A best response of users at this state is to choose action A with probability 1 and
exert effort ê(m,σA) if
−c(m, ê(m,σA)) + δgπ̃(m+ 1, φ(σA, ê(m,σA))) > max{0, σV +RV − CV }. (5.40)
Otherwise it is optimal to choose action V with probability 1 if m ≥ 1 and σV +
RV − CV > 0 and to choose action N in all the other cases.
Following the above procedure, we have constructed (π̂, ê) for state m < m̃
such that it is the best response for users given that the same main action rule is
adopted by others. Therefore, the action pair (π̂, ê) is also an SSPE for state m < m̃.
We are left to show that π̂ satisfies (5.37) for state m < m̃. The key is to show
the utility of answering with optimal effort is increasing in user’s ability. Consider
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0 ≤ σA1 ≤ σA2 ≤ 1. We have
−c(m, ê(m,σA1)) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, φ(σA1, ê(m,σA1)))
≤ −c(m, ê(m,σA1)) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, φ(σA2, ê(m,σA1))) (5.41)
≤ −c(m, ê(m,σA2)) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, φ(σA2, ê(m,σA2))). (5.42)
The inequality in (5.41) follows from the fact that gπ̂ is increasing in answer quality
q and that q = φ(σA, e) is an increasing function of σA. The inequality in (5.42)
is derived using the definition of ê in (5.39). Therefore, a user with higher ability
can obtain a higher utility of answering than that received by a lower ability user.
According to the condition in (5.40), such a monotonicity property leads directly
to the threshold structure for answering where the threshold â(m,σV ) can be set as
the solution a ∈ [0, 1] to the following equation
−c(m, ê(m, a)) + δgπ̂(m+ 1, φ(a, ê(m, a))) = max{0, σV +RV − CV }. (5.43)
When the above equation does not have a solution in [0, 1], the â(m,σV ) can be set
as 0 if the left hand side is greater or 1 otherwise. Moreover, the threshold structure
on voting can be verified with σ̂V = CV −RV .
From Theorem 5.3, we see that there exists an SSPE for the proposed game
with endogenous effort that has a very similar structure as the unique SSPE for
homogenous effort model. The difference here is that the calculation of the threshold
function for answering now needs to take into account different possible efforts. In
other words, to decide whether or not to answer the question, a user must first
find his optimal effort and then evaluate his utility for answering using this optimal
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Table 5.1: Reputation Updating Rule
Action Reputation change
Answer is upvoted +10
Answer is downvoted -2 (-1 to voter)
Answer is accepted +15 (+2 to accepter)
effort. Moreover, we note that the SSPE characterized in Theorem 5.3 may not be
the unique one as there may be multiple optimal efforts and the quality function
may not be strictly increasing.
5.4 Empirical Evaluations
In this section, we use real-world data from a popular Q&A site Stack Overflow
to valid our model. In particular, we investigate how qualitative observations ob-
tained from the data compare with predictions of our model. We will first introduce
in details the dataset we use and then present our evaluation results.
5.4.1 Dataset Description
Stack Overflow is one of the most popular and active Q&A site, where ques-
tions are strictly restricted to be factual and programming-related. Questions in
Stack Overflow are generally hard and thus usually require strong domain knowl-
edge and deep expertise to answer, which makes it a good fit for our homogenous
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effort model. Besides question asking and answering, voting is another popular type
of user activity on Stack Overflow, which is designed to provide additional infor-
mation regarding the quality of answers as well as long-lasting incentives for users
to answer questions. The model of Stack Overflow has been proved successful and
adopted by over 100 other focused Q&A websites under the StackExchange [92].
Different types of user activities in Stack Overflow are connected through an
incentive mechanism that is built with reputation points. We list in Table 5.1 how
reputation points are gained and lost by actions related to our discussions. Note
that, to prevent abuse, downvotes are discouraged in a sense that the voter will lose 1
reputation point by casting a downvote. Moreover, in Stack Overflow, the user who
asks the question can select an answer as the selected answer, which brings slightly
more reputation points to the contributor than a regular upvote does. In addition
to the listed actions, reputation of a user can change in many other ways such as
offering or wining a bounty associated with a question. Overall, a user’s reputation
summarizes his activities on Stack Overflow since registration and roughly measures
the amount of expertise he has as well as the level of respect he received from his
peers.
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Figure 5.2: The distribution of answer count.
The user activity data on Stack Overflow is publicly available through the
Stack Exchange Data Explorer [93]. We collect questions that are posted in the
first Quarter of 2013, i.e. from January 1st, 2013 to March 31st, 2013. We include
all the answers and votes that are related to these questions (as of March 2014)
into our dataset. Note that we only impose time restrictions on questions but not
on the related answers and votes. We consider questions that receive at least one
answer and further exclude questions that are closed for various reasons such as
being marked as subjective or duplicate. In addition, to fit the data into our model,
we regard the action of accepting an answer simply as a regular upvote. That is, we
treat the user who asks the question the same as other users with respect to voting.
The statistics of our dataset are shown in Table 5.2.
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Figure 5.3: The average answering rate by different view count intervals.
5.4.2 Observations and Validations
The Saturation Phenomenon. In our analysis, the existence of SSPE is
based on an observation that the number of answers of a question stops increasing
after a certain value, which makes our game equivalent to a finite sequential game.
To verify such an observation, we first show in Figure 5.2 the distribution of answer
count for questions in our dataset. The maximum answer count is 33 and we can see
that the distribution is concentrated around the lower end. We further investigate
how the answering rate varies with the view count of a question. The answering
rate is defined as the number of answers a question has divided by the number of
users who view this question. Our results are shown in Figure 5.3. We found that
the answering rate decreases very quickly as the view count increases. A possible
explanation could be that as users keep arriving to the question and as answers
accumulate, it is getting harder for the question to obtain new answers. Therefore,
there exists a saturation phenomenon for answers to the question, which justifies
our observation.
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Figure 5.4: The average score of answers versus the reputation level of users by
different time rank.
The Advantage of Higher Ability. A key prediction derived from our
model is that the reward function for answering is monotonically increasing in answer
quality, as stated in Proposition 5.2. In homogenous effort settings, it means that a
user with higher ability can receive a higher reward by answering the question than
a user with lower ability does. Such a prediction serves as the foundation of our
equilibrium analysis and leads directly to the threshold structure of the equilibrium.
To justify such a prediction, we investigate how the average score of answers varies
with the contributors’ abilities. We define the answer score as the number of positive
votes an answer has minus the number of negative votes, which is a good indication
of the reward a user can obtain from his answer. Since user ability is not directly
observable from the data, we use reputation as a rough approximation of a user’s
ability. In particular, we quantize the reputation using a set of logarithmic boundary
values as {0, 100, 1000, 5000, 20000, 1e7}. Roughly speaking, a user with a higher
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Figure 5.5: The relative frequency of answering versus reputation level.
reputation level is more likely to have a higher ability in answering the question. We
show in Figure 5.4 our results for answers with different time ranks that correspond
to different states in our model. From Fig. 4, we can see that at any state, users
with higher abilities can receive more rewards by answering the question. Therefore,
observations obtained from the data match up well with predictions of our model.
We further investigate the relative frequency of answering for users with dif-
ferent abilities. In particular, we show the number of answers contributed by users
from different reputation levels divided by the population size of the corresponding
reputation level. Our results are shown in Figure 5.5. We can see that the frequency
of answering increases drastically as user ability increases, which shows an evidence
of threshold structures in users’ decision makings. With threshold structures, users
with higher abilities are more likely to answer the questions. Since different type-
s of questions may have different thresholds, the average frequency of answering
therefore is monotonically increasing in user abilities.
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Figure 5.6: The average score versus time rank.
The Advantage of Answering Earlier. Another important prediction de-
rived from our model is that the reward for an answer decreases with respect to its
time rank, as stated in Proposition 5.4. That is, there is an advantage for answering
earlier. To compare such a prediction with observations made from real-world data,
we show in Figure 5.6 the curve of average score of answers versus the answer time
rank. We find answers that are posted earlier receive higher scores on average, which
is consistent with our prediction.
5.5 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we investigate through numerical simulations how our model




Recall that a mechanism in our model is defined by a set of three parameters
{RV , Ru, Rd}, which specify how the system should reward voting and answering
respectively. The system designer adjusts these parameters to steer user behavior on
the site. Depending on the characteristics of applications, system designers may be
interested in optimizing different metrics. Therefore, we consider a general function
as the system designer’s utility that covers many typical use case scenarios in social
computing. Denote qk and tk as the quality and arrival time of the kth answer and
K as the number of received answers. The system designer’s utility function can be
written as





where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. We show below three typical use case scenarios
that can be captured by the above objective function with different choices of α and
β.
1. Use Case I: α = 0 and β = 1, where the objective function becomes the sum
of qualities. In this case, the diversity of answers is valuable where the system
designer prefers a large number of reasonable answers over a few near-perfect
ones. Moreover, answers have long-lasting values that will not decay over time.
2. Use Case II: α = 0 and β < 1. In this case, the diversity of answers is valuable
but the question is time sensitive where the system designer prefers answers
to arrive sooner rather than later.
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3. Use Case III: α = 1 and β = 1, where the objective function becomes the
average quality of answers. In this case, individual answer quality rather than
diversity is valuable to the system designer. Moreover, answers have long-
lasting values in this case.
We assume user types are drawn identically and independently according to
the probability density function (PDF) f(σA, σV ) =
λe−λσA
2(1−e−1) over [0, 1] × [−1, 1].
That is, we assume σA and σV are independently distributed; σV follows a uniform
distribution and σA follows a truncated exponential distribution with parameter λ.
Note that the larger λ is, the more rare high ability users are. Unless otherwise
stated, we set by default λ = 1. We assume CV = 0.2 and set the discounting factor
δ = 0.9.
For homogenous effort model, we choose c(m) = 1 + 0.1m. For endogenous






the quality function, where γ ≥ 0 is a parameter that controls how much the answer
quality depends on a user’s ability. The larger γ is, the less dependent the answer
quality is on a user’s ability and thus more on the amount effort he exerts.
5.5.2 Simulation Results for Homogenous Effort
In the first simulation, we investigate the impact ofRV on the system designer’s
utility. Our results for all the three use cases are shown in Figure 5.7 where we set
Ru = 2 and Rd = 1. In all cases, when RV is small, the system designer’s utility
increases very quickly as RV increases. This is because a higher reward for voting
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Figure 5.7: The system designer’s utility versus RV : (a) Use Case I: α = 0 and
β = 1; (b) Use Case II: α = 0 and β = 0.9; (c) Use Case III: α = 1 and β = 1.
stimulates more users to vote rather than to leave without participation, which
creates a stronger incentive for answering. Nevertheless, as the value of RV keeps
increasing, it starts driving users away from answering since voting becomes more
profitable. When diversity is valuable for the system designer such as in Use Case
I and II, the system designer’s utility will decrease after RV passes an optimal
value. Nevertheless, the decreasing rate is smaller than the increasing rate. It can
be further observed that the optimal value is around 1.2 which is just enough to
make voting preferable over no participation for all users. For Use Case III, since
the average quality of answers is less sensitive to RV when RV is large, the system
designer’s utility fluctuates within a small range until RV is large enough such that
no users will have the incentive to answer the question when voting is an option.
From the above simulation, we can abstract an important principle towards
the design of incentive mechanisms: voting should be encouraged but not too much!
In practice, the reward to voting should be designed large enough to make voting
preferable over no participation for a large fraction of users but relatively small
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Figure 5.8: The system designer’s utility versus Ru and Rd: (a) Use Case I: α = 0
and β = 1; (b) Use Case II: α = 0 and β = 0.9; (c) Use Case III: α = 1 and β = 1.
compared to the reward for answering. Moreover, when the system designer is
uncertain about the optimal value, it would be safer to over estimate than to under
estimate, especially for cases where a few near-perfect answers are desired.
Next, we study how the system designer’s utility depends on Ru and Rd.
Recall that a user will receive Ru points for receiving an upvote and lose Rd points
for receiving a downvote. We show our simulation results in Figure 5.8 where we set
RV as 1. For Use Case I, the primary factor that influences the system designer’s
utility is Ru. Since diversity is valuable in this case, a larger Ru will stimulate
more users to provide their answers and thus lead to a higher utility for the system
designer. The impact of Rd is more visible in Use Case II and Use Case III. We
found that, surprisingly, the value of Rd impacts the system designer’s utility in
two distinct directions for these two cases. In particular, as Rd increases the utility
decreases in Use Case II while increases in Use Case III. This can be explained as
follows. Recall from Proposition 5.3 that Rd
Ru+Rd
sets a lower bound on user’s ability
for answering. So roughly speaking, the thresholds of user ability for answering will
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Figure 5.9: The system designer’s utility versus λ for α = 0 and different values of
β.
increase as Rd increases. With higher thresholds, the system designer’s utility will
be lower in Use Case II, since it takes longer time for answers to accumulate. On
the other hand, higher thresholds lead to higher quality, which makes the system
designer’s utility higher in Use Case III. Moreover, since the diversity of answers is
not valuable in Use Case III, the ratio of Ru to Rd is the primary factor that impacts
the system designer’s utility.
To summarize, we can abstract another principle that could potentially aid the
design of incentive mechanisms in practice. When diversity of answers is desired, a
high reward should be assigned to users for each upvote they receive. Depending
on whether the answer quality or the answer timeliness is more valuable, different
strategies should be applied to set the punishment for receiving downvotes.
In the third simulation, we study the impact of λ on the system designer’s
utility. Recall that λ controls the shape of user type distribution; the larger λ
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Figure 5.10: The system designer’s utility versus γ: (a) Use Case I: α = 0 and
β = 1; (b) Use Case II: α = 0 and β = 0.9; (c) Use Case III: α = 1 and β = 1.
is, the more rare high ability users are. We show the system designer’s utility
versus λ in Figure 5.9. We can see that the system designer’s utility decreases as
λ increases, which demonstrates the value of high ability users to social computing
systems. Therefore, for applications that rely heavily on users’ domain knowledge
and expertise, it is of key importance to develop and maintain an active community
of elite members.
5.5.3 Simulation Results for Endogenous Effort
Finally, we consider the endogenous effort model in our simulation. In par-
ticular, we are interested in how the degree of sensitivity of answer quality with
respect to effort influences the system designer’s utility. We show curves of utility
versus γ for all the three use cases in Figure 5.10. We set RV = 1 and Rd = 2 in
our simulations. We can see that in Use Case I and III, the utility decreases as γ
increases while in Use Case II, the utility first increases and then decreases.
Since a larger value of γ implies that the answer quality will be less dependent
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on user’s ability, low ability users will get an advantage for answering with large γs.
As a result, the threshold of user ability for answering will decrease as γ increases.
On the one hand, lower thresholds lead to low quality on average, which explains why
the utility decreases in all the three use cases. On the other hand, lower thresholds
implies that answers will arrive earlier, which makes the behavior of utility non-
monotonic in Use Case II.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we study sequential user behavior in social computing system-
s from a game-theoretic perspective. Our model explicitly takes into account the
answering-voting externality, which can be found in many social computing systems.
We begin with a homogenous effort model and prove the existence and uniqueness
of a pure strategy SSPE. To further understand the equilibrium user participation,
we show that there exist advantages for users with higher abilities and for answer-
ing earlier. As a result, the equilibrium exhibits a threshold structure where the
threshold for answering increases as the number of answers increases. Our results
derived for the homogenous effort model well captures the essence of the game and
can be extended naturally to the more general setting where users endogenously
choose their efforts for answering. Our model is verified through evaluations of user
behavior data collected from Stack Overflow. In particular, we show that the main
qualitative predictions of our model are consistent with observations made from the
data. Finally, we study the system designer’s problem through numerical simula-
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tions and derive several design principles that could potentially guide the design of
incentive mechanisms for social computing systems in practice.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we have developed game-theoretic frameworks to formally
analyze strategic user behaviors and systematically design incentive mechanisms for
four typical networks. Each of these four networks has unique challenges in terms
of incentive mechanism design and they together cover a wide range of emerging
networks.
First, we proposed a cooperation stimulation mechanism for multiuser cooper-
ative communication networks. We theoretically analyzed the proposed mechanisms
using an indirect reciprocity game framework. Specifically, we proved that, when
the cost to gain ratio is below a certain threshold, cooperation with users having
good reputation can be sustained as an equilibrium. Moreover, we showed that
cooperating with good reputation users is an ESS and therefore resistant to the mu-
tation of any other action rules. To take into account possible cheating behaviors,
we further introduced energy detection at the BS and analyzed its impact to the in-
direct reciprocity game. Simulation results showed the effectiveness of the proposed
scheme in enforcing cooperation among rational and self-interested users.
Second, we proposed a contract-based incentive mechanism for V2G ancillary
services. We derived the optimal contract, which can be employed by the aggregator
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to maximize its profits while incentivizing self-interested EVs with various prefer-
ences to act coordinately to accomplish the service request. The derived optimal
contract takes a very simple form where the aggregator only needs to publish two
optimal unit prices, one for selling energy and the other for purchasing energy and
therefore can be implemented very efficiently. Although calculating the optimal unit
price explicitly requires the distributional knowledge of EVs’ preferences, we also
investigated the case without such statistical distributions and proposed an online
learning algorithm for the aggregator to learn the optimal unit price through its
interactions with EVs, which has a provably logarithmic upper bound on regret.
Third, we study the quality control problem for microtask crowdsourcing from
the perspective of incentives. We developed a strategic worker model where the
primary objective of a worker is to maximize his own utility. Such a model enabled
us to analyze user behaviors in the context of microtask crowdsourcing theoretically.
After showing the limitations of two widely adopted incentive mechanisms, we pro-
posed a novel cost-effective mechanism that applies quality-aware worker training to
reduce mechanism costs in stimulating high quality solutions. We proved theoreti-
cally that the proposed mechanism can be designed to collect high quality solutions
from self-interested workers and ensure the budget constraint of requesters at the
same time. The effectiveness of our proposed mechanisms have been demonstrated
through both numerical simulations and behavioral experiments.
Finally, the sequential decision makings of users in social computing systems
was investigated under the presence of answering-voting externality among users.
We modeled user interactions as a sequential game and chose SSPE as our solution
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concept. We began with a homogenous effort model and proved the existence and
uniqueness of a pure strategy SSPE. To further understand the equilibrium user
participation, we showed that there exist advantages for users with higher abilities
and for answering earlier. As a result, the equilibrium exhibits a threshold structure
where the threshold for answering increases as the number of answers increases. Our
results derived for the homogenous effort model well captured the essence of the game
and can be extended naturally to the more general setting where users endogenously
choose their efforts for answering. We show that our analysis is consistent with
observations made from real-word user behavior data and can be applied to guide
the design of incentive mechanisms for social computing systems in practice.
6.2 Future Work
It is foreseeable that networks and systems will continue the current trend to
become more intelligent and self-enforcing in the near future, which leads to the
growing importance of incentive mechanisms in system design. Therefore, the study
of incentive mechanisms, especially from game-theoretic perspectives, will remain
an active research area. There are numerous interesting problems to be investigated,
which I will continue to devote my efforts to.
In this dissertation, we have designed and analyzed incentive mechanisms for
four typical networks, which together cover a wide range of scenarios in network
science. Nevertheless, with the rapid development of commuting and networking
technologies, there are a lot of newly emerged networks and systems that have
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different characters from existing systems and place unique challenges for incentive
mechanism design. Therefore, in the future, we would like to extend this dissertation
by investigating incentive mechanisms for other networks and systems, such as online
advertising systems and massive open online courses (MOOCs) systems.
In addition to decision making, learning is another feature that has growing
importance in today’s system design. It is our belief that the study of the interac-
tion between learning and decision making will bring new tools to both fields and,
more importantly, lead to new paradigms in designing future systems. We believe
that the joint study of learning and decision making can take the following three
forms. First, when information required by incentive mechanisms is unknown such
as the distribution of users’ private information, the system designer can combine
mechanism design with learning to develop algorithms to learn the optimal incentive
mechanisms. We have studied an example of this case in Chapter 3 and we plan to
continue to investigate along this direction in the future.
Second, in many networks and systems, there are unknown parameters that
will affect users’ utility and thus their decision makings. For example, in sponsored
search, advertisers’ value of a certain keyword depends on the click through rate
(CTR) of that keyword, which nevertheless is unknown to advertisers. In such cases,
users have the motivation to learn from their interactions and thus face exploration-
exploitation tradeoffs. The learning activities of users bring a new form of dynamics
to the design and analysis of incentive mechanisms, which will be of particular
interest to conduct research on.
Third, game-theoretic frameworks and machine learning techniques can be
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combined to develop new methods to obtain a deep understanding of user behaviors
exploiting both our prior knowledge and existing user behavior data. There has
been an explosive growth of user behavior data recent years. Machine learning
techniques are good for generalizing large volumes of data to predict future behaviors
while game-theoretic models has the advantage of incorporating prior knowledge to
formally model user behaviors. We hope that, by combining these two tools, we can
derive new paradigms toward effective system design in the future.
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